1973

The periodical press and the Pullman strike: an analysis of the coverage and interpretation of the railroad boycott of 1894 by eight journals of opinion and reportage.

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THE PERIODICAL PRESS AND THE PULLMAN STRIKE:
An Analysis of the Coverage and Interpretation of the Railroad Boycott of 1894 by Eight Journals of Opinion and Reportage

BY

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II

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
(Journalism)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1973

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INTRODUCTION

The catastrophic depression of 1893-1897 vividly dramatized the failure of the existing financial system and emphasized the widening chasm between the rich and the poor.

The Pullman Strike of 1894 symbolized the social effects of an economic system rationalized in terms of Social Darwinism. The strike began as a local dispute, but gradually expanded into a nationwide railway boycott. Soon the federal government was involved. For these reasons the strike was of great public interest and attracted much comment in the magazines.[1]

The 1890's were an important decade for periodicals. Of all the mass media, "none experienced a more spectacular enlargement and increase in effectiveness than the magazines."[2] Furthermore, in both the general monthly and weekly journals of opinion and reportage, an increasing number of articles dealt with current events and public affairs.

This is a historical study of the performance of the periodical press in the 1890's. Specifically, this study examines the reporting and interpretation of eight journals of opinion and evaluates their coverage of the Pullman Strike.

The fundamental purpose is to contribute an historical perspective to the evolution of interpretative reporting.

Robert B. Harper has studied the development of news interpretation in five case studies involving labor conflict during the period 1914 to 1966. Harper points out that several journalism historians have agreed on when interpretative reporting became an important journalistic development; but these same historians "have not very thoroughly answered the question of when interpretative reporting first began or how it developed." Harper believes there may have been different forms of news interpretation prior to World War I.[3]

Journalism historian Theodore Peterson, assessing the role of magazines, concludes that they have "not only interpreted issues and events but also put them in national perspective." Another scholar, Roland E. Wolseley, comments: "A newspaper informs mainly by printing the news. A magazine informs chiefly by printing explanations of news and descriptions of conditions." Similarly, journalism professor John Schacht notes that journals of opinion often provide a fuller interpretative treatment than other media: "Where these magazines may claim primacy, then, is not in spreading information, but in assessment of information and in their conclusions regarding it."[4]

The Commission believed it to constitute an the welcome participation in the promotion of international understanding.

Among a number of reasons the development of some interpretation in this area seemed particularly important during the period 1951 to 1954. Larger, richer and more varied international activities were opening up that necessitated interpretation regarding issues of international development, but there was little information "fully and fairly observedly assessed the practices of other international organizations first hand or has it been available. Many delegations may have been quite ignorant from or even misinformation prior to coming here."[1]

Commission discussion focused largely around the role of regulations, considering their long term effect and international issues and events. In order for this to occur "progressively." Another concern, related to relevance, concerned the delegation's ability to influence the course of a major value influence ability to influence organizations of their and specifications of resolutions." Relatedly, delegations were further data demands which limit ability to activate action provide a fuller interpretation of problems that arise within these organizations and their relevance, thus, in was in attracting interventions, and in consideration of interpretations and in their conclusions regarding it."[2]

According to journalism historian Edwin Emery, several magazines of opinion, at the turn of the century, were important in the trend toward interpretative reporting which emerged after World War I and became significant in the 1930's.[5]

This study examines the proposition that the journals of opinion in the 1890's were instrumental in the development of interpretative reporting. This proposition is examined by evaluating the manner in which these journals covered the Pullman Strike of 1894. The study focuses on the nature, adequacy and extent of their interpretative reporting. Journals of opinion--as opposed to other types of magazines--were selected for analysis because of their emphasis on public affairs. The Pullman Strike was selected as an historical event because it attracted nationwide interest and extensive comment in the press.

A second and broader purpose of this study is to develop knowledge about the magazines of the 1890's, an area of study that has been overshadowed by emphasis on the sensational newspapers of the period, and the muckrakers which came to prominence after 1900. Historian Allan Nevins asserts there is a need for research into the role of the press--its public service function.[6] In a sense, this analysis of the periodical press provides a case study of the role played by journals of opinion in explaining the social issues of the 1890's.

According to Jerrold Marquis, Public Theory, several conclusions of sociology, in the view of the economist, were important in the areas labour institutions, unemployment which should surprise other social sciences, particularly in the 1970's.[1]

This study examines the presumptions that and theories of economics in the 1970's were influential in the development of transportation economics. This presumption is assisted by emphasizing the manner in which these theories covered the various fields of study. The work focuses on the theory, analysis, and issues of public transportation regulation. Journals of sociology-economics appeared to offer signs of magnitude--were utilized for analytical purposes or their opinions on public studies. The reviews which were selected as an illustrated areas focusing on economics, economic theory, labour and economic policies in the 1970's.

A second and further purpose of this study is to develop knowledge about the activities of the 1970's as areas of study that has been overshadowed by attention to the economical consequences of the periods and the economic which came to prominence after 1970. Economics plays during research there is a need for research into the role of the private-sector public service institutions. In a sense, this analysis of the publications (and suggests a new body of the work) leaves by theorists or authors in explaining the social issues of the 1970's.

This study cannot definitively assess the social role of the journals of opinion during this period. Nevertheless, an attempt is made, not only to evaluate the interpretative reporting of these periodicals, but also to determine what functions they performed with respect to the public during and immediately after the strike.

As a matter of interest, it should be noted that this study complements an existing thesis, John R. Finnegan's "The Press and the Pullman Strike: An Analysis of the Coverage of the Railroad Boycott of 1894 by Four Metropolitan Daily Newspapers," completed in 1965. Finnegan found strike reporting in the daily press to be highly distorted and sensationalized.[7]

Objectives

This study evaluates the performance of eight journals of opinion and reportage and examines the manner in which they interpreted the Pullman Strike and associated issues.

Three questions have been posed to guide the investigation:

(1) How did the coverage provided by the journals compare with the Report on the Chicago Strike by the U. S. Strike Commission, and related sources?

(2) What were the significant differences, if any, between the weeklies and monthlies in their reporting and interpretation of the issues compared to historical evidence?

This study seeks authoritatively answer the central role of the journalist in making daily news decisions. Interviews on students in order, not only to evaluate the interpretative reporting of state government, but also to determine what functions they performed with respect to the public during and immediately after the crisis.

In a review of literature, it should be noted that this study complements an existing theory, that is, "Gatekeeper's Top Press and the Political System." In analysis of the coverage of the National Guards at Kent to test the "political daily Newspapers" developed in 1972. Findings found media responsible to the daily press to be highly directed and nonrationalistic.

<u>Hypothesis</u>

This study evaluates the performance of state journalists of editors and reporters and determine the extent which they transmitted the political facts and conditions therein.

These questions form some guide to point the investigation:

(1) How did the coverage provided by the journalist compare with the report of the Governor's Commission to see if it reflect Democratic and National concern?

(2) What were the qualitative differences, if any, between the reporting and editorial in their interpretation and interpretation of the issues involved in institutional environment.

(3) What social functions were performed by the journals of opinion during and immediately after the strike?

Periodicals and Content to be Studied

Professor John Schacht has described the characteristics of a "journal of opinion and reportage;" its content deals primarily with public affairs in a broad sense, involving politics, economics, and social and cultural relationships:

> This interest involves both the reporting of such affairs (though in some cases on a limited scale) and an analysis and evaluation of—and recommendations concerning--its own news and that of other sources.[8]

These are the journals studied:

Monthly Reviews	Weekly Journals
Arena (1889-1909)	Harper's Weekly (1857-1916)
Forum (1886-1930)	Independent (1848-1928)
North American Review (1815-1940)	Nation (1865---)
Review of Reviews (1891-1937)	Outlook (1870-1935)

Four historians are in substantial agreement that these particular journals are of primary importance for their coverage and discussion of public affairs in the 1890's.[9]

Chapter I provides background concerning these journals, as well as an historical perspective of the strike.

Content to be evaluated consists of all pertinent articles, editorials and "letters to the editor" relating to the strike during the period June 1894 to June 1895.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Methodology

Comparatively little research has been conducted in the field of periodical press performance. A review of Journalism Abstracts, the Journalism Quarterly Index, and other bibliographic aids reveals that only four of seventeen press performance studies discovered involved a qualitative evaluation of the periodical press.[10]

In establishing an appropriate research method for this study, the author has drawn from procedures developed or explained in three other studies.[11]

Definitions

For purposes of this study the definitions of "interpretation" and "issue" are as follows:

(1) "Interpretation" is defined as the attempt to report or explain cause or effect relationships.[12]

John E. DeMott summarizes the distinctive characteristics of interpretative news stories: they have many kinds of opinion, especially concerning cause and effect; they have greater depth, extensive background, exposition and description. According to Curtis D. MacDougall, interpretation involves explaining "why;" it is an objective appraisal that provides perspective; it explains the social background--the root causes--of an event.[13]

(2) "Issue" is defined as a topic of controversy.

For purposes of analysis there are three types of

issues:[14] (a) immediate issues are those discussed by the participants in the event; (b) underlying issues are those issues which, though possibly recognized to some extent by the event's participants, were subject to far less attention and discussion; (c) related issues are those which emerged from the basic event and were discussed primarily by the Strike Commission, historians, or the mass media.

Historical Standard

An historical standard is established by constructing a chronology of the "landmark history" of the Pullman Strike.[15]

Sources for the standard include: the Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July 1894, a document prepared by the U. S. Strike Commission which investigated the dispute; President Grover Cleveland's The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894; Almont Lindsey's comprehensive study, the Pullman Strike: The Study of a Unique Experiment and of a Great Upheaval (1942); and several other primary and secondary sources.

Analysis of Coverage

An historical narrative is developed in Chapter II; the landmark history is established and the reporting of the journals of opinion is summarized. During the discussion, three types of deviation from the historical standard are noted: (1) inaccuracies of fact (e.g., who, what, when

and where); (2) significant omissions of information; and (3) judgments not consistent with the historical record.[16] The landmark history of the strike is extrapolated and presented in Appendix I.

Analysis of Interpretation

The important issues in the strike have been identified by inspection of the historical record and the content of the articles and editorials included in the study. These issues are explained in Chapter III, an interpretative analysis of the strike which expands the historical standard.

Chapter IV is an appraisal of the adequacy and extent to which the journals attempted to explain cause or effect relationships concerning the immediate and underlying issues in comparison to the historical standard. Chapter V is a similar analysis of the related issues as explained by the journals.

Evaluation of Coverage and Interpretation

Chapter VI evaluates the performance of the journals qualitatively against the following framework: (1) extent of coverage—significant omissions; (2) interpretative distortions and inaccuracies of fact; (3) objectivity and fairness, including qualities such as "tone" (the general extent to which content revealed emotionality, concern, or reassurance), and "authority" (particular groups referred to with approval or disapproval); (4) incomplete interpretations.

Following the performance evaluation, several reasons are offered to explain weaknesses in coverage and interpretation. The journals are assessed in terms of editorial values (e.g., economic, political or humanitarian) and the extent to which advocacy may have impeded objective interpretation.

As the strike began to collapse, the journals proposed a variety of recommendations concerning labor relations. These are summarized in Appendix III and discussed in relation to the social role of the periodical press in the mid-1890's.

Acknowledgements

In the preparation of this study, several persons and institutions have rendered assistance without which the work would have been impossible. Special acknowledgement is made to the United States Marine Corps for enabling me to attend the University of Wisconsin; to Professor Douglas C. Jones, my adviser, not only for stimulating my interest in the press of the 1890's, but for his scholarly counsel and guidance; to the Wisconsin State Historical Society for facilitating research; to Mrs. Teresa Pace, my typist, for professional results in a short span of time; and to my wife, Jan, for her encouragement and understanding.

FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION

[1]Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905 Vol. IV (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 156, 218.

[2]Ibid., p. 2.

[3]Robert B. Harper, "Reporting Social Strife in Five Labor Conflicts" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971), quotation, p. 2; p. 181.

[4]Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 394; Roland E. Wolseley, The Magazine World: An Introduction to Magazine Journalism (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p. 4; John H. Schacht, The Journals of Opinion and Reportage: An Assessment (New York: Magazine Publishers Association, 1966), p. 75, quotation, p. 77.

[5]Edwin Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretative History of the Mass Media (3d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 562, 569.

[6]Allan Nevins, "American Journalism and Its Historical Treatment," Journalism Quarterly XXXVI (Fall, 1959), 421.

[7]See Chapter V for an assessment of the relationship between weeklies and the daily press.

[8]Schacht, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

[9]Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905, Vol. IV, pp. 51-52, 57-62; Emery, The Press and America, pp. 290, 403; Harold U. Faulkner, 1890-1900: Politics Reform and Expansion (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1963), pp. 281-82; Schacht, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

[10]Robert K. Bellinger, "Protest from the Right Wing: How the National Review and American Opinion Magazines Covered the Civil Rights Issue from 1955-1969" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Syracuse University, 1972). Dennis Berrett, "Coverage by Five National Magazines of the Growth of the Use of Drugs in America" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Brigham Young University, 1969); Paul B. Parham, "Vietnam 1958-1961: U. S. News Magazine Coverage" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Missouri, 1971); Eugene J. Rossi, "How 50 Periodicals and the Times Interpreted the Test Ban Controversy," Journalism Quarterly XL (Autumn, 1964), 545-54. For a quantitative analysis, see James R. Hickey, "Interpretation in the Weekly Press," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1962).

[11]This study follows the same procedure used by Harper (op. cit.) in analysis of the issues; first an historical standard is established in which issues are explained; then press performance is compared to this standard. The historical standard developed in this study was established in accordance with the method explained by John L. Martin and Harold L. Nelson: "The Historical Standard in Analyzing Press Performance," Journalism Quarterly XXXIII (Autumn, 1956), 456-66. This study also uses certain elements of the analytical framework for evaluation of interpretative writing developed by Rossi (op. cit.). The method used by Rossi involves evaluation of content in terms of qualities such as "tone," "values," etc.

[12]Harper, op. cit., p. 2.

[13]John E. DeMott, "A Content Analysis of Newspaper Stories Described as Interpretative" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1971), cited in Journalism Abstracts IX (1971), 16; Curtis D. MacDougall, Interpretative Reporting (5th ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 197-202.

[14]Definitions of immediate and underlying issues are derived from Harper, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

[15]Martin and Nelson, "The Historical Standard in Analyzing Press Performance," p. 460.

[16]Ibid., pp. 461, 465.

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Periodical Press of the 1890's

The 1890's were a decade of hard times in the midst of a period of extraordinary industrial and financial development. "American society was growing more and more complex, and economic and political problems were multiplying as the century approached its end."[1]

The number of newspapers and magazines was rapidly increasing during these years. Journalism expanded into every field and area. In 1890 there were slightly more than 4,400 periodicals. By 1900 that number had increased to somewhat more than 5,500. Popular education was producing an increasingly literate public during the eighties and nineties. The technology of printing was steadily improving. Postal rates were more favorable. National marketing and magazine advertising were beginning to provide periodicals with a broader financial base. And middle-class readers were taking more of an interest in the socio-economic problems associated with the new industrial order.[2]

During this period several highly successful, low-priced magazines began to appear. In 1892, Frank A. Munsey began issuing Munsey's Magazine, a fully illustrated monthly costing twenty-five cents. The following year the Ladies

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Home Journal, at ten cents a copy, reached a circulation of seven hundred thousand. McClures began publication. Two years later it was being sold at ten cents a copy, along with Cosmopolitan. From 1895 onward there were many ten cent magazines in the field. Several of these became leading muckrakers in the 1900's.[3]

By 1894, the North American Review was well established, having been founded in 1815. It was the first general monthly to seriously discuss topics of current public interest. Between the years 1886 and 1891, however, it found competition from three new monthly journals of opinion: the Arena, the Forum, and the Review of Reviews. These news-oriented magazines became increasingly concerned with coverage of current events. By the time of the Pullman Strike they had circulations ranging from 25,000 to 85,000. Symposiums, in which authorities presented varying points of view on a leading issue, were common among these journals in the nineties.[4]

Several weekly journals of opinion and commentary were also beneficiaries of the rising demand for magazines. Less timely than the newspapers, but featuring more reporting than the monthlies, were the Nation, Harper's Weekly, the Independent and the Outlook. These were the leading weeklies in the coverage of current affairs. Founded during the years 1857 to 1870, by the 1890's their circulations were in the 12,000 to 75,000 range.

Both the weeklies and the monthlies were active in reform movements that reached their fruition in the muckraking era. Throughout the nineties they printed an increasing number of articles exposing political corruption in city, state and national government. The Arena, Forum, and North American Review were especially active in this field; Harper's Weekly and the Independent fought for reform of the civil service.[5]

The threads of the muckraking tradition were evident in all the magazines of the 1890's. "In various forms, exposure of social ills appears in both general and specialized periodicals." Poverty, slums, monopolies and factory conditions came under attack.[6] The hard times following the Panic of 1893--the march of "Coxey's Army" and the violent strikes of the period--brought discontent into the open, focused public attention on economic and political problems, and furnished material for magazine articles. Animated discussions of these issues were conducted mostly in the journals of opinion and reportage.[7]

These periodicals, which had relatively small but influential audiences, along with certain newspapers were the direct forerunners of progressive muckraking.[8]

In the newspaper press, two developments contributed to the rise of muckraking. (1) The "New Journalism" of Pulitzer and Scripps emphasized the social service function of the press. "Editorial support for the common man and for the community interest, rather than for a particular

party or group, grew widespread in the 1880's and 90's."[9]
(2) Sensationalism such as that found in the yellow journals--Pulitzer's World and Hearst's Journal--"thrived on crusading forays into the underworld of vice and scandal; its rapid development . . . worked to the incidental advantage of reform."[10]

The reporters who covered such stories of social conflict as the Pullman Strike, and lesser ones, gained experience which unquestionably prepared them for a later role in muckraking.[11]

Events during President Cleveland's second term, 1892-96, in Mott's words, "called forth voluminous magazine commentary." Current affairs were followed more closely. Of particular interest to the public was the Pullman Strike.[12] Several magazines of this period were instrumental in forcing the serious consideration of social issues upon the American people. These were the monthly and weekly journals of opinion and reportage.

The Journals of Opinion and Reportage*

The Weeklies

Two important weeklies of the period which dealt with public issues (yet are not included within the scope of this study) were the Literary Digest and Public Opinion. They

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*A summary of the characteristics of these journals is presented in Table 1, page 11.

parts of power, more accessible to the public and diffuse.[2] Theoretically such an idea fitted in the pluralist democratic preference for a decentralized society, fragmented and consensus based like the authority of some gas companies. It might development . . . serve to the functional advantage of future.[3]

The industrial system had brought a certain mobility to the Italian peasant, but improved rural conditions had increasingly impoverished land for a local role in marketing.[4]

Among Sardinian peasants, particularly around Orgosolo, in remote areas, "Italian force" administrative decisions appropriately. Instead efforts were exhausted and identity of particular interest on the part of the Italian media.[5] Several examples of this survival have interested in learning the actual administration of social interest and the Sardinian people. These were not merely the memory peasants of culture and tradition.

The Journey to Culture and Tradition*

The Setting

The Sardinian tradition of the peasant remain deals with public issues that are not involved within the range of other people's work and interest groups and public problems. This

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*A summary of the characteristics of Sardinian culture is provided in Table 1, page 111.

"were not, in basic intention, current-events periodicals, but rather weekly eclectics that surveyed editorial opinion and condensed and arranged it for the information of readers."[13] Nevertheless, since they contain useful opinion summaries, they may be cited infrequently during the study when necessary for the purpose of comparison or contrast.

According to historian Frank Luther Mott, four weekly journals of opinion and commentary were early leaders in the movement toward coverage of current events or analysis of news. Three of these--Harper's Weekly, the Independent and the Outlook--could also be classified as "general illustrated miscellanies." These were not "pure" journals of opinion; all printed some fiction and included articles on subjects other than current affairs. However, few of the leading weeklies of the 1890's were strictly concerned with discussions of public affairs.[14]

The fourth journal to be studied, the Nation, was a weekly edition of the New York Evening Post. Although seldom illustrated, it was often more timely than its competitors.[15]

The Nation--the only 19th century journal of opinion now surviving--was established in 1865 under the editorship of Edwin L. Godkin. In the original prospectus, Godkin emphasized that his journal would provide a critical scrutiny of current events. It would discuss important

issues, especially in their legal, economic, and constitutional phases, with more moderation than the party press:[16]

> The Nation will not be the organ of any party, sect, or body. It will, on the contrary, make an ernest effort to bring to the discussion of political and social questions a really critical spirit, and to wage war upon the vices of violence, exaggeration, and misrepresentation by which so much of the political writing of the day is marred.[17]

In 1881 Godkin sold the Nation to the New York Evening Post; for the next thirty-three years it was issued as a weekly edition of the Post. Wendell Phillips Garrison became the general editor and was primarily concerned with current literature. Godkin, however, remained as political and advisory editor.[18]

Although the Nation's circulation in the 1890's was never above 12,000, it was a journal of substantial influence. According to Frank Luther Mott, "The power of the Nation came not from the number of its readers, but from their station and influence and from the frequency which it was quoted."[19]

Godkin's social and political views permeated the Nation. A believer in Victorian English liberalism, Godkin stood for a laissez-faire economy and the highest possible standards for public officials. He advocated unrestrained capitalism, women's suffrage, public education and civil service reform. He consistently opposed the abuse of power.[20]

[illegible] responsibility in [illegible] journals, [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In labor disputes, Godkin's attitude was that "labor must not be allowed to usurp the prerogatives of the natural aristocracy of a free society."[21] The Nation took capital's side against labor, attacked trade unionism, and opposed the eight-hour working day. Godkin believed that the "iron laws of supply and demand" dictated wages; he denied labor's right to dictate its own price.[22]

The Nation enthusiastically supported President Cleveland. According to historian John Chamberlain, "the true apostles of laissez-faire in the eighties and nineties were the Cleveland Democrats." Many of them were also followers of Godkin's commentary.[23]

Harper's Weekly was founded in 1857 by Fletcher Harper, who managed it until his retirement in 1875. One of several "general illustrated miscellanies," it was called a "Journal of Civilization" and was the best of its class. Offering news, editorials, pictures and essays, it provided a vital illustrated history of the years from 1857 to 1916. It became a strong political and social force.[24]

James Playsted Wood credits the journal with contributing to the development of modern pictorial journalism. Harper's Weekly used full page pictures that always told a story. The aim of its pictures and illustrations was accurate graphic reporting. Wood calls it "the precursor of today's weekly pictorial and news magazines."[25]

Somewhat more popular than its monthly cousin (founded in 1850), the weekly had been designed largely as a vehicle for the political discussion which Harper's Monthly eschewed.[26]

Political cartoonist Thomas Nast was hired in 1862. His illustrations of events, persons and social conditions had a powerful impact. His greatest work consisted of a cartoon campaign against the famous Tweed Ring of Tammany Hall in New York. Nast also popularized the Republican elephant and the Democratic donkey as political symbols.[27]

During the Pullman Strike, Harper's Weekly featured many superb illustrations of the federal troops and railroad violence in Chicago by the famous artist, Frederic Remington.

In 1894 Henry Loomis Nelson became general editor. Carl Schurz, an independent, wrote the leading political editorials. Although Harper's Weekly was intended to be an independent forum, "it is as a vigorous political journal of conservative tendencies that it was most noteworthy."[28]

Two weeklies, originally oriented to religion, became journals of opinion before their demise. One was the Independent, begun in 1848 as a weekly Congregationalist paper. Published in New York, it was edited from 1870 to 1896 by Henry C. Bowen.[29]

Although it featured interdenominational religious news, it also gave attention to current events and the

issues of the day. The Independent printed some fiction and had departments devoted to fine arts, education, and science; but it emphasized public affairs. Normally it supported Republican candidates for President.[30]

With a circulation of approximately 15,000, the Independent maintained an important position among American periodicals. In Mott's evaluation, "It was one of a very small group of religious papers to hold a comparatively general audience in a period which saw most such periodicals degenerate into denominational news letters."[31]

In October 1928 it was merged in the Outlook, a journal which had paralleled the Independent in various phases.[32]

The Outlook grew out of the Christian Union, founded in 1870 by Henry Ward Beecher. Like the Independent, it was published in New York and began as a specialized religious journal. When Lyman Abbott became managing editor in 1881, he made the weekly somewhat more a journal of opinion and reportage. "There was some political commentary, Republican in sympathy, yet denunciatory of official corruption."[33]

In 1893 Abbott discarded the old name and christened the weekly the Outlook. This marked a major change in emphasis from religious news to the broader field of public affairs. Circulation gained and passed the 30,000 mark in 1894. By then the journal had correspondents in Washington, Boston and Chicago. Under Abbott's editorship the Outlook

issues of the day. The *Independent* printed some letters and had questionably strong on this area, emphasizing and endorsing the 18 candidates public efforts. Generally it supported Republican candidates for President.[7]

Edit a criticism of environmental [illegible] the *Independent* maintained an independent position among different periodicals. In Hart's evaluation, "In the [illegible] it [illegible] small group of religious people or [illegible] conservative general audience in a period when the [illegible] degenerate into democratic [illegible].[8]

In January 1870 it was noted in the *Publisher* a journal that which has [illegible] the *Independent* in various phases.[9]

The *Publisher* was one of the *Publishing Journal*. Founded in 1870 by Henry [illegible] Allen. Like the *Independent*, it was published in New York and began as a religious periodical. This journal which [illegible] 1870, be made the weekly [illegible] more a journal of opinion than reporting. "There was some political [illegible], including in [illegible] of political [illegible]."[10]

In 1871 [illegible] changed the old name and [illegible] the weekly the *Publisher*. This marked a major change in emphasis from religious news to the broader field of public affairs. Circulation [illegible] and grew [illegible] 1874. By then the [illegible] had [illegible] in [illegible] Tucker and [illegible]. Under [illegible] editorship the *Publisher*

became strong in comment on national affairs, as well as biography and literary criticism.[34]

Although Abbott was sympathetic to reform and to the social gospel, his weekly did not engage in the exposure of corruption as a practice.[35] Nevertheless, "the editorials and articles he published helped to shape the rising sense of dissatisfaction with politics and industry in America." The Outlook, according to historian C. C. Regier, helped pave the way for the rise of the muckraking movement.[36]

The magazine reached a peak of circulation, and of influence, in the Theodore Roosevelt era; Roosevelt himself served as a contributing editor from 1908 until 1914. The Outlook merged with the Independent in 1928. Because of declining circulation, the Outlook and Independent, as it was then called, became a monthly. A victim of the Depression, it finally ceased publication in 1935.[37]

The Monthlies

Four non-fiction monthly reviews of the 1890's contained articles, the majority of which dealt very closely with the critical issues of the day: the Arena, the Forum, the North American Review and the Review of Reviews. Some of the greatest editors in the history of American magazines, according to Mott, worked for these journals during the 1890's.[38]

become strong in terms of political influence, as well as
belonging with literary activities."

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Japanese, in [illegible] [illegible] in 1951.

The Decision

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[illegible].

TABLE 1—LEADING JOURNALS OF OPINION AND REPORTAGE - 1894

A. Weeklies:	Harper's Weekly	Nation	Independent	Outlook
1. Est. circ.*	75,000	12,000	15,000	30,000
2. Editor(s)	Carl Schurz Henry L. Nelson	Wendell P. Garrison Edwin L. Godkin	Henry C. Bowen	Lyman Abbott
3. Illustrations	yes	no	some	some
4. Religious background	no	no	yes	yes
5. Politics	Conservative	Conservative	Republican	Republican
6. Fought corruption	yes	yes	yes	yes
7. "Pre-muckraker"	---	---	---	yes

B. Monthlies:	Arena	Forum	North American Review	Review of Reviews
1. Est. circ.*	25,000	30,000	75,000	85,000
2. Editor	Benjamin O. Flower	Walter H. Page	Lloyd Bryce	Albert Shaw
3. Politics	Liberal	Bipartisan	Bipartisan	Republican
4. Fought corruption	yes	yes	yes	yes
5. "Pre-muckraker"	yes	---	---	yes
6. Debate format	no	yes	yes	no
7. Summaries	no	no	no	yes

*Estimated circulation

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

The Arena "was more bold and persistent in its presentation of current social issues than any other review of the nineties." Founded in 1889 and published in Boston, this monthly was edited by Benjamin Orange Flower, whose chief interest was in social reform.[39]

Flower, a believer in "Progress," aimed at promoting happiness for all people. He hoped the Arena would

> . . . present great vital movements and theories of the hour, giving emphasis to the sides and views which, because of their conflicting with entrenched privilege or the rising tide of reaction, or on account of their being too new and unconventional to be popular, were for prudential and financial reasons denied a free hearing in current periodical literature.[40]

The editor of a competing journal said of Flower's monthly, "It is an open arena for the discussion of subjects tabooed by the Forum and the North American. There is more audacity about the Arena than its older rivals."[41]

The Arena played a pioneer role in the development of muckraking. Without hesitation it exposed corruption and urged social, economic and political reform. During the 1890's it was a crusading magazine; it adopted the technique of multiple crusades which had been developed by Pulitzer. Particularly during the hard times of the mid-nineties, the Arena attacked the evils of poverty, sweatshops, slums, unemployment, and child labor; it crusaded against trusts and other combinations of wealth. And it urged reforms such as the initiative, referendum and recall, to increase popular influence upon government.[42]

Unlike Godkin, the editor of Arena did not subscribe to laissez-faire doctrine. Flower was dedicated to the goal of making American industry "democratic." He waged an unceasing war upon "the interests"--the powerful corporations that decreased economic freedom and corrupted the political process. An advocate of social justice, Flower generally defended labor unionism, usually without reservation; he favored the ends sought by labor, but opposed the use of violent or oppressive measures in attaining those ends. He supported government ownership of utilities and transportation lines.[43]

In 1894 the Arena's circulation was about 25,000. To further the spread of its ideas among the educated community, up to 2,000 copies were sent each month to magazine and newspaper editors. In subsequent years, although its circulation once exceeded 30,000, the journal became financially weak. It was last issued in August 1909.[44]

According to Mott, "On the whole the Arena was a truly liberal and significant journal. Its circulation was never large, but it reached many leaders of American thinking and (through schools, editorial offices, and libraries) many leaders-to-be."[45] It was the only journal to muckrake consistently by plan in the 1890's.[46]

Less radical than the Arena were two monthlies that discussed the great questions of the day, the Forum and the North American Review.

Founded in 1886, the Forum was first edited by Lorettus S. Metcalf, a man trained on the North American staff. Metcalf's editorial policy consisted of four basic principles: (1) to present articles by experts on topics of greatest timely significance; (2) to provide a symposium for debates on a variety of social, political and economic problems; (3) to print several articles in each issue designed to attract reader interest; and (4) to edit severely all manuscripts.[47]

When Walter Hines Page became editor in 1891, he said the purpose of the Forum was "to provide discussion about subjects of contemporary interest, in which the magazine is not partisan, but merely the instrument."[48] Page continued to emphasize the use of expert writers and the magazine debate technique. He concentrated on articles dealing with economics, sociology and politics, with secondary emphasis on education, religion, science, history and literature.[49]

The influence of the journal was probably greater than its circulation indicated. By the time Page quit as editor in 1895, the Forum had attracted some 30,000 subscribers. The prestige of the magazine in the 1890's was extensive. It was used in schools and colleges in connection with academic exercises which made use of its debates and symposiums.[50]

The Forum absorbed Century in 1930, then was itself absorbed by Current History in 1940. It was last published

in 1950. In its best days, writes Mott, "the Forum made an admirable contribution to free and open discussion of great public questions."[51]

The North American Review, similar in its editorial policies to the Forum, was established in 1815. When Lloyd Bryce became editor and publisher in 1889, the North American had a circulation of 17,000. Under his direction the journal reached its peak circulation of 76,000, several years before the Pullman Strike. Like Page at the Forum, Bryce emphasized controversy, symposiums and joint debate.[52]

As Mott described the editor,

> Bryce was a Democrat in politics, while his predecessor had been a Republican; but the [North American] Review was kept nonpartisan—or rather bipartisan, for it continued to present both sides of most controversial questions. The new editor was a man of wealth, a novelist, a liberal, and a member of Congress from New York.[53]

While Bryce was editor, until 1896, the North American Review was lively, successful, and frequently contained important discussions of current issues. It was a publication of real power and influence because it was read and studied by the leading men of the country.[54] In the words of a competing monthly, it was regarded by many to be "at once the highest and most important platform upon which current public issues can be discussed, than is any other magazine or review."[55]

Following the Depression, the North American Review finally ceased publication in 1940.[56]

Different in concept and format from the other three monthlies was the Review of Reviews. A forerunner of the modern newsweekly, the Review emphasized informed discussion of current events and contributed to the trend toward timeliness in the contents of popular magazines. It began in 1891 as the American version of W. T. Stead's London Review of Reviews, which was intended to be an international review.[57]

Stead founded the original magazine in England in 1890. A year later, Dr. Albert Shaw began publishing the Review in New York as an American affiliate. Each Review was independent of the other in editorship and method, yet there was a close relationship between the two journals. In the estimation of Frank Luther Mott, the American version was "far superior to its English parent in nearly every respect."[58]

The Review, unlike the monthlies mentioned above, used digests of articles which had appeared in other periodicals, though it also printed articles of its own. The section, "Leading Articles of the Month," presented condensations from the chief reviews and magazines of the world. In its department entitled "The Progress of the World," the Review included an editorial analysis of current events. This section was devoted mainly to politics and economics.[59]

Albert Shaw, who was editor of the Review until its

end in 1937, maintained a high standard of fairness and unemotional rationality in his news and comment. Although he avoided exposes and all-out attacks on social evils, Shaw kept his readers informed of muckraking revelations. Gradually he built up the Review's circulation. By 1894 he had nearly 85,000 subscribers. By 1906 circulation more than doubled that figure.[60]

> The problems attendant on the hard times of the early nineties, plans for the relief of the unemployed, agrarian unrest, the free coinage of silver proposal, and social reforms in the cities were prominent [in the Review].[61]

Shaw approached these topics from a fairly consistent Republican viewpoint.

The Review of Reviews, by summarizing, explaining and judging the news, was a pioneer newsmagazine. By providing historical background, and delving into areas neglected by newspapers, the Review contributed to the development of news interpretation.[62]

As the Review observed in 1929:

> Its aim has always been to bring to its readers a monthly statement of events at home and abroad, with a reasonable interpretation of those transactions that constitute history in the making. We have sought to support an intelligent and high-principled conduct of the governmental and social affairs of the United States, regardless of party.[63]

The General Labor Situation

The Pullman strike began as a local dispute in the town of Pullman, several miles south of Chicago. It

escalated by stages into a general strike of the railroads centered in Chicago, and it spread westward until it covered two-thirds of the United States.

Freight trains ground to a halt. Mails were delayed. Property was destroyed. Perishable foods rotted in boxcars. People were killed. Mobs rioted. Nearly all the forces of law and order, civil and military, were involved.

"The fury with which labor and capital battled in 1894 was the outgrowth of years of mutual distrust and hate. . . ." Workers had long suffered such conditions as miserable slum housing conditions, long hours, dangerous and unsanitary working conditions, and inadequate wages.[64]

During the post-Civil War period, laissez-faire economic doctrines permitted few restraints upon capitalists, except those imposed by vigorous competition. It was the job of big business to make profits. One way to increase profits was to keep down costs. Since the cost of labor was substantial, one sure way to reduce expenses was to slash wages paid to workers.[65]

Following the Panic of 1873, strikes assumed the character of major industrial upheavals. In July 1877 the nation was shaken by a railway dispute of major proportions. Angered by repeated wage cuts, the employees of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad precipitated a series of spontaneous strikes that broke out in dozens of localities.[66]

These strikes were the first to induce massive federal intervention. U. S. troops were ordered into the states of Maryland, Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Missouri and Illinois. In Chicago, police and state militia battled 5,000 enraged rioters. Six companies of the 9th U. S. Infantry and two more companies of the 22d Infantry were standing by. The governor had formally requested military assistance from President Hayes. After some hesitation, the President had authorized the use of regulars against Chicago rioters. A precedent was set: the U. S. Army had been used to back up police and state militia. This procedure became a vital part of the strategy of the federal government in 1894.[67]

Upon termination of the strikes of 1877, there was no consensus as to what should be done to prevent such disorders in the future. There was some serious discussion concerning the problem of creating better relations between employers and their men.[68] However, as far as the editors of Nation and Harper's Weekly were concerned, one conclusion was clearly evident: the need for a larger U. S. Army.[69]

The years 1878 to 1885 were relatively quiet. But violence returned again to Chicago with the Haymarket Riot in May, 1886. Following a bomb explosion at Haymarket Place, eight leading anarchists were placed on trial and pronounced guilty. Though four of the anarchists were hanged, three lived to receive their pardons from Governor

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John P. Altgeld in 1893. Conservatives were shocked. As a result, Altgeld was bitterly criticized as an "anarchist," a label that was reapplied by some journalists during the Pullman Strike.[70]

The outbreak of the Burlington Strike in February 1888 brought the nation once again face-to-face with the threat of a major transportation tie-up. But the railway workers lacked unity. They failed to fight together in boycotting the Burlington; the dispute never got beyond the "serious threat" stage. Nevertheless, the strike had several important consequences: (1) the Burlington Railway established an insurance system, the purpose of which was to give employees a financial stake in the company and deprive them of a financial stake in organized labor; (2) the use of the judicial injunctive process to suppress strikes began to develop; (3) the first federal railroad labor act was signed; it provided the alternative of voluntary arbitration or of a presidential fact finding commission which might recommend a settlement.[71]

As will be demonstrated in later chapters, these outcomes have relevance for the Pullman Strike. George Pullman could have established some means of providing his employees a financial stake in the Pullman Company. He did not. The injunctive process became an essential component in the federal strategy. And President Cleveland could have either encouraged arbitration or established a fact-finding commission to facilitate a settlement. The President did

neither. Instead, he appointed a commission to investigate the strike--after it had substantially run its course.

There was little labor peace in the half-dozen years following the Burlington Strike. During the 1890's, the primary period of great strikes was that of 1892-1894. In the silver and lead mines of the Coeur d' Alene district of Idaho in 1892, a dispute over unionization led to violence that was put down by federal troops. Benjamin Harrison was the first President since Hayes to use the U. S. Army in a labor dispute. Grover Cleveland would do the same, two years later.[72]

The year 1892 was also the year of the great Homestead Strike. Steel-mill workers clashed with the Carnegie Steel Corporation over reduced wages. Pinkerton guards backed by the Pennsylvania militia forced workers to call off the strike and return to the mills as non-unionists.[73] Like Carneigie, the Pullman Company was vehemently opposed to organized labor unions.

A milestone development for labor was the formation of the American Federation of Labor in 1886, an alliance of a number of trade unions of skilled workers. During the Pullman Strike, the A.F. of L. would voice sympathy for striking workers, but otherwise would remain aloof from the struggle.[74]

By 1892, labor leader Eugene V. Debs was convinced that the trade union idea had ceased to be useful. He

matter. Instead, he appointed a commission to investigate the strike—after it had successfully run its course.

There was little labor peace in the mill-town years following the Washington Strike. During the 1920's, the primary period of union activity was that of 1926-1928. In the spring and early summer of the year, 2,000 workers at Idaho in 1926, a dispute over piecework and by a strike that was put down by Company troops. Negotiations and the first provisions were found by the end of a long and a large dispute. Women discovered early in the year, and years later.[70]

The year 1928 was also the year of the great Longview Strike. Twenty-odd workers, mostly with the Longview Lumber Corporation, also produced signs. Although strike action among the Longview utility forced company to call out the police and troops in the city in mid-October,[71] this Longview, the failure through and conservatory support to organized labor unions.

A different development in labor was the formation of the American Federation of Labor in 1919, as affiliate of a number of craft unions in mills and shipyards. During the Pulleys Strike, the city of Longview called upon the striking workers, the citizens made remarks about "the strangers."[72]

By 1920, labor leaders reported to Washington that the crews were long but proved to be useful. In

thought it fostered divisiveness and competition, rather than cooperation for the collective good. Since the problems encountered by railroad employees were common to all, Debs believed they ought to belong to one organization--a union capable of asserting its united strength in the protection of every member. Accordingly, he resigned from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen to establish such a union.[75]

The American Railway Union (A.R.U.) was organized at Chicago on 20 June 1893. Its purpose: "to protect and promote the interests of its members as wage earners through organization and legitimate cooperation." Membership was open to all white employees who served on railroads, except high officials. The A.R.U. consisted of a general union and of local unions. The general union was formed of representatives of local unions. A strike could be declared only by a majority vote of the locals involved.[76]

Under the leadership provided by Debs, the American Railway Union by 1894 was powerful. About 150,000 railroad employees were members. The A.R.U., representing labor, would become the major contestant against capital during the Pullman Strike.

In establishing the A.R.U., Debs was prompted by one other vital consideration. Railroad capital and management--at least in Chicago--had become an organized coalition. Debs felt that a management concentration of power demanded a like union of employees for the purpose of mutual protection.[77]

The twenty-four railroads terminating in Chicago had formed the General Manager's Association (G.M.A.) in 1886. Its aim was to take united action concerning railroad or labor problems centering at Chicago in which members had a common interest. By 1893 one of its primary concerns was to establish approximate uniformity in wages and to develop a firm policy toward labor. In March, 1893, the G.M.A. successfully prevented a switchmen's union from initiating a strike. The men abandoned their demands and accepted the old wage schedule.

By the time of the Pullman Strike, the General Manager's Association had developed effective strike-breaking machinery. Its members operated more than 40,000 miles of road and employed over 220,000 men. The combined net earnings for the 24 member roads in fiscal year 1894 exceeded $100 million. The G.M.A., representing organized capital, would be a formidable opponent in the fight against Debs' A.R.U.[78]

The Panic of 1893 signalled the beginning of an acute depression that would be severely felt by Pullman workers. The industrial market collapsed, business operations were drastically curtailed, and unemployment increased sharply. As historian Almont Lindsey notes, "The winter of 1893-94 was filled with tragedy for thousands, and during such a crisis the people grew restless and critical of the economic order."[79]

Two lesser disorders and a general strike of coal miners preceded the onset of the Pullman Strike.

One of these disorders was an eighteen-day strike against the Great Northern Railway involving the newly organized American Railway Union. When James J. Hill, president of the Great Northern, refused to discuss the matter of wage cuts with A.R.U. officials, the union called a strike on 13 April, 1894. Not one freight train moved over the line during the tie-up; no blood was shed. The strike ended on May 1 when both sides accepted the ruling of a board of arbitration. The decision was almost a complete victory for Debs' A.R.U. Seventy-five percent of current pay cuts were restored.[80]

This triumph for the young A.R.U. gave its members a false sense of confidence that the union could deal effectively with management in the subsequent Pullman Strike.

In response to the widespread unemployment emerging from the Panic of 1893, Jacob S. Coxey, a manufacturer-reformer from Ohio, sponsored a march by an army of unemployed to petition Congress for appropriate legislation. Thousands of idle men travelled to Washington D. C. from various parts of the nation. Though peaceful in intention, the movement assumed lawless proportions when other industrial armies from the West began to seize trains and to run them toward the nation's capital.

The United States government was swift in retaliation. Attorney General Olney dealt with Coxeyites who stole trains

by court injunctions enforced by federal troops. President Cleveland was apparently determined to use the full force of his authority to crush the spirit of rebellion. "Commonwealers" who had seized trains were arrested by federal agents for obstructing and retarding the passage of mails. In Washington, Coxey's petition went largely unheard. The government refused to let him speak at the capitol.[81]

Magazines took the movement more seriously than newspapers. The Review of Reviews reported that marchers had the sympathy of the American people, who recognized the protest as a gesture of economic desperation. In contrast, the North American Review was alarmed; it said Coxeyism was a "menace."[82]

The final prelude to the Pullman Strike was a general strike of coal miners, called by the United Mine Workers on 21 April 1894 while the Coxeyites were still marching. In five states the militia were called out to suppress violence. Again the federal government intervened to prevent interference with mail.

In Illinois, Governor Altgeld demonstrated his willingness to use state troops in meeting emergencies. In response to requests for help from sheriffs in various parts of the state, "Altgeld sent troops when there seemed the slightest basis for anticipating trouble." Troops were authorized to assist local officials in preserving the peace, quelling riots and executing the law, but they were not allowed to guard private property. Nor were they

by every influential element of Imperial society. Prominent citizens were especially admonished to see the full force of his authority as vested the habits of individuals. "Commonwealth", who had called Indian men attached to "secret agents for observing and reporting the opinion of native in assemblages, usually political with authority obtained. The government subject to its low level of the country."[6]

Superiors used the movement more positively than suspicious. The Indian of Indian expressed that contrast had the property of the American people, who recognized the problem as a problem of economic development. In contrast, the Hindi Sabha Indian was allowed to work Congress was a "nation."[7]

The final product of the Indian Sabha was a general model of what students could do in the future. Some students in Hindi life media are interested more social reformers. In this manner the ability were helped and to concentrate political labor. Again the Indian government intervened to control Indian-Europeans with well.

In Allahabad, Governor Colvin's assessments his activities to the Hindi Sabha to Indian nationalists. He proposed to publish for such the activity to Indian people of the state, "Colvin's that Lucky was that Sabha helped the activities again for educational institution." Those men endeavored to encourage local activity to preserve the peace, quelling riots and controlling the land, but they were not allowed to guard political prisoners. Did even they

allowed to be used for strike-breaking purposes. The governor was "unalterably opposed to the practice of using the armed forces in the interest of one economic group against another. . . ."[83]

Altgeld's position regarding the use of federal troops would become a significant issue in the Pullman Strike.

The Situation at Pullman

The United Mine Workers went on strike in April, 1894, when mine owners refused to restore wages to the previous year's level. Like the miners, workers at the Pullman Palace Car Company, in Pullman, Illinois, had suffered severe wage cuts as the Depression deepened. The Pullman Strike broke out in May, 1894, after George Pullman had tried to reduce the wages of his workers without effecting a corresponding reduction in the rents charged in the company's "model" town.

The Pullman Palace Car Corporation was organized in 1867. Over the years George Pullman had built up a unique and highly successful business. The company constructed, rented and repaired Pullman "palace cars" (dining, parlor and sleeping cars). It also manufactured and sold on contract general types of cars. In 1894 Pullman sleeping cars were operated on about 125,000 miles of track, three-fourths of the railway mileage of the United States. The Pullman Company was financially sound; its financial reserves exceeded $25,000,000.[84]

allowed to be used for varied-purpose purposes. The governor was "unfortunate enough to be involved in using the armed forces in the interest of one economic group against another. . . ."[3]

Adelaide's position regarding the use of federal troops would become a significant issue in the Italian election.

The Election of 1924

The United Italy Workers' Party in Adelaide in April, 1924, when also Morris attempted to produce unity in the working class party. Also the Labor, Protest in the Italian Labor Party was unknown, in fact, actually, the unaffiliated workers made up a low percentage. The Italian Party lacks known for its age, only after Morris joined had tried to remove the wages of the workers without affecting a corresponding reduction in the Trade Unions in the region's "usual" order.

The Italian Party in Adelaide was organized in 1907. Over the years Morris joined had built up a unique and highly successful machine. The Morris organization, which was supported Italian Italian Labor Party and always party. It was homogeneous and made up of con- siderable general types of men. In the Italian community was dominated by about 12,000 which is nearly three-quarters of the military of the Italian Labor. The Italian Company was financially weaker than Morris organization numbered 75,000,000."

Following the Panic of 1893, wages were drastically reduced, but profits distributed as dividends actually increased.

	Wages Paid	Dividends
Fiscal year 1893	$7,220,000	$2,520,000
Fiscal year 1894	$4,470,000	$2,880,000
Change	-$2,750,000	+$ 360,000

From July 1893 to July 1894, wages had declined by more than $2,000,000, yet dividends had increased by $360,000.[85]

Wage reductions per se might not have been so hard on the workers if rents had correspondingly declined. But this was not the situation at Pullman, where the entire town--land, houses, churches and all--was owned by George Pullman. The town, built between 1880 and 1884, was established for several reasons: (1) to consolidate repair and construction facilities; (2) to accommodate the thousands of Pullman workers in an attractive, well-planned community which would prevent labor unrest over bad housing; and (3) to be a business investment expected to earn at least six percent on the entire cost.[86]

The town of Pullman included repair shops, a hotel, an arcade, athletic grounds, a library, paved streets, parks, and brick tenements. The town had a complete sewage and water system. Under the paternalistic regime of George Pullman, the company town was kept neat and attractive. About 5,000 of its residents were employees.[87]

following the fiscal [illegible] 1969, [illegible] were [illegible] reduced, the [illegible] [illegible] increased.

	[illegible]	[illegible]
Fiscal year 1969	[illegible]	[illegible]
Fiscal year 1970	[illegible]	[illegible]
Change	[illegible]	[illegible]

From July 1970 to [illegible], [illegible] the [illegible] to [illegible] $8,000,000, the difference was increased by $[illegible].[7]

[illegible] on the [illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In the spring of 1894 these workers were not happy. Pullman had reduced their pay five times in less than a year, without at the same time reducing rents in his "model" town. For many workers, their income was so small that every bit was needed for food and clothing; after paying their rents they had from $1.00 to $6.00 left on which to support their families for two weeks. Rents were 20 to 25 per cent higher in Pullman than in Chicago.[88]

Gradually the employees became convinced that their grievances could be redressed only through a united effort. The American Railway Union offered a tremendous appeal to the restless men at Pullman. They were able to join the union because the Pullman Company owned several miles of railroad. In March and April 1894 the workers at Pullman joined the A.R.U. in large numbers.[89]

Although the A.R.U. strongly advised against a strike, the Pullman employees decided to present their demands to the corporation: reduction in rent, correction of shop abuses and the restoration of wages to the pre-depression level.

On May 7 a forty-six member grievance committee called on a vice president of the Pullman Company, Thomas H. Wickes, to whom the demands were presented. A spokesman for the group asked that wages be restored to the June 1893 level, or that a reduction in rent be made (along with a raise in pay) to enable workers both to meet their rental payments and to support their families.[90]

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The company refused, maintaining that business conditions did not justify any change. Wickes said that reduction in rent was impossible since the company was earning only three per cent on its rental investment. Wages could not be raised since the company was losing money on its construction contracts. Although Wickes offered to let the committee review the financial records of the company, the offer was ignored because the men felt the records had been falsified.

The committee met with George Pullman on May 9. He reiterated the position taken by Wickes: rents could not be lowered; wages could not be raised.[91] Pullman's uncompromising attitude increased the determination of the workers to strike.

On May 10 three members of the grievance committee were laid off by a foreman for alleged lack of work. That night the grievance committee, disregarding the advice of the A.R.U., voted unanimously to call a strike. On May 11 the strike began. Some 4,000 employees walked out. To demonstrate their intention that the strike remain nonviolent—that no Pullman property would be destroyed—300 strikers were assigned to guard production and repair facilities. George Pullman promptly closed his shops and left for the East.[92]

During the period May 11 to July 4, 1894, no violence or destruction of property by strikers or sympath-

izers took place at Pullman. Not until late June did many persons except the Pullman employees give more than passing attention to the strike. For its first month, the dispute was of major interest only to the Chicago press, which generally was sympathetic to the cause of the workers. The American Railway Union, striving to gain the support of public opinion, urged workers to avoid unruliness. By mid-June the strike had lasted over a month, yet workers had nothing to show for their efforts.[93]

The Situation at Chicago

Beginning on June 12, however, pressure began building in Chicago to force the Pullman Company into a settlement--even if it meant escalating the strike on a wider scale. On that day over 400 delegates representing the 465 local unions of the American Railway Union met to begin their first regularly scheduled convention. Several days later the delegates voted to consider the Pullman situation. A committee of strikers appeared before the convention and submitted a long list of their reasons for the strike. Wage reductions, high rentals, and Pullman's failure to redress grievances were the main issues.[94]

The A.R.U. recognized that wrongs must be corrected in lawful and orderly ways. It was carefully geared to settle grievances in a harmonious fashion. In the event issues could not be resolved by mediation, only a majority vote of the locals could decide to strike. The convention

decided to seek arbitration with the Pullman Company. On June 16 a committee of delegates met with Vice President Wickes and requested arbitration. He told them the Pullman Company would never arbitrate. Similarly, when the Civic Federation of Chicago urged conciliation, Wickes rejected the plea; under no circumstances would the company arbitrate.[95]

On June 21 the delegates, under instructions from their local unions, unanimously voted that the members of the A.R.U. would refrain from handling Pullman cars on June 26 unless the Pullman Company would consent to arbitration. Eugene Debs, president of the A.R.U., later testified that "the strike was practically ordered by the rank and file of the membership . . . the delegates acted by their express authority and instruction." He emphasized that the delegates--not Debs--had ordered the strike. According to historian Harry Bernard, the A.R.U. members had nothing to gain for themselves by risking their jobs to help the Pullman workers; the local unions voted to boycott because of sympathy for their class.[96]

The next day three members of the A.R.U. called upon Wickes and presented their ultimatum. The Pullman Company flatly refused to deal with the A.R.U. or to submit anything to arbitration.[97] At that moment the Pullman Strike changed from a local issue to a matter of national concern.

The General Manager's Association responded quickly to the threat. The G.M.A. resolved to resist the proposed

boycott by a united effort among its members in the interest of railroad contracts and "for the benefit of the travelling public. . . ."[98]

On June 26 the boycott was initiated.

Switchmen would refuse to couple Pullman cars, inspectors to examine them, and engineers and brakemen to haul any train carrying the cars. Service would be tied up until the Pullman Company negotiated, or the railroads stopped using Pullman cars.[99]

The boycott started slowly, but then spread rapidly. Switchmen at the Illinois Central refused to attach Pullman cars to trains. Their subsequent discharge resulted in a strike of the remaining union men.

The General Manager's Association adopted the policy of discharging any man who refused to handle Pullman cars, even though he may be willing to do all his other work. Although no strike was declared against the railroads, employees voluntarily initiated a strike in retaliation against railroads who implemented this policy. As the boycott spread it became a contest between the A.R.U. and the G.M.A.[100] But once initiated, the boycott also became a matter of increasing concern for the public, the government and the press.

CHAPTER I--FOOTNOTES

[1]Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines Vol. IV, 1885-1905 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 1. Hereinafter, Mott, Magazines IV.

[2]Mott, Magazines IV, p. 11. Robert Stinson, "McClure's Road to McClure's," Journalism Quarterly, XLVII (Summer, 1970), 256-57. Judson A. Grenier, The Origins and Nature of Progressive Muckraking (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1965), pp. 203-205. Hereinafter, Grenier, Progressive Muckraking.

[3]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 3-5.

[4]Ibid., p. 13.

[5]Ibid., pp. 207, 211.

[6]Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, pp. 282-288.

[7]C. C. Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers (Glocester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1957), pp. 26, 31, 42.

[8]Emery, The Press and America, p. 403. Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, pp. 282, 283, 286, 287, 294.

[9]Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, p. 209.

[10]Harold U. Faulkner, 1890-1900: Politics, Reform and Expansion (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 19.

[11]Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, pp. 222-23.

[12]Mott, Magazines IV, p. 156.

[13]Ibid., p. 65.

[14]Ibid., p. 60.

[15]Ibid., p. 10.

[16]Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines Vol. III, 1865-1885 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 331. Hereinafter Mott, Magazines III. Carey McWilliams, "One Hundred Years of the Nation," Journalism Quarterly, XLII (Spring, 1965), 193.

CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTION

[17]Godkin's statement, quoted in McWilliams, "One Hundred Years of the Nation," p. 195.

[18]Mott, Magazines III, pp. 331-334; Mott, Magazines IV, p. 60.

[19]Mott, Magazines III, p. 339.

[20]Roland E. Wolseley, The Magazine World: An Introduction to Magazine Journalism (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p. 61. Hereinafter, Wolseley, Magazine World; Aaron Miller, "The Paradoxical Godkin, Founder of the Nation," Journalism Quarterly XLII (Spring, 1965), 201; McWilliams, "One Hundred Years of the Nation," pp. 196-97.

[21]Miller, "The Paradoxical Godkin," p. 201.

[22]Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 367; Mott, Magazines III, p. 342.

[23]John Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform (New York: Liveright, Inc., Publishers, 1932), p. 9.

[24]James P. Wood, Magazines in the United States (3d ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1971), p. 80; Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines Vol. II, 1850-1865 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 469. Hereinafter, Mott, Magazines II; Mott, Magazines IV, p. 57.

[25]Wood, Magazines in the United States, p. 81.

[26]Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, p. 248. According to the American Newspaper Directory: 1896 (New York: George P. Rowell & Co., 1896), p. 201, Harper's Monthly in 1895 had a circulation exceeding 75,000.

[27]Mott, Magazines II, pp. 474-82.

[28]Ibid., pp. 486-87.

[29]Mott, Magazines II, p. 367.

[30]Ibid., p. 376; Mott, Magazines IV, p. 59.

[31]Mott, Magazines II, p. 376.

[32]Ibid., p. 379.

[33]Mott, Magazines III, pp. 422-23, 426.

[34]Ibid., pp. 428-29. Mott, Magazines IV, p. 59.

[35]Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, p. 38.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[36]Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, p. 20.

[37]Mott, Magazines III, pp. 430-35. Schacht, The Journals of Opinion and Reportage, p. 6.

[38]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 10, 35. Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, p. 23.

[39]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 190, 401.

[40]Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, p. 326.

[41]W. T. Stead, editor of the London Review of Reviews, quoted in Mott, Magazines IV, p. 403.

[42]H. F. Cline, "Benjamin Orange Flower and the Arena, 1889-1900," Journalism Quarterly XVII (June, 1940), 142, 145. Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, p. 19. Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 216, 404-407, 410.

[43]Mott, Magazines IV, p. 408. Cline, "Benjamin Orange Flower and the Arena," 1889-1900," pp. 146-48.

[44]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 401, 411-15. Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, p. 327.

[45]Mott, Magazines IV, p. 416.

[46]Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, p. 324.

[47]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 51, 512.

[48]Page, quoted in Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century, p. 138.

[49]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 515-16.

[50]Ibid. Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century, p. 138.

[51]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 511, 523.

[52]Mott, Magazines II, pp. 219-20, 254-55.

[53]Ibid., p. 254.

[54]Mott, Magazines IV, p. 51. Wood, Magazines in the United States, p. 43.

[55]Review of Reviews, quoted in Mott, Magazines II, p. 255.

[56]Schacht, Journals of Opinion and Reportage, p. 6.

[57]Mott, Magazines, IV, p. 52. Lloyd J. Graybar "Albert Shaw and the Review of Reviews," Journalism Quarterly XLIX (Winter, 1972), 692.

[58]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 657-59.

[59]Ibid., pp. 52, 660.

[60]Ibid., pp. 52, 657, 662. Graybar, "Albert Shaw and the Review of Reviews," p. 716.

[61]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 660-61.

[62]Wolseley, Magazines in the United States, pp. 44-45.

[63]Review of Reviews, quoted in Mott, Magazines IV, p. 664.

[64]Almont Lindsey, The Pullman Strike: The Story of a Unique Experiment and of a Great Labor Upheaval (Chicago Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 1-3. Hereinafter, Lindsey, Pullman Strike. Lindsey's book is thoroughly documented and provides supplementary information not contained in the Report of the United States Strike Commission (1895).

[65]Donald L. McMurry, The Great Burlington Strike of 1888: A Case History in Labor Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. vi. Hereinafter, McMurry, Burlington Strike.

[66]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 8. Gerald G. Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes: The Beginnings of Federal Strike Policy (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 24. Hereinafter, Eggert, Labor Disputes.

[67]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 7, 8. Robert V. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence (New York: The New Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 247-51.

[68]McMurry, Burlington Strike, p. 267.

[69]Nation, XXV (August 2, 1877), 68. Harper's Weekly XXI, (August 11, 1877), 618.

[70]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 9.

[71]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 81. McMurry, Burlington Strike, pp. 114, 169, 267.

[72]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 108. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence, p. 319.

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[73]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 108. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 9-10.

[74]McMurry, Burlington Strike, p. viii. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 4.

[75]United States Strike Commission, Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July 1894, (Clifton, N. J.: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1972), p. XXIII. Hereinafter, Strike Report. This volume is a reprint of the original, published in 1895. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 109.

[76]Strike Report, pp. XXIII, XXIV. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 110. Concerning dates, when the year is included in a date, the sequence used is day, month, year; when the year is not cited, the sequence used is month, day.

[77]Strike Report, p. XXIII.

[78]Ibid., pp. XXVIII, XXIX. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 114-19.

[79]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 12.

[80]Ibid., p. 113. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 108. Harvey Wish, "The Pullman Strike: A Study in Industrial Warfare," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, XXXII (1939), 291. Hereinafter, Wish, "Industrial Warfare."

[81]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 12-14. Faulkner, 1890-1900: Politics, Reform and Expansion, pp. 164-68.

[82]Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 158-59.

[83]Harry Bernard, Eagle Forgotten: The Life of John Peter Altgeld (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 276-78. Hereinafter, Bernard, Life of Altgeld.

[84]Strike Report, p. XXI.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 24, 31, 32, 40.

[87]Ibid., pp. 24, 40. Strike Report, p. XXI.

[88]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 93-94. Strike Report, p. XXXV.

[89]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 103, 110. Strike Report, p. XXV.

[90]Strike Report, p. XXXVII; p. 423.

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[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid., pp. XXXVII, XXXVIII; p. 417. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 122-23.

[93] Strike Report, p. XXXVIII. Stanly Buder, Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and Community Planning, 1880-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 169-70, 177. Hereinafter, Buder, Pullman Experiment.

[94] Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 128. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 178.

[95] Strike Report, pp. XXV, XXXVIII; p. 590. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 111, 129.

[96] Strike Report, p. XXXIX; Debs' quotation, p. 140. Bernard, Life of Altgeld, p. 282.

[97] Strike Report, p. 590.

[98] Ibid., p. XLII.

[99] Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 180.

[100] Strike Report, p. XLIII. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 134.

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[illegible], op. [illegible], [illegible] p. [illegible]. [illegible], *Pulling Strings*, p. [illegible].

[illegible], op. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], *Soldiers in Politics: [illegible] 1920-1964* (New York: [illegible] Press, [illegible]), p. [illegible], [illegible], *Pulling Strings*.

[illegible], op. [illegible], p. [illegible].

[illegible], op. [illegible], p. [illegible], [illegible], *Pulling Strings*, p. [illegible].

[illegible], op. [illegible], p. [illegible], [illegible], op. [illegible], [illegible], *Latin American Politics*, p. [illegible].

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CHAPTER II

THE STRIKE AND THE PERIODICALS: A SUMMARY OF COVERAGE

On June 26 Debs sent telegrams to all parts of the nation. He told local unions Pullman cars were not to be handled and he urged non-violence, since violence could alienate the public and provide justification for military intervention. With his headquarters at Uhlich's Hall in Chicago, Debs coordinated the boycott and resulting strike until he was arrested in July.[1]

Railroads could have left Pullman cars off their trains, thereby avoiding trouble but at the same time accomplishing the strike's purpose. The General Manager's Association, however, decided to resist the boycott. In a resolution issued to the public, the managers set forth their reasons for this decision: to discontinue the use of Pullman cars on passenger trains would be not only an inconvenience to the travelling public, but also a violation of existing contracts with the Pullman Company.[2]

Railroad workers were in general sympathy with the cause of the Pullman employees, and predisposed to strike. They were, according to the Strike Commission, in a

> . . . disturbed and apprehensive condition . . . resulting from wage reductions on different lines, blacklisting . . . and from the recent growth and development of the General Manager's Association, which seemed to them a menace.[3]

When some employees were fired for refusal to handle Pullman cars, many local railroad unions took the opportunity to express their own grievances.

Hence the Pullman Strike was rapidly transformed from a boycott to a general strike against the railroads. There were several contributory factors: (1) sympathy for the Pullman workers among railroad union employees; (2) the firing of railroad employees who refused to handle Pullman cars; and (3) the frustrations of railroad workers brought on by bad working conditions.

As the boycott spread it became an issue of national concern. The first big story of the Pullman Strike to reach readers in the East was printed in the New York Times on June 27.[4] In early July the journals of opinion began serious coverage of the strike.

Editorially, the four weeklies were unanimous in their denunciation of the A.R.U. and the boycott. The Outlook declared:

> The issue is an absolutely simple one: it is whether the highways of the Nation are to be controlled by the American Railway Union, reinforced by murderous mobs, and the right to travel . . . is held at the pleasure of the American Railway Union and its officers.[5]

The Nation asserted that "the present boycott is an attempt to starve out society."[6]

> . . . distorted and exaggerated versions . . . resulting from many reductions on different levels, disciplinary . . . are then the raison d'etre and development of the Soviet Company's innovations, which reveal to them a system.[3]

Some more sympathetic voices lined up received to Soviet Pullman carry their local principal service load the equivalent to express their own criticism.

Since the Pullman service has recently transformed from a backwash to a premium service despite the railroad. There have been several noticeable factors: (1) expansion for the Pullman service along railroad being employed (2) the firing of Pullman employees who refused to board Pullman cars and (3) the transformation of railroad workers brought on by the employing associations.

In the express cars it become an issue of minimal concern. The first 15 days of the Pullman service is much reports in the line was carried in the Red Star Express on June 27.[4] In every sense the service of pulling began working managing at the period.

Historically, the Soviet railroad were considered to short demonstration of the U.S.S.R. and the express. The Pullman declared:

> The train is an exceptionally simple case. It is whether the delegates of the Soviet are to be conveyed by the American Railway Trains, originated by manufacturer body, and the right to travel . . . in fact at the pleasure of the American Railway Unions and the Soviet.

The Soviet answered that the pleasant surprise is an attempt to assure our welcome.[5]

The Independent called the boycott "senseless and inhuman," and added, "The railroad companies must resist it to the bitter end."[7]

Harper's Weekly denounced the boycott as the "basest of crimes," and said it was "an attempt at blackmail on the highest scale."[8] The Weekly probably expressed the sentiments of most of the conservative press when it exclaimed, "Until the rebellion is supressed, all differences of opinion concerning its origin . . . are irrelevant to the issue of the hour, and must wait for the future."[9]

The General Managers and Federal Attorneys

The employees of the Northern Pacific and Santa Fe lines joined the strike on June 27.

By then Mayor John P. Hopkins had ordered his entire 3,000 man police force to total readiness, with orders to preserve the peace, protect property and prevent violence.

The strike expanded rapidly. By June 28 almost 18,000 workers on six railroads had walked off their jobs.[10]

The General Manager's Association, headed by Everett St. John, directed all efforts on behalf of the railroads toward victory over the American Railway Union. In daily meetings to plan strategy against the strike, the G.M.A.: (1) began to coordinate with civil and military authorities; (2) set up a committee of lawyers to initiate legal proceedings; (3) started hiring replacements for strikers; and

The Independent noted the joyous "celebration and fatness," and added, "The military government seems inclined to be the sinner now."[7]

Kenyon's article denounced the lawyer as the "lawyer of evil," and said it was the strength of Cleveland on the Bigham scale.[8] The Democratic president convened the assembly of most of the conservative press when it published, "Until the rebellion is suppressed, all discussion of opinion concerning its origin . . . may irritate to the issue of the hour, and must lead, for the return."[9]

The General Assembly and Judicial Interpretation

The employees of the Assembly (Militia and Home Guard) have joined the service on June 27.

On Sunday (June 1), Governor Bond ordered the Militia (1,000 men) active duty to quell disturbances, which seemed to paralyze the entire economic and governmental structure.

The entire expenses amounting to [illegible] dollars 38,000 expended on all institutions educational or charitable.[10]

The General Assembly's Resolution, passed by Thomas Dr. John, directed all officers on behalf of the militiamen toward slavery over the Southern Union Union. In fact meetings in Ohio directly against the militia, the Supreme (1) begin to constitute this state and military authorities (2) act as a committee of Congress to initiate legal case constituting (3) charges filing requirements for ministers and

(4) established a publicity bureau to provide the press with information designed to build public support for their cause.[11]

To manage anti-strike activities, the General Managers appointed John M. Egan "director of resistance" on June 28. Everett St. John presided over the daily meetings, but Egan was charged with executing all strike policies. The next day, 4,500 railroad workers met at Blue Island. More than one-third decided to support the American Railway Union. In response, the General Managers promised they would blacklist any worker who joined the A.R.U. strike or refused to perform any of his duties.[12]

On about June 29 the legal committee of the G.M.A. recommended immediate proceedings against the American Railway Union for interference with mail and interstate commerce; and it decided to seek injunctions to restrain the strikers. The General Managers agreed; federal assistance was needed. The association relayed its legal recommendations, along with a request for more federal deputies, to Thomas E. Milchrist, United States district attorney in Chicago.[13]

Milchrist was fully cooperative. He told the G.M.A. he would invoke the conspiracy section of the Interstate Commerce Law in prosecuting those who obstructed interstate freight. Furthermore, he asked the railways to supply his office with the names of any persons who interfered in any

(4) established a publicity bureau to provide the press with information designed to build public support for their cause.[11]

In another post-strike activities, the Central Managers association then at Lynn telegraphed on June 28. Director G. Allen presided over the daily meetings, but Lynn was charged with attending all strike activities. The week ahead, Allen informed managers, was to show labor's ability and willingness to support the American Railway Union. In response, the General Managers association would blacklist any engine men who joined the A.R.U. Lynn was ordered to perform any or all duties.[12]

On Friday June 29 the local committee of the A.R.U. presented Cleveland's representatives with the Pullman Railway union demands. The General Managers agreed to meet with the committee and it decided to send representatives to Washington to discuss the strike. The General Managers agreed to meet with representatives of the committee. The committee refused its local representations, along with a request for more federal mediation by Thomas G. Pritchard, Pullman union president in Chicago.[13]

Politics was full complexity. On July 1st the A.R.U. in Seattle issued the emergency warrant of the Commercial Telegraphers Union to prevent them from monitoring Independent Pacific Telegraphers, in order the railroad to supply the office with the names of any persons who interfered in any

way with the movement of trains carrying the mail, or who cut off Pullman or other cars from mail-carrying trains.[14]

During the Great Northern strike in April, the Justice Department had issued an opinion regarding mail trains; in effect, every car of any train carrying mail was part of the mail train and thus entitled to federal protection. Under this precedent, any employee who cut off a Pullman car from a train carrying mail was subject to punishment by the federal government.[15]

These preliminary dealings between the G.M.A. and U. S. District Attorney Milchrist received only slight coverage by the journals. The appointment of Egan as "strike manager" of the G.M.A. was reported only in Harper's Weekly.[16]

In a telegram to Attorney General Richard Olney on June 30, Milchrist reported that mail trains in the suburbs of Chicago were, on the previous night, stopped by strikers. He recommended that the U. S. Marshal in Chicago be authorized to appoint a special force of deputies to help protect the mail trains.[17]

Olney had served as attorney for the Chicago, Quincy and Burlington Railroad; he viewed the strike as an attack against railroad property and a threat to corporate control.[18] Olney authorized the U. S. Marshal to swear in as many men as were needed, and he appointed Edwin Walker as a special attorney for the federal government.[19]

Walker had served as a general counsel for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad. He was then a legal adviser to the General Manager's Association.[20]

The Outlook, though it omitted Walker by name, and referred to him simply as "a prominent lawyer at Chicago. . . ." was the only journal to report (correctly) that he had been appointed in response to a recommendation from the General Manager's Association to the Attorney General.[21] Walker's appointment received no mention in the other journals.

Although Walker was assigned to assist Milchrist, it soon became evident that Walker, in close liason with the G.M.A., was the real director of affairs for the Justice Department in Chicago.[22] Despite his importance to the federal strategy, Walker's role in the strike was almost completely ignored by the journals of opinion.

Before the day was over, U. S. Marshal John Arnold had begun to swear in a force of special federal deputies. During the period June 30 to July 5 several thousand men were deputized, many of them loyal railroad employees furnished by the G.M.A.[23]

By 1 July 1894, nearly 50,000 men were on strike. Of the 24 railroads centering in Chicago, few escaped involvement. As the strike gained momentum, railway transportation became increasingly disrupted. Freight trains hauling boxcars loaded with perishable food supplies were soon unable to move.[24]

Walker had served as a general counsel for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad. He was also a legal adviser to the General Managers' Association.[2]

The Pullman, though it without malice to deny and referred to the origin of the grievance letter as "... was the only journal to report (correctly) that it had been suggested in connection to a grievance that the General Managers' association be the intended target." Walker's appointment involved no mention in the other journals.

Although Walker was employed by Pullman's attorney, it seems lawyers without that relation, in fact James Lewis, of the G.M.A., was the real director of strategy for the railroad department in Chicago.[3] Despite the information to the General strategy, Pullman's view is the author was actually completely ignorant of the operation of operations.

Before the 1893 crisis, [illegible] had never [illegible] had begun as there is a lack of [illegible] employees during the period. Even so, in July [illegible] were dependent upon at the local national employees terminated by the [illegible].[4]

By 1 July 1894, nearly half the men in service of the 21 railroads operating in Chicago, had changed involvement. In the short period [illegible] interpretation [illegible] strategy. Walker [illegible] leading [illegible] with [illegible] were [illegible] to [illegible].[5]

Olney urged U. S. district attorneys to take all measures necessary to prevent the stoppage of mail and punish the guilty. He suggested that injunctions against the strikers be obtained that would, in his words, "have the effect of preventing any attempt to commit the offense."[25]

The Attorney General's plan for suppressing the strike was not confined to strictly legal tactics. In a telegram to Edwin Walker, Olney said that he felt the best way of dealing with the matter was "by a force which is overwhelming and prevents any attempt at resistance."[26]

Harper's Weekly, in one of several personality sketches, referred to Richard Olney as "the moving spirit of the government . . . his cool and steady brain has discovered and given vitality to a doctrine of the authority of the national government."[27]

Walker and Milchrist drafted the petition for an injunction. They asked the federal court to enjoin all interference with the mail and to prohibit all interference with interstate commerce under the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.[28]

The injunction, issued by a United States Circuit Court, was extremely comprehensive. Officials of the American Railway Union and all other persons "combining and conspiring" with them were "restrained, commanded, and enjoined absolutely to desist and refrain from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stopping any of

Olney argued that, in America, Independence was first and necessary business in achieving the freedom of self and peoples and policy. He suggested that Independence against the mother in obtaining this policy, in the second, "were the effects of preserving any manner of means the existence."[21]

The Virginia Assembly's plan for supervising the English was not motivated by strictly legal considerations. It is indicative of their feeling, Olney said, that "in fact the law may of dealing with the mother was, in a free state, to be overwhelming and prohibitive, instead of individual."[22]

Thomas Jefferson, in his A Summary View, mentioned additional reasons, referred to Britain that in "the British Parliament of the government . . . , the land was always held for the common and given liberty by a monarch or the ministers of the national government."[23]

Adams and Jefferson thought the principle has to be independent. They argued the Indians were to provide all interference with the land and to provide all interference with independent commerce under the protection of the Indians land-trade law.[24]

The Indians then based on a United States Indian Trade Court, the principle independence. Although of the American Indians Tribe and all other Indians "regulating and commerce" with them many "restrictions, consequently and arrangement constituents to Indian and relinquish from it but manner interfering with, hindering, encouraging or obligating any of

the business. . . ." of the railroads. The injunction listed a myriad of specific acts prohibited. It even restrained Debs, president of the A.R.U., from "sending out any letters, messages, or communications directing, inciting, encouraging, or instructing any persons whatsoever to interfere with the business. . . ." of the railways.[29]

On July 2 the injunction was issued and served on Debs and other officials of the A.R.U. This was not the first time the union had faced such an order. The A.R.U. experienced a similar injunction during the Great Northern Strike and had successfully ignored it. Debs intended to ignore this one as well.[30]

While federal attorneys dealt with Debs, the General Manager's Association decided to take more direct action in order to draw the U. S. government into the struggle. Part of the G.M.A.'s policy had been to arouse the anger of the travelling public by aggravating the transportation tie-up. On July 2 the General Managers decided gradually to withdraw passenger trains from service.[31] This decline in railway traffic would be attributed to the boycott and strike "instigated" by Debs and executed by members of the A.R.U.

Part of the strategy developed between Walker and the G.M.A. involved the rationale that the A.R.U. was interfering with the mails. On July 1, however, the mail trains had free passage. In fact, the A.R.U. had even offered crews to move mail trains that included no Pullman cars.[32]

None of this strategy or this collusion between the G.M.A. and Walker was reported in the weeklies. They apparently accepted at face value "strike manager" Egan's assertion that the strikers had "fought" the railroads to a "standstill."[33]

Before the day was over, Special Attorney Edwin Walker had telegraphed Olney: "It is the opinion of all that the orders of the court cannot be enforced except by the aid of the Regular Army." In response, President Grover Cleveland directed that federal troops be prepared to move to Chicago.[34]

The next day U. S. Marshal Arnold wired Olney. A mob of several thousand had rioted in the Rock Island yards at Blue Island, Illinois. A mail train had been ditched. The marshal had read the injunction to the mob and commanded it to disperse. The mob responded with jeers and hoots, then threw several baggage-cars across the tracks. Arnold reported:

> I am unable to disperse the mob, clear the tracks, or arrest the men who were engaged in the acts named, and believe that no force less than the regular troops of the United States can procure the passage of the mail-trains, or enforce the orders of the courts.

Attorneys Walker and Milchrist, plus a federal judge endorsed Arnold's message.[35]

At this time, Illinois Governor Altgeld was sending troops to various points as requested by local authorities. He was prepared to move state troops to Chicago if the need

Some of this antagonism on their relationship between the Bishop and Bellmer was imported in the meantime. They apparently managed to have Father Virchis transport letters asserting that the Bishop had "fainted" the religious to a "nervous crisis."[33]

Before the day was over, Sgt-Maj Kenneth Tobin Bellmer had categorically stated: "It is the opinion of all that the action of the Irish Guards is directed solely to the aid of the Regular Army." In retaliation, Irish officers displayed displeasure when Canadian troops in prepared to come to Ghent.[34]

The main idea in the Belgian Canadian social diary, a web of personal discussion had arisen in the Irish Guards regarding the Canadian Militia. A very lively and long discussion. The decision had been made in consultation in the mess and communicated to the officers. The Canadian Militia Guards were laughed and jeered. Then there arrived Canadian-born officers from Toronto. Official resolution:

> I am prepared to accompany the men, sorry for
> inferior, or arrange for one and more transport in the
> Irish Guards, and believe that we have been treated the
> regular troops of the United States, and protestant the
> passage of the well-trained, to welcome the Canadian
> of the country.

Bishop Fallon and Bellmer, with a Canadian, were the Canadian Militia Guards.[35]

At this time, Allied Canadian officers were sending troops to various points on requested by local authorities. He was prepared to make social troops in Belgium if the need

arose. Arnold's telegram, however, made no mention of the availability of local police or state militia.[36]

In Washington, the President met with his Cabinet. Secretary of War Daniel Lamont, General Nelson A. Miles, and Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham opposed the use of federal troops. Attorney General Olney, however, was in complete agreement with the telegram he received from Chicago. President Cleveland decided to intervene. He ordered troops to Chicago under the authority of sections 5298 and 5299 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Governor Altgeld had not requested U. S. troops, nor had President Cleveland consulted with the governor in arriving at his decision.[37]

Federal Intervention, Official Protest and Violence

At 4:00 p.m. 3 July 1894 Army Headquarters telegraphed the order to Fort Sheridan that directed Colonel R. E. A. Crofton to move his entire command to Chicago. Olney wired Walker and Milchrist to ensure that troops were used "within the limits provided by the Constitution and laws." Troops were ordered to protect federal property, prevent obstruction of the mails, prevent interference with interstate commerce, and enforce the mandates of the federal courts.[38]

During that night some 1,200 U. S. Army regulars were brought into Chicago, "the Fifteenth Infantry, Troops B and K, Seventh Cavalry, and Light Battery E, First

areas. Arnold's telegram, however, made no mention of the availability of local police or state militia.[16]

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Federal Intervention, Military Tactics and Violence

At 4:00 p.m. 3 July, the War Department telegraphed the order to Fort Sheridan that directed Colonel R. E. A. Crofton to move his entire command to Chicago. Olney wired Walker and Milchrist to ensure that troops were used "within the limits provided by the Constitution and laws." Troops were ordered to protect federal property, prevent obstruction of the mails, prevent interference with interstate commerce, and enforce the decisions of the federal courts.[18]

During that night some 2,000 U. S. Army regulars were brought into Chicago, the Fifteenth Infantry, Troops E and K, Seventh Cavalry, and Light Battery F, First

Artillery . . .," according to the official report. The only journal to provide an accurate summary of these units was Outlook.[39]

By the morning of Independence Day the regulars had set up camp on Chicago's lake front. General Miles arrived and assumed command.[40]

Harper's Weekly described Miles as "a man . . . of perfect loyalty, of trained capacity, of sound judgement, unmoved by fear or passion, independent of political pressure, uninfluenced by prejudice, a ruler of others and of himself."[41]

According to Almont Lindsey, "Prior to July 4 the situation in Chicago did not go beyond some sabotage and an occasional demonstration that was quickly suppressed by the police." As the troops arrived the city was quiet. Although many trains did not move, this was in no way due to threatening mobs; it was due to insufficient crews.[42]

Soon, however, the workers heard of the arrival of the federal troops. Aggressive crowds began to form. Vandalism increased, and mobs at the Union Stock Yards halted the movement of all railway cars containing meat or livestock.[43]

Outlook was the only weekly to report that disorder in Chicago increased after the arrival of the regulars.[44]

Attorney General Olney told reporters, "We have been brought to the ragged edge of anarchy and it is time to see whether the law is sufficiently strong to prevent this condition of affairs."[45]

On the tenth day of the boycott, July 5, Governor Altgeld wired President Cleveland a long, vigorous protest on the presence of federal troops in Chicago. The Governor said it was "entirely unnecessary and . . . unjustifiable." He pointed out that a marshal in southern Illinois had twice requested state troops, that the troops had been quickly provided, and that the same course of action was open to the marshal at Chicago. Altgeld asked for the immediate withdrawal of federal troops and said:

> Should the situation at any time get so serious that we cannot control it with the State forces, we will promptly and freely ask for Federal assistance. . . .[46]

Cleveland made a terse, formal reply. He said that troops were sent to remove obstruction of the mails, to enforce the processes of the federal courts, and to cope with "conspiracies" against interstate commerce.[47]

The Nation said Altgeld's protest was perfectly understandable. He was the "anarchist" governor who had pardoned three Haymarket prisoners a year earlier; "it is only natural that he should sympathize with anarchists who have not yet been sent to prison."[48]

Harper's Weekly was equally outspoken: "In the light of burning property and amid the howls of furious throngs bent on cutting off the food of his citizens . . ." Governor Altgeld informs the President that federal interference is unjustifiable.[49]

The Independent and the Outlook both supported the President, but were more moderate in their denunciation of Altgeld. The Independent referred to Altgeld's protest as an "untimely and impertinent rebuke . . .," and justified federal intervention with the assertion that for a week or longer "the strikers have gone on . . . destroying property at a rate of two or three million dollars a day."[50]

Outlook less passionately declared, "It is no time for a public debate concerning the powers of the Federal Government," and urged men of all parties "to sustain the President . . . in enforcing law and punishing crime."[51]

That afternoon General Miles reported a mob of more than 2,000 had overturned about 20 freight cars, which obstructed all freight and passenger traffic in the vicinity of the stock yards. He added,

> The injunction of the United States court is openly defied, and unless the mobs are dispersed by the action of the police or they are fired upon by United States troops, more serious trouble may be expected, as the mob is increasing and becoming more defiant.[52]

Commanding General J. M. Schofield replied, telling Miles to protect U. S. property, but to leave the preservation of peace to city and state authorities.[53]

The Rock Island railroad reported having trouble from a mob of several thousand which was moving eastward along the line, overturning cars, burning station houses and destroying property. The Outlook, in an exaggerated report, said that mobs up to 25,000 obstructed tracks.[54]

Mayor Hopkins telegraphed Governor Altgeld and asked that the First Regiment of Chicago be alerted for possible duty within 24 hours. Altgeld complied with Hopkins' request immediately and ordered Brigadier General Horace A. Wheeler to take appropriate action in support of the mayor. By then the police force had increased to 3,500 men and was fully engaged in breaking up mob violence. And Hopkins had issued a proclamation prohibiting riotous assemblies and directing the police to stop people from interfering with the railroads.[55]

Late that night, a colossal fire of unexplained origins destroyed the seven largest buildings remaining from the 1893 World's Fair in Jackson Park. The result: one man dead and four injured. Harper's Weekly was the only journal to report the fire. It accurately declared that the "origin of the fire is a puzzle that will never be solved."[56]

On Friday, July 6, Governor Altgeld renewed his protest against federal intervention. In an even longer, even stronger objection, he wired the President:

> Your answer to my protest . . . evades the question at issue--that is, that the principle of local self-government is just as fundamental in our institutions as is that of Federal supremacy.

Altgeld charged the President with assuming a legal right to order federal troops into any community of the United States,

> . . . whenever there is the slightest disturbance, and . . . without any regard . . . as to whether the community is able and ready to enforce the law itself.[57]

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The governor repeated his belief that state troops were adequate to deal with the situation and again asked for the withdrawal of federal troops.[58]

Cleveland sent a one sentence reply. He denied that he had transcended his authority and concluded:

> . . . it seems to me that in this hour of danger, . . . discussion may well give way to active efforts on the part of all in authority to restore obedience to law and to protect life and property.[59]

Following Cleveland's response to Altgeld's second telegram, the Nation declared:

> President Cleveland's method of dealing with Governor Altgeld is a model one. He wastes no time in arguing with him or in defending himself against his attacks, but . . . sets him before the country in his true light as the friend and champion of disorder.[60]

Harper's Weekly expressed similar views. It called Altgeld a "demogogue" and a "crank;" said he has made himself a "counsel for those opposed to law;" and asserted that his protest to Cleveland "wholly misrepresented the facts as they were known to exist in Illinois . . ."[61]

The Independent made no mention of Altgeld's second protest. The Outlook, however, gave a concise, objective account of the incident.[62]

By then the struggle involved 27 states and territories. The federal government had sworn in thousands of deputy marshals; over 16,000 federal troops were being used to protect the nation's railroads. Although the American Railway Union had advised against strikes on roads that did

The governor requested his United Nations Ambassador to deal with the allegations and again assured the Ambassador of Iranian support.[3]

Cleveland sent a new memorandum daily. In fact, he felt that transmitting his authority and responsibility

> . . . is equal to the task in this land of ancient, . . . dismemberment may well grow out of . . . efforts on the part of all to maintain or restore conditions of law and to protect life and property.[4]

Following Cleveland's response to Ambassador Bowles's

[illegible], the Asian Bureaucrat

> Ambassador Cleveland's action of declaring Iran's government illegal is a model case. He acted on time in spelling out his or his subordinate's attitude against the situation. . . . [illegible] the country to its true place in the United and champion of democracy.[5]

Bowles's [illegible] suggested similar course. In [illegible]

Algeria a "Commonwealth" and a "Society" must be the [illegible]

Indonesia a "Council for Free Asian Nations to Serve" [illegible]

that the Division of Cultural Affairs [illegible]

[illegible] as they were [illegible] to [illegible] . . .[6]

The Department [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

process. The Division, however, [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] of the [illegible].[7]

By [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]. The Indian [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

to [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

not use Pullman cars, some of the local unions had decided to strike on their own initiative based on local grievances.[63]

Governor Altgeld was not alone in his protests against Cleveland. The governors of Missouri, Colorado, Texas, Oregon and Kansas issued similar complaints that federal intervention was unwarranted.[64]

Prior to the rioting on the Rock Island line and the overturned freight cars at the stockyards, damage to railroad property amounted to less than $6,000. None of the railroads had asked either Governor Altgeld or Mayor Hopkins for help. On July 6, however, railways began to request state troops and police.[65]

That morning, Governor Altgeld received a telegram from officials of the Illinois Central that indicated a riot was in progress. He told the president of that railroad to ask the mayor to seek assistance from the state. Then he relayed a message urging Hopkins to ensure that police and state troops dealt with the situation before federal troops could be reinforced. Shortly thereafter, the mayor wired the governor with a request for four additional regiments of state militia. Altgeld responded promptly. Over 4,000 state troops were ordered into the city.[66]

The weeklies differed in their accounts of this episode. None mentioned that the additional Illinois troops were requested by the mayor after Altgeld had urged him to do so. According to Harper's Weekly, Mayor Hopkins "called

not have failures only, some of the local unions had decided to strike on their own initiative based on local grievances.[33]

General Wiggins was not alone in his concerns against Communism. The governors of Kentucky, Colorado, Texas, Oregon and Illinois issued similar resolutions over Communist involvement and leadership.[34]

Prior to the violence in the coal fields, some saw the unrestrained criminal acts of the anti-strike groups as militant property measures to keep their jobs. Some of the railroads had taken active measures against strikers by hiring the help. On July 6, however, railroad officials requested state troops and deputies.[35]

That morning, Governor Lowden received a telegram from officials of the Illinois Central that contained a plea for his protection. In fact the president of that road said he was the major in the Southern from the Civil War. That he ordered a regular engine foreman to escort some police due which brought back with the locomotive before federal troops could be provided. Central officials, the major stated had assured him a crowd for the local union strike violence of their strikers. Illinois responded promptly. Over 1,000 state troops were rushed into the area.[36]

The troopers arrived in their automobiles at dawn against. Some witnesses that the additional Illinois troops were dispatched by the Governor Lowden had helped him to do so. According to Donnelly's history, Governor Lowden "ordered

on the Governor for militia, which were rather reluctantly furnished. . . ." The Outlook accurately reported that "the State militia was immediately ordered out." The Independent and the Nation failed to report the incident.[67]

Despite Hopkin's proclamation, lawlessness was prevalent along the railroad lines. Rioting mobs had demolished train stations, cut telegraph lines, and set fire to more than one hundred box cars. Incendiaries had ignited the cars with torches and the wind had fanned the flames through row upon row of tightly packed cars, stored in the outlying yards. Railroad property valued at $340,000 was destroyed.[68]

United States soldiers were kept busy in four locations dispersing mobs and supporting the marshals in making arrests of those violating the court injunction.[69]

The artist Frederic Remington, with the U. S. Army in Chicago, covered the strike for Harper's Weekly in several features with accompanying illustrations of the military. In one account he related,

> When infantry must walk through a seething mass of smells, stale beer, and bad language, they don't understand. The soldier idea would be to create about eleven cords of compost out of the material at hand.[70]

That afternoon, in a telegram to the Secretary of War, General Miles reported:

> Of the twenty-three [sic] roads centering in Chicago, only six are unobstructed in freight, passenger and mail transportation. Thirteen are at present entirely obstructed, and ten are

> running only mail- and passenger-trains. Large numbers of trains moving in and out of the city have been stoned and fired upon by mobs, and one engineer killed.[71]

Late that night at the railroad yards in South Chicago, an epidemic of fires destroyed some seven hundred cars. As the devastation reached its climax, more and more state troops were deployed to clear the tracks, protect property and restore order.[72]

The most serious incident of the strike occurred on July 7. A crowd had gathered at 49th and Loomis Streets. A company of state troops stood guard as a work crew attempted to raise an overturned box car. After a time, the mob threw stones and fired several shots at the guards. The soldiers were told to load their weapons. When four of the troops were wounded, orders were given to fire at will. The result: four persons killed and 20 wounded. This was the peak of violence in the Chicago phase of the struggle.[73]

Three weeklies reported this confrontation. The Outlook and Harper's Weekly each reported that it was the state militia which had engaged with the rioters. Their accounts differed as to the number killed and wounded, with the Outlook's estimate closest to official reports. The Independent was vague as to which troops were involved (i.e., "the soldiers meant business"), and said the incident happened on July 8.[74]

While the militia was engaged with rioters, General Miles and Marshal Arnold had decided to use 40 deputies and

July 8.

eight U. S. Army companies to protect trains bringing food and mail to the city. They began to clear the tracks.[75]

As the day drew to a close it became evident that the violence of the past 48 hours was waning. Chicago had survived several tragic, but limited spasms. The city was shaken, but police and Illinois troops, with slight backing by the regulars, had effectively put down most of the mob disturbances. Sensational news stories, however, distorted these developments beyond their true perspective. Many newspapers gave the impression that most of Chicago was convulsed by revolution and that President Cleveland and the federal troops were saving the city.[76]

The Collapse of the Strike

On July 8 President Cleveland issued an Executive Proclamation. He warned all persons having anything to do with unlawful assemblages to disperse and return home by noon on the following day.[77]

All the weeklies reported the proclamation. According to Harper's Weekly, it "fairly electrified the country. There had been nothing like it since Lincoln's call for volunteers. . . ." Remington, in a separate article, probably expressed the military reaction to the proclamation when he remarked, "Chicago should have been put under martial law immediately; a few rioters shot, and this would all have been over before now."[78]

At Uhlich Hall, headquarters of the American Railway Union, representatives from more than 100 locals of the Chicago trade unions met. They decided that another attempt should be made to induce the Pullman Company to accept arbitration. If the grievances of the Pullman workers were not settled by July 10, a city-wide general strike would be called.[79]

The following day a subcommittee composed of representatives from the Chicago trade unions and aldermen from a committee appointed by Mayor Hopkins called upon the Pullman Company. They proposed the creation of a board of arbitration consisting of two judges, two Pullman officials, and a fifth member acceptable to both sides. This proposition was flatly rejected; the Pullman Company again asserted there was nothing to arbitrate.[80]

The only journals to report the Pullman refusal were Outlook and Harper's Weekly.[81]

On July 10 Illinois troops at the Union Stock Yards succeeded in clearing a blockade which had halted the movement of boxcars loaded with meat. Trains on the Rock Island Railroad began to run. Additional federal troops arrived in Chicago, increasing the total there to nearly 2,000.[82]

Milchrist and Walker met with a special grand jury and asked for indictments against Eugene Debs and other A.R.U. officials on the grounds of conspiracy in the obstruction of mails and interstate commerce. Two hours

At Union Hall, representatives of the American Federation of Labor, representatives from more than 100 locals of the Chicago trade unions met. They decided that another attempt should be made to induce the Pullman Company to accept arbitration. If the grievances of the Pullman employees were needed to show the necessity of a permanent board, they could be called.[77]

The following day a committee composed of representatives from the Chicago trade unions met at noon with a committee appointed by Roger Sullivan called upon the Pullman Company. They proposed the creation of a board of arbitration consisting of two members, two Pullman officials, and a fifth member acceptable to both sides. This proposal also was flatly rejected. The Pullman Company again showed there was nothing to arbitrate.[78]

The only concession to labor the Pullman officials made was to meet with the Pullman employees individually.[79]

On July 12 Eugene Debs, in the Union Labor Party succeeded in obtaining a pledge from the United Trades Congress of Chicago, representing 200 unions, that unless the Pullman Company agreed to arbitrate the strike, the Labor Party would nominate a ticket. Debs in the Labor Party arrived in Chicago, accompanied by the Labor Party ticket of 5,000.[80]

Officials and Pullman had kept a careful watch upon the strike for indications during Debs and other A.R.U. officials on the advisability of remaining in and organizing of Debs and Lawrence Phelan. The Debs

later, Debs and three of his associates were indicted. They were quickly apprehended, but a few hours later they were released on bail.[83]

While Debs and his associates were in the custody of the court, several law officers raided his headquarters, seized his books and papers, and delivered them to the office of U. S. District Attorney Milchrist. The following day, however, a federal judge declared this to be an illegal procedure and ordered all of Debs' personal papers returned.[84]

Although all the weeklies reported Debs' indictment, none reported the illicit aspects of the raid on his headquarters. The Nation observed:

> The fact of the arrest of the head of the conspirators, the swift measures taken to collect overwhelming evidence against them, and the practical certainty that they will be convicted in due time . . . could but have an immediate and powerful effect. Debs . . . could not palm himself off as a Dictator much longer.[85]

Harper's Weekly reported:

> The United States attorney had some of the best legal talent in the city to assist him in his work . . . The papers and official documents of the union were seized by the Federal authorities, and the quartet was jailed. They were soon bailed out.[86]

Elsewhere the Weekly proclaimed:

> When men combine to effect an unlawful purpose, even by acts each of which may be in itself no offense, they are guilty of conspiracy, and all who abet them, knowing their purpose, share their guilt.[87]

Outlook's account included an explanation of the legal rationale upon which Debs was indicted. Rather than urging

later, John and three of his associates were indicted. They were quite quickly apprehended, but a few hours later they were released on bail.[5]

While John and his associates were in jail awaiting trial, the court, against the activists rather his inconsistent, seized his books and papers, and detained them in the office of D. J. Dorsey (Deputy Attorney General). The following day, however, a federal judge declared this to be an illegal procedure and ordered all of their papers returned.[6]

Although all the activists received their freedom, some regretted the illegal manner of the raid on the Lodge-quarters. The Sentinel commented:

> The fact of the arrest of the head of the Lodge-quarters, the small amount found to indicate conspiracy, or even unlawful intent, and the unusual manner in which they were all released in the time . . . shows that the authorities are somewhat ashamed. Now . . . really and truly herself is not a dangerous body indeed.[7]

Sentinel [illegible] commented:

> The Dorsey raiders [illegible] and some of the more legal minded [illegible] to realize that in the end . . . The papers and personal documents of the Lodge were seized by the federal [illegible], and the country was jolted. They were [illegible] out.[8]

Discussing the Sentinel commented:

> Even our readers may be asking, as activists ask, why, even in a case of which any of us in Toronto do believe, they are guilty as [illegible] and all who know them, [illegible] [illegible] guilty.[9]

Sentinel's support included an examination of the legal [illegible] upon which John was [illegible]. Various [illegible]

a hasty conviction, however, Outlook cautioned,

> A serious danger, now that the strike is over, is that the law will be stretched, if not violated, in popular passion against the strikers. . . . It is a great deal better that the officers of the American Railway Union be acquitted of crime, despite the injury they have inflicted on American commerce, than that they should be convicted by stretching the law. . . .[88]

As for the Independent, its report was concise and straightforward.[89]

Out of sympathy for the cause of the A.R.U., labor leader James Sovereign issued a call on July 10 for a general strike of the Knights of Labor. It proved a futile gesture, however, for the Knights refused to act.[90]

All the weeklies except Nation reported this incident involving the Knights. Harper's Weekly reported it in a separate feature about Sovereign. The Independent gave it a brief mention. The Outlook, however, was the journal to offer Sovereign's reasons for declaring the strike in sympathy with the A.R.U.[91]

The congress of Chicago trade unions soon learned that Pullman had refused to arbitrate. A city-wide general sympathy strike was called, effective July 11. It failed miserably. With Debs under arrest and the military in firm control of the city, only about 25,000 workers responded to the call. Most returned to work the following day.[92]

Meanwhile, in Washington, the Senate adopted a resolution expressing full endorsement of the "prompt and vigorous" measures taken by the President to deal with the strike disorders. An attempt was also made to add an

amendment supporting the principle of arbitration in resolving labor disputes, but it failed to pass.[93]

The Nation was quite pleased: "The Senate had . . . shown that there is no sympathy with anarchy outside the three or four Populist cranks" who tried to weaken the resolution.[94]

On July 12, Mayor Hopkins of Chicago and Mayor Pingree of Detroit called upon Vice President Wickes at the Pullman Company. They presented telegrams from 50 other mayors throughout the country concerning the strike and asking George Pullman to arbitrate differences with his men. Wickes repeated the official Pullman position that there was nothing to arbitrate. He told them the question of "reopening the shops at Pullman, and carrying them on at a ruinous loss, was not a proper subject for arbitration."[95]

That same day, the executive officers of labor unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor met at Chicago. The purpose of their meeting was to consider all aspects of the strike and to decide what policy, if any, should be adopted. Samuel Gompers presided over the meeting.

Debs, freed temporarily on bail, appeared before the conference and explained the position of the A.R.U. He asked Gompers to deliver a message to the G.M.A. from the A.R.U. proposing an end to the boycott on condition that the strikers be permitted to return to their jobs; if the offer were rejected a general strike should be ordered.[96]

amendment supporting the principle of arbitration in resolving labor disputes, but it failed by plus.[33]

The Editor was quite pleased: "The results had . . . shown that there is no sympathy with anarchy outside the ranks of some foreign-born workers" who intend to "make the revolution."[34]

On July 12, three hundred of Chicago and Cook County's leaders met in Grand Pacific Hall to discuss the Pullman strike. They passed resolutions that in effect supported the company, condemning the strike and calling for the militia to activate "whatever measures are necessary to protect property and life." Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld replied that there was nothing in existence. He had also the reputation of "sympathizing with those at Pullman, and serving him as a rational law, but not a proper basis for activities."[35]

That same day, the Executive Committee of Labor Unions affiliated with the Chicago Federation of Labor met at Uhlich's. The purpose of their meeting was to consider all aspects of the strike and to decide what policy, if any, should be adopted. Samuel Gompers presided over the meeting.

Debs, fresh immediately at hand, appeared before the conference and explained the position of the A.R.U. He asked Gompers to deliver a message to the C.F.L. from the A.R.U. pledging its aid to the support of organized labor if the strikers be permitted to remain in state. Only if the strike were rejected a general strike should be considered.[36]

The conference, though sympathetic with the cause of the American Railway Union, rejected Debs' request. As the Strike Commission explained:

> The conference concluded that the strike was then lost; that a general sympathetic strike throughout the country would be unwise and inexpedient. . . .[97]

Furthermore, the A.F. of L. delegates recommended that all striking men return to work. They were, however, in favor of a rapid settlement. That afternoon they wired President Cleveland, urging him to bring an end to the strike with fairness to both sides. The President neither acknowledged nor answered their request.[98]

Having failed to gain the full support of the American Federation of Labor, Debs asked Mayor Hopkins to deliver to the General Manager's Association the A.R.U. proposal which Gompers had declined to transmit. The mayor was willing to try.

The next day, July 13, Mayor Hopkins and a Chicago alderman called on the General Manager's Association and presented the document to G.M.A. chairman Everett St. John. A short time later the document was returned to the mayor with the explanation that the G.M.A. was unwilling to accept any communication from the A.R.U. John Egan, strike manager of the G.M.A., asserted that the document was insulting: it originated with the A.R.U. which had "attacked railway companies," was "whipped," and yet sought to "dictate the terms of the surrender."[99]

The conference, though sympathetic with the cause of the American military forces, rejected John's request. In the strong concluding sentiments:

> The conference considered that the Devil was then lord; that a general conflagration would consume the country which is worth and be-expectant. . . .[17]

Furthermore, the U.S. of A. delegates recommended that all publicity be reduced to zero. They also, however, in favor of a joint statement. This statement was being translated literally, saying that it would be not to the advantage of Germany to deny guerre. The Prussian military authorities had somewhat their trouble.[18]

Having failed to gain the full support of the American representatives at Lausanne, the Prussian leaders decided to deliver to the General Staff's instructions the U.S. proposal which requires the Prussian to consider. The major was willing to try.

The more so, only the major decided and a Prussian alderman called on the Prussian Ministry's Information and presented the document to a. [illegible] Prussian [illegible] A short time later the document was returned to the major with the instruction that the [illegible] is [illegible] any [illegible] from the U.S.A. [illegible] change of the [illegible], [illegible] the [illegible] publicity. It [illegible] with the [illegible] which was [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] in [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible].[19]

In the opinion of Eugene Debs, the proposal was returned because the G.M.A. "wanted to crush and annihilate the American Railway Union at whatever cost to the public."[100]

The Independent and Harper's Weekly each reported this final effort to end the strike by an agreement, but both reports were sketchy.[101]

The Weekly criticized Mayor Hopkins, who "instead of putting forth, at the beginning, his whole power to enforce the laws, played the dawdling part of a feeble mediator." Neither the Weekly nor the Independent reported the earlier effort of Hopkins and Pingree to secure arbitration with Pullman. The Outlook, however, covered both incidents, and did so in a more complete account.[102]

As Friday, July 13, came to a close there was little doubt that the strike in Chicago had been virtually broken. All rioting had ended and most trains were running on schedule. Mobs had succumbed to the combined forces of the police, militia, marshals and U. S. troops. With the arrest of Eugene Debs, the courts had deprived the A.R.U. of effective leadership.[103]

On July 16 a resolution was introduced into the U. S. House of Representatives. Similar to the Senate resolution of July 11, it expressed approval of the efforts of President Cleveland and his Administration to end the strike. Representative Lafe Pence, a Colorado Populist, argued against the measure. He said it was improper for

In the opinion of Tagore (who, she proposed was returned because she felt), "Gandhi is crude and exploiting the Indian failing today as whatever used to the people."[100]

The Independent and Gurney's Weekly each reported this final effort to use the nation in an agitation, but such reports were scarcely.[101]

The Indian contributed more negative, was "disgusted at meeting terms, as the Indpendent, also seemed inclined to attribute the slowly signed the dwelling part of a truly revolutionary. Neither the Weekly nor the Independent reported the recent efforts of Gandhi and Tagore to arrange satisfactory terms. The Indian, however, reported both interviews, and did so in a more sympathetic manner."[102]

On Friday, July 13, said to a close there was little doubt that the people in Durban had been thoroughly tired. All working has ceased and that public have reached an exhaustion. Even the government is the political terms of the police, military, commerce and in a "deadlock." With the arrest of Tagore here, the country has reached the crisis of activity immediately.[103]

On July 21 a resolution was introduced into the T.C. House of representatives. Further on the Tuesday preceding of July 23, it appeared received in the efforts of Theodore Cleveland and his representatives to end the strike. Interviewing with them, a telegram requesting argued against the measure. He said it was impossible for

Attorney General Olney, as a former railroad lawyer, to order indictments and injunctions against union officials. Congressman Richard P. Bland of Missouri also opposed the resolution. He protested the "omnibus" nature of the federal injunction and asserted, "The whole arm of the State authority should be used in suppressing violence before the Federal Government should intervene. . . ."[104]

Despite these objections, most congressmen felt that Olney was merely performing his duty; the resolution was adopted.

Before the day had ended, the New York Times proclaimed: "Strike is Dead."[105]

Harper's Weekly criticized Congress for its tardy support of the President:

> It was only after the popular response to the President's order to the troops and his telegrams to Altgeld that Congress found its voice sufficiently to denounce violence and commend the President for enforcing the laws of the United States.[106]

The Nation, in a similar editorial tone, concluded: now that the emergency is past, "no one will have any feeling but amused contempt for a House that falls a-fighting a fortnight too late."[107]

On July 17, one week after Debs and his top A.R.U. officials had been arrested and charged with conspiracy, they appeared again in federal court. This time they were charged with contempt of court in having disobeyed the injunction issued July 2. The defense requested sufficient

Attorney General Olney, as a former military lawyer, he order indictments and injunctions against union officials. Congressman Pickard of Board of Mediation did oppose the resolution. He predicted the "condition" worse of the federal injunction and asserted, "The whole law of the Union authority should be used in suppressing violence before the federal government should interpose. . . ."[111]

Despite these objections, such resolutions fail when Olney was nearly paralyzing his decay his resolution was adopted.

Before the day had ended, the new Union Pacific president: "Pledge to obey."[112]

Debs's family attributed Cleveland the help support of the President:

> It was only after the personal assurance to the President by Mr. Debs himself and his friends that the President was induced to direct that troops be withdrawn from Chicago and to discontinue the injunction and withdraw the indictments against the leaders of the Pullman strikers.

The Debs, in a similar editorial tone, continued: "We then the emergency in part, "We are still here by feeling that common necessity for a time when their union a fraternity has been."[113]

On July 17, the men after that and the Pullman officials had been divided and reunited with Association, they appeared again in federal court. This time they were charged with contempt of court in trying to violate the injunction issued July 5. The union representatives maintained

time to prepare its case. Despite the strenuous objections of Edwin Walker, the court deferred the hearing until July 23. Bondsmen were present, but the defendants waived bail and spent a week in jail.[108]

The weeklies made brief mention of the incident, but gave fuller coverage of the legal proceedings as they later developed.

Throughout the major struggle in Chicago, the Pullman strikers had remained quietly in the background. On 18 July, 1894, the management of the Pullman Company posted a notice on the gates of the shops:

> These shops will be opened as soon as the number of operatives taken on is sufficient to make a working force in all departments.[109]

All former employees, except strike leaders, had the opportunity to reapply for work provided that they would renounce their membership in the A.R.U. The strike had gained the workers nothing, and cost them a great deal; they were forced to accept their old wage scale and pay the same rents as in April.[110]

Pullman employees lost some $350,000 in wages; striking Chicago railroad employees lost over $1,000,000 in wages. The cost to Chicago railroads was nearly $700,000 in property damage and expanses, and more than $4,600,000 in passenger and freight revenue. By the time the strike ended in Chicago, 12 persons had been killed, 71 indicted, and 515 arrested on charges of murder, arson, burglary, assault and rioting.[111]

time to prepare its case. During the successive adjournments of both Houses, the court authorized the hearing until July 23. Commons were prepared, but the defendants refused and spent a week in jail.[110]

The revolver was held outside of the Dominion, but gave future coverage of the legal jurisdiction to later laws devised.

Throughout the major municipalities in Canada the Italian workers had received quietly in the backgroundness. By 1 July, 1924, the management of the Italian Canadian Journal a notice on the plaza of the Canada:

> These shops will be opened to show as the number of operations which on be activities in make a working force in all respectively.[111]

All labour organizers, except Italian leaders, had the opportunity to supply the same grievance that their wants remained fairly moderately in the [illegible]. The strike had ended the workers working, and made them a great deal they were forced to accept their all work which and by the same people as in April.[112]

Italian employees lost some $100,000 in wages; building citizens without employees lost over $1,000,000 in wages. The loss to Canada railroad and nearly $[illegible] in property damage and expenses, and over over $4,000,000 in passenger and freight revenue. By the time the strike ended in October, 22 persons had been killed, 70 injured, and 313 arrested on charges of murder, arson, burglary, assault and rioting.[113]

After the strike collapsed, Independent commented, "The act of the American Railway Union was an impudent attempt at dictation and coercion, and the whole country rejoiced in its failure."[112]

A summary of the key events in the Chicago phase of the Pullman Strike, the "Landmark History," is included as Appendix I.

Since the earlier manuscript, Independence commencement, "the use of the American Indian was so improved attempts at literature and oratory, and the white monarch replaced in the fables."[13]

A summary of the key events in the through which of the Pulitzer Prize, the "Indian Princess," is included as Appendix F.

CHAPTER II--FOOTNOTES

[1]Strike Report, pp. 140-41. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 244-45.

[2]Strike Report, p. XLII. Eggert, Labor Disputes, pp. 156-57. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 180.

[3]Strike Report, p. XL.

[4]John R. Finnegan, Sr., "The Press and the Pullman Strike: An Analysis of the Coverage of the Railroad Boycott of 1894 by Five Metropolitan Daily Newspapers," (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1965), p. 82. Hereinafter, Finnegan, "Press and Pullman Strike."

[5]"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46.

[6]"The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5.

[7]"A Senseless Strike," Independent XLVI (5 July, 1894), 858.

[8]"The Boycott of the Pullman Company," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (7 July, 1894), 627.

[9]"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 651.

[10]Strike Report, p. 354. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 293. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 134.

[11]Strike Report, p. XLII. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 138.

[12]Strike Report, p. 251. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 138-39, 204.

[13]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 141. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 161.

[14]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 153. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 159.

[15]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 158.

CHAPTER II—FOOTNOTES

[1] Service Report, pp. 140-41. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 414-42.

[2] Service Report, p. 142. Stewart, Labor Injunction, pp. 136-37. Taft, Pullman Controversy, p. 10.

[3] Service Report, p. 144.

[4] John E. Finnegan, Jr., "The Press and the Pullman Strike: An Analysis of the Coverage of the National Press of 1894 by Five Metropolitan Daily Newspapers," (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1971), p. 10. Manufacturer, Chicago, "Press and Pullman Strike."

[5] "The News," Pullman 2 (14 July, 1894), 6.

[6] "The Pullman Strike," Pullman 1-2 (13 July, 1894), 3.

[7] "A Business Crisis," Engineering 58 (13 July, 1894), 34.

[8] "The Report on the Pullman Troubles," Engineer 77 (13 July, 1894), 27.

[9] "Overcome the Obstacles," Engineer (Lond) 77 (13 July, 1894), 21.

[10] Service Report, p. 134. Also, "Commercial Gazette," p. 390. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 1.

[11] Service Report, p. 141. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 149.

[12] Service Report, p. 151. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 154-174.

[13] Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 171. Stewart, Labor Injunction, p. 38.

[14] Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 171. Stewart, Labor Injunction, p. 139.

[15] Stewart, Labor Injunction, p. 138.

[16]"The Situation in Chicago," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 655.

[17]Grover Cleveland, The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894 (Princeton, N. J.: The Princeton University Press, 1913), p. 14. Hereinafter, Cleveland, Chicago Strike.

[18]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 148-49.

[19]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 14.

[20]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 154.

[21]"The Week," Outlook L (7 July, 1894), 5.

[22]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 154.

[23]Strike Report, p. 343. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 165-66.

[24]Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 181. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 203.

[25]Olney's quotation cited in Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 163. Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 15.

[26]Olney's quotation cited in: Jerry M. Cooper, "The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military Intervention in American Labor Disputes, 1877-1900" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 228. Hereinafter, Cooper, "Military Intervention."

[27]"Men In Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 678.

[28]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 164.

[29]The full text of the injunction is presented in the Strike Report, pp. 179-80.

[30]Strike Report, pp. XL, 114. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 295.

[31]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 142.

[32]Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 183. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 293.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[33]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 144. The close relationship between the G.M.A. and Justice Department officials Walker and Milchrist in Chicago is clearly evident in the Report of the U. S. Strike Commission, pp. XIX, XXVIII, XXX-XXXI, XL-XLIII.

[34]Walker's quotation cited in Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 296. Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 21-22.

[35]U. S. Marshal Arnold's telegram is printed in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 25-27.

[36]Barnard, Life of Altgeld, pp. 290-91.

[37]Ibid., p. 293. Strike Report, p. XX. Lindsey Pullman Strike, pp. 164, 171.

[38]Strike Report, p. XX. Olney's telegram, printed in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 28; order to Crofton, pp. 27-28.

[39]U. S. Congress, House, Executive Docs., Report of Major General Nelson A. Miles, 1894, Vol. IV, Part 2, 53d Cong., 3d sess., 1894-95, p. 109. "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

[40]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 29. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 293.

[41]"Men In Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 678.

[42]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, (quotation) p. 203; p. 172. Superintendent of Police Michael Brennan's testimony, Strike Report, p. 293.

[43]Strike Report, pp. XLV-XLVI.

[44]"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

[45]Olney's quotation cited in Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 172.

[46]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 186. Altgeld's telegram, Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 40-41.

[47]Cleveland's telegram to Altgeld, Cleveland Chicago Strike, pp. 41-42.

[48]"Governor Altgeld and the President," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 22.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[49]"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650.

[50]"Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (12 July, 1894), 897. The Strike Commission said railroads lost less than $700,000 in destroyed property; Strike Report, p. XVIII.

[51]"The Strike: Our Present Duty," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 49.

[52]Telegram, Miles to Schofield, reprinted in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 30-31.

[53]Ibid., p. 31.

[54]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 195, 206. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 297. "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

[55]Strike Report, p. 347. Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 31-32. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 196-97.

[56]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 207. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 306. "The Burning of the World's Fair Buildings," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

[57]Telegram exchange between Altgeld and Cleveland, reprinted in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 43-45.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid.

[60]"The Week," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 19.

[61]"Men In Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 679. The issues raised by Altgeld are discussed in "State Rights and State Duties," same issue, p. 674.

[62]"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

[63]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 239-40.

[64]Wish, "Industrial Warfare," pp. 303-4.

[65]Ibid., p. 305. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 308.

[66]Strike Report, p. 347. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 198-99. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," pp. 304-5.

[67]"Men In Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 679. "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

[illegible]

[68]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 32. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 207.

[69]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 32.

[70]Frederic Remington, "Chicago Under the Mob," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 681.

[71]Telegram, Miles to Lamont, reprinted in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 31-33.

[72]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 208.

[73]Ibid., pp. 208-9. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," pp. 306-7.

[74]M. A. Lane, "The Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687. "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46. C. B. F. Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

[75]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 210. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 185.

[76]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 211. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 311.

[77]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 34-35.

[78]"A Word to the Workingmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 698. Frederic Remington, "Chicago Under the Law," Harper's Weekly, same issue, 703.

[79]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 223-24. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 185.

[80]Mayor Hopkins' testimony before the U. S. Commission, Strike Report, pp. 350-51. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 224-25.

[81]"The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85. M. A. Lane, "The Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

[82]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 174, 233.

[83]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 36. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 277-78.

[84]Strike Report, pp. 143-44. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 278-79.

[illegible]

[85]"The Week," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 39.

[86]M. A. Lane, "The Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

[87]"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650.

[88]"The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85.

[89]"News of the Week: Domestic," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 921.

[90]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 268.

[91]"The General Master Workman," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 679. "News of the Week: Domestic," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1893), 921. "The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85.

[92]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 225. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 174. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 185.

[93]Marion M. Miller, ed., Great Debates in American History, Vol. X (New York: Current Literature Publishing Co., 1913), pp. 402-7. Hereinafter, Miller, Great Debates. This work includes verbatim transcripts of the Senate and House debates concerning federal intervention.

[94]"Common Sense in the Senate," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 41.

[95]Strike Report, p. XXXIX; Wicke's testimony, p. 591; Hopkins' testimony, p. 351.

[96]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 226-27.

[97]Strike Report, p. XL.

[98]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 226.

[99]Egan's statement, Strike Report, p. XLI. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 229-30.

[100]Strike Report, p. 147.

[101]"News of the Week: Domestic," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 921. "Samuel Gompers, Labor Leader," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 702.

[illegible]

[102]"A Word to the Workingmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 698. "The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85-86.

[103]Strike Report, p. XLII. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 175.

[104]Miller, Great Debates, pp. 407-9.

[105]Finnegan, "Press and Pullman Strike," p. 226.

[106]"Legislators and Organized Labor," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (11 August, 1894), 722.

[107]"The Week," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 39.

[108]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 37. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 281-82.

[109]Strike Report, p. 591.

[110]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 268-69.

[111]Strike Report, p. XVIII.

[112]"Report of the United States Strike Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894), 1503.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CHAPTER III

THE ISSUES: AN EXPLANATION

On 19 July 1894, state and federal troops began to leave Chicago. On August 6 the last of the Illinois militia was ordered home. At the height of the struggle, more than 14,000 armed forces, including police and deputies, had been on duty.[1]

Elsewhere throughout the country the strike gradually collapsed. Grand juries were summoned, indictments drawn, and hundreds arrested for contempt. Few persons were actually found guilty.[2]

With Debs under indictment, the American Railway Union steadily declined in power.

At Pullman, Illinois, most of the workers who quit the A.R.U. were re-employed and by August 24, more than 2,300 men were back at work.[3]

To place the Pullman Strike in proper perspective, three topics remain: (1) the legal action against Debs; (2) the Report of the U. S. Strike Commission; and (3) repercussions of the strike.

Eugene Debs and the Federal Courts

Although Debs had been charged with conspiracy to obstruct mails and interstate commerce, proceedings related

CHAPTER IV

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

On 17 July 1949, Johns and Gaylord arrived Kansas Lagoon to learn Dillingham. On January 1 the base of the Military Medical was activated there. At the height of the struggle, there been 14,000 across Tarawa, including quite a few Marines, but been on duty.[1]

Elsewhere throughout the country the medical profession delighted. Based upon their experience, individuals drawn and hundreds accepted for commission. The Journal Medical editorially stated policy.[2]

This has been fundamentally the Dwelling Dillingham Union assuming dominant in peace.

At Philadelphia, Pilkington, head of the medical the said the A.M.A. were re-employed and it became 70, been than 4,000 men were then at work.[3]

To place the Medical Corps in proper perspective, three topics remain: (1) the legal status medical (2) the theory of the U. S. Medical Department and (3) medical conditions of the nation.

Power Gain and the Medical Corps

Although Corps had been plagued with complaints of shortage calls and inadequate resources, preparedness planned

to these charges were never completed. On 14 December 1894, however, Judge William A. Woods--one of the judges who had issued the injunction against the strikers--found Debs and his associates guilty of contempt. Debs was sentenced to six months in prison.[4]

Following an appeal to the Supreme Court, hearings began in March 1895. Two basic questions were raised: (1) whether the government had the authority to prevent forcible obstruction of the mails and interstate commerce; and (2) whether a U. S. court of equity was authorized to issue injunctions. On 27 May 1895 the Supreme Court issued its decision: both questions were answered in the affirmative and the proceedings of the lower court were upheld.[5]

Eugene Debs returned to prison to complete serving his sentence. By the time he was released from confinement he had become a determined Socialist, convinced that only a thorough revision of the prevailing economic system could right the wrongs of the working class.[6]

The Report of the U. S. Strike Commission

Under the provisions of a federal law passed in 1888, President Cleveland on 26 July 1894 appointed a three-man commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding the strike. Carroll D. Wright, U. S. Commissioner of Labor, was in charge of the investigation. Hearings began in Chicago on 15 August 1894, and for the next two weeks more than 100 witnesses were examined.[7]

to these charges were never convicted. In 1[illegible] [illegible]
1[illegible], however, Judge William H. Moore—one of the judges
who had issued the injunction against the strikers—fined
John and six associates [illegible] or imprisonment. They had
[illegible] to jail rather than pay.[illegible]

Following an appeal to the Supreme Court, Debs's
[illegible] in March 1[illegible]. The court [illegible] [illegible]
(1) whether the injunction had the authority to prevent
[illegible] conspiracies of the railroad and [illegible]
and (2) whether [illegible] or [illegible] had authority to
issue injunctions. On [illegible] the Supreme Court [illegible]
its decision. [illegible] questions [illegible] in the [illegible]
also [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible].[illegible]

Debs [illegible] to [illegible] to [illegible]
his [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]
be had [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible].[illegible]

<u>The Impact of the U. S. Postal Inspection</u>

Under the [illegible] of a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
1897, President Cleveland [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]
of [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].[illegible]

In addition to its findings, the U. S. Strike Commission made specific recommendations, several of which were: (1) that a permanent federal strike commission be established, with authority to investigate, make recommendations and decisions concerning railway disputes;[8] (2) that states be encouraged to consider the adoption of some system of conciliation and arbitration;[9] (3) that labor unions be fully recognized by law in order to "prevent their follies by conferring upon them the privileges enjoyed by corporations, with like proper restrictions and regulations;"[10] (4) that employers be urged to recognize labor unions, since "while the interests of capital and labor are not identical, they are reciprocal;"[11] (5) that employers should voluntarily raise wages when economic conditions permit such a change, but that if wages are reduced, workers should be given the reasons.[12]

The Strike Commission did not favor government ownership of railways as an immediate solution to the problems of labor. However, if railroads continued to consolidate, there would "at least have to be greater Government regulation and control of quasi-public corporations than we have now."[13]

The Report of the Strike Commission was made public in November, 1894, and provoked much comment in the press.

Repercussions of the Strike

The Pullman Strike challenged many of the laissez-

In addition to the findings, the L. A. Times Commission made specific recommendations, several of which were: (1) that a permanent labour relations commission be established, with authority to investigate, make recommendations and decisions concerning unfair practices;[7] (2) that statutes be amended to consider the adoption of rules governing of associations and individuals;[8] (3) that labor unions be fully regulated by law in order to "protect their members by safeguarding them from the privileges enjoyed by employers alone, with the proper restrictions and obligations;"[9] (4) that employers be legal to negotiate labor contracts alone "while the legislature of England and Europe are the identical, that are recognized;"[10] (5) that employers should voluntarily relinquish wages when business conditions justify such a change, but that if wages are reduced, overtime should be given the employee.[11]

The Times Commission did not favor government ownership of railways or any industrial activities as the problem of labor. However, it recommend in case additions, there should be laws made to provide compulsory regulation and control of monopolistic corporations that be have now.[12]

The issues of the Times commission are most similar to Greenbaum's 1911, and previous such commen in the press.

Investigation of the Press

The Times Series contained many of the issues

faire economic assumptions prevailing in the 1890's. It created precedents, implications and controversies that influenced the course of labor relations long after 1894.[14]

First, the strike led to the death of the American Railway Union. Labor began a shift to trade unions.

Second, the use of federal court injunctions in dealing with labor disputes became institutionalized, a trend that was not reversed until the 1930's.[15]

Third, states began to experiment with the creation of boards of arbitration and eventually enacted legislation responsive to the needs of laborers.[16]

Fourth, in 1898 Congress passed the Erdman Act, which provided for the voluntary arbitration of railway labor disputes by a three-man ad hoc commission. According to one historian, this law was evidence of a changed attitude on the part of the government, that force was no longer accepted as the ultimate answer to railroad strikes.[17]

Finally, in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (and related New Deal legislation), industrial workers were guaranteed the right to organize and bargain collectively through their own representatives.[18] As recommended by the Strike Commission, labor unions were at last "fully recognized by law."

Immediate Issues

Arising from the "original" strike at Pullman,

Debs episode: assumptions prevailing in the 1890's. It created precedents, legislation and controversies that influenced the course of labor relations long after 1894.[14]

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Second, the use of federal court injunctions in dealing with labor disputes became institutionalized, a trend that was not reversed until the 1930's.[15]

Third, Eugene Debs began his conversion with the formation of [illegible] and eventually [illegible] transition to the ranks of socialism.[16]

Fourth, in 1898 Congress passed the Erdman Act, which provided for the voluntary arbitration of railway labor disputes by a three-man *ad hoc* commission. Interesting is the indication, this the next evidence of a changed attitude on the part of the government, that force was no longer accepted as the ultimate answer to [illegible] problems.[17]

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Comparative Lessons

[illegible] from the "political" [illegible] at Pullman,

Illinois, were the issues of wages, rents, shop abuses, and the refusal of company officials to arbitrate.

Wage Reductions

The principle cause of the Pullman Strike of 1894 was a radical reduction of wages fostered by a depression in business conditions. Following the Panic of 1893, the market for Pullman cars decreased; employment dropped from 4,500 men to less than 1,100 workers by 1 November 1893.[19]

From September 1893 through April 1894, in order to meet the competition and keep the plant running, Pullman reduced the prices for his cars an average of 25 per cent. Because of this drastic policy, the company managed to secure sufficient contracts to keep the construction shops operating. As of April 1894, the working force had increased to nearly 4,200 men.[20]

During this period the Pullman Company lost almost $52,000 on its construction work. In comparison, the loss to labor by the reduction of wages paid on this work was over $60,000--an average pay cut of 25 per cent.[21]

Concerning this reduction in wages, several questions need to be asked.

(1) Could the Pullman Company have absorbed the $52,000 loss in revenue without reducing wages? The construction department, in which the company suffered this financial loss, was a small portion of the total business

Illinois, were the issues of company rents, shop abuses, and the refusal of company officials to arbitrate.

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From September 1893 through April 1894, in order to meet the competition and keep the plant running, Pullman reduced the prices for its cars an average of 33 per cent. Because of this drastic policy, the company managed to secure sufficient contracts to keep the construction shops operating. As of April 1894, the working force had increased to nearly 3,100 men.[15]

During this period the Pullman Company lost about $52,000 on its construction work. In comparison, the loss to labor by the reduction of wages paid on this work was over $60,000—an average per man of 25 per cent.[16]

Concerning this reduction in wages, several comments need to be stated.

(1) Could the Pullman Company have absorbed the $52,000 loss in revenue without lowering wages? The construction department, in which the company suffered this financial loss, was a small portion of the total business

conducted by the company. It employed only about 20 per cent of the total work force. The majority of the employees worked in the operating division, which, despite the depression, continued to earn substantial profits.[22]

According to historian Almont Lindsey,

> The revenue from the operating division in 1894 was sufficient to have absorbed all losses sustained in the construction department, to have permitted the payment of regular dividends, and in addition to have left a surplus of over $2,000,000.[23]

(2) Was the financial loss to the company fairly shared between management and labor? The evidence suggests it was not. As noted above, the Pullman Company did contract work during September 1893 to May 1894 at a loss of $52,000 below shop cost for labor and materials. The cost of building a car was about 75 per cent of total production cost. Yet the company passed more than its entire loss--$60,000--to labor in the form of reduced wages.[24]

As the Strike Commission observed, "Three-quarters of the loss for the company and the balance for labor would have more fairly equalized the division of the loss on these contracts."[25] Had Pullman shared the loss to his company in this manner with his employees, they would have lost in reduced wages only about 25 per cent of the $52,000, or $13,000. The average wage reduction would have been closer to five per cent.

(3) In justifying his refusal to increase the wages of his employees, Pullman argued,

> . . . the aggregate cost of a piece of work must not exceed its selling price. . . . This company can not control the selling price of cars, and it can not pay more for making them than it can contract to sell them for.[26]

Pullman claimed he was selling his cars at a price below the cost of building them. Assuming the cost of materials to be a "fixed" expense, in what ways other than wage reductions could he have reduced construction costs?

He could have reduced the "cost" of his managers. While Pullman workers in the shops lost about 25 per cent in wages, the salaries of officials, supervisors and foremen were not reduced at all. Reductions in these salaries, said the Strike Commission, "would have relieved the harshness of the situation and would have evinced a genuine sympathy with labor in the disasters of the times."[27]

Second, Pullman could have accepted a lower level of corporate profit. Despite declining revenue, the Pullman Company suffered no loss on its own earnings. During fiscal year 1894, the company had a surplus of $2,320,000 and paid dividends of eight per cent.[28] Commenting on this matter before the Strike Commission, a leader of the employee grievance committee said: "Mr. Pullman claimed he was losing money, and then two days afterward declared a [quarterly] dividend of $600,000, and that made the men much more determined to strike."[29]

(4) How did Pullman distribute the wage reductions among the various departments? The Strike Commission concluded that wages were cut in every department, regardless

of its financial condition, "to the lowest point possible to be reached in the department most seriously affected by the depression;"[30] the commissioners asserted that such a reduction was not relatively fair to repair shop employees.

Moreover, the percentage of wages reduced in each workshop varied considerably. Painters, for example, lost an average of 18 per cent; freight-car builders lost 41 per cent.[31] As Reverend William H. Carwardine, pastor of a church in Pullman at the time of the strike, noted,

> The cuts seemed to fall unequally on different classes of employees, the scale changed so often that the men were in a constant condition of wonderment as to what would be the next move. The worst feature was that . . . they did not have the opportunity to put in full time.[32]

(5) Why had Pullman continued to operate his factory if he was losing money on construction contracts? Pullman asserted that he had done so mainly for the unselfish reason of keeping his men employed.[33] The Strike Commission, however, rejected this contention:

> The commission thinks that the evidence shows that it [the company] sought to keep running mainly for its own benefit as a manufacturer, that its plant might not rust . . . that it might be ready for resumption when business revived with a live plant and competent help, and that its revenue from its tenements might continue.[34]

(6) Was it fair for the employees to demand their old wage scale? The Strike Commission blamed the company for reducing wages excessively, but said, "The company was hardly more at fault therein than were the employees in insisting upon the wages of June, 1893."[35]

According to Reverend Carwardine, however, the employees never really expected to obtain the old wage scale; they did, however, expect that at least "the Company would agree to lessen the severity of the cut in wages . . ., and then to reduce their rents. . . ."[36]

Rents

Concerning George Pullman, one observer in 1894 wrote: "The wages he pays out with one hand, the Pullman Palace Car Company, he takes back with the other, the Pullman Land Association."[37] The company controlled both wages and rents, yet the two were not coordinated to insure residents had something to live on. Wages were sharply reduced but rents remained constant.

The average rental in Pullman was $14.00 including the water fee. During the depression, rents had gone down elsewhere, but not in Pullman. This the workers considered unfair. Rents were up to 33 per cent higher than in other nearby towns and 20 to 25 per cent higher than in Chicago. One Pullman employee testified before the Commission that comparable accommodations in a nearby town could be obtained at about $8.00 a month.[38]

The Pullman Company maintained that its rents could not be reduced. The company expected to earn a six per cent return on the cost of its tenements, but claimed to be earning less than four per cent. Furthermore, said Pullman, if employees were dissatisfied with rents in his town, they

According to Lorenzo Gutierrez, Manager, the employees never really wanted to unionize and was only making this job, however, argued that it least "the company should agree to lessen the severity of the job to begin . . . and then to reduce that month . . ."[16]

Texas

Operating Texas Pulling, the company in 1921 stated, "The wages is very low and hard work, the Pulling Valve Oil Company, in cases have with the owner, for Pulling Land Association."[17] The company associated high wages and working job the has been not specifically be longer available and contributing to this job. Wages have always reduced the years resulted additions.

The average worked in Pulling was $1.00 including six years ago. During the depression, wages had gone down slowness, but not to Pulling. This was because unemployed market. Men may go as it is for long wages then is other money cases and in it to get work Pulling then is Pulling. The Pulling employee complained before the association that competition association in a month was would be increase as about $1.00 a month.[18]

The Pulling company maintained that the union would not be product. The company argument is work a six per week report on the work of its members, the Pulling is in starting from than four per day. Furthermore, said Pulling, if employees were dissatisfied with pension in his mind, they

were free to live elsewhere and were not required to rent in the company town.[39]

In the opinion of the Strike Commission, "The Company's claim that the workmen need not hire its tenements and can live elsewhere if they choose is not entirely tenable."[40] Reverend Carwardine said that workers were expected to rent company houses. He cited instances of employees who had told him they were urged to live at Pullman or be laid off. One strike leader testified that men were "required" to live at Pullman as a condition of employment. The Strike Commission found that employees believed they would be given work preference by renting at Pullman; thus they felt some compulsion to rent in the model town.[41]

Residents of Pullman were also subjected to several abuses in connection with their rentals. For instance, as the Strike Commission noted, tenants were required "to pay for <u>all repairs</u> which are either necessary . . . or which the company <u>chooses</u> to make."[42]

To increase the probability that the company would collect its rentals on time, workers would be given two checks: one for the amount of rent; the other for the balance due in wages. Although employees were free to cash their checks elsewhere, the Pullman Bank, where they were paid, also collected the rents. The town bank, as the Commission explained, "presses for the rent and is aided in

were free to live elsewhere and were not required to remain in the company town.[39]

In the opinion of the Joint Committee, the Company's claim that the workmen were not bound to live and the live elsewhere if they chose to not actually exists.[40] Interested representatives made this contention supported by their company lawyer. On about January of employees who had left the company town began to live in Pullman or in Lake City. One witness testified that they had been "required" to live at Pullman or a condition of employment. The Joint Committee found that employees believed that would be given more preference in getting in Pullman; thus they felt more compulsion to live in the company town.[41]

Inability of Pullman employees to secure housing elsewhere is evident in numerous cases. For instance, in the Joint Committee testimony, company spokesmen were requesting the [illegible] for all repairs which are Pullman necessary . . . in order the company [illegible] to work.[42]

To increase the probability that the company would obtain the results its [illegible] wanted to gain, the [illegible] one of the [illegible] at least [illegible] believe the [illegible]. Although [illegible] that it [illegible] their [illegible] paid, also [illegible] the [illegible]. The [illegible] of the Joint Committee [illegible]

collecting it by the knowledge on the part of the tenant that by arrears he may lose his job."[43]

Some witnesses before the Strike Commission testified that at times workers received checks for as little as four cents to $1.00 above their rent. The Pullman Company produced no evidence to counter this charge. Although the company was lenient toward those who could not pay their rent, and attempted no evictions during the strike, tenants felt they could be evicted on short notice.[44]

Concerning this grievance, the Strike Commission concluded:

> The demand for some rent reduction was fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Some slight concession in this regard would probably have averted the strike, provided the promise not to discharge men who served on the committee had been more strictly regarded.[45]

Shop Abuses

In addition to wages and rents, a third category of employee grievances was that of shop abuses, what Carwardine described as "unfair and tyrannical dealing on the part of certain foremen . . .," toward the Pullman workers.[46]

Blacklisting, nepotism, favoritism, intimidation, and arbitrary dismissal of laborers were among the complaints prevalent. "There is a constant feeling of insecurity," wrote Carwardine; "Men have put in years of hard, laborious work only to be dismissed without a moment's warning, and then scarcely to receive a word of thanks."[47]

When Pullman cut wages, yet left rents unreduced, discontent among the workers sharply increased. Inequality in wage cuts and lack of full time regular employment exacerbated this discontent. As workers became more rebellious, shop rules became more stringent. When friction mounted between well-paid foremen and under-paid laborers, shop abuses became a major complaint.[48]

What made these abuses seem so intolerable, was that no system existed by which employee complaints could be registered and investigated impartially. Apparently, no adequate structure for the expression of grievances was ever considered.[49]

As one historian put it, "The Company was determined not to share power with the employees, and in consequence, few opportunities for meaningful communication between labor and management were developed."[50]

The workers of the Pullman Company, after months of frustration, finally presented their complaints to the management on 7 May 1894. The grievance committee that met with Vice President Wickes, and subsequently with George Pullman, was told that rents and wages could not be adjusted, but that complaints of shop abuses would be promptly investigated.[51]

Wickes testified that he began the investigation on May 10 and that he had intended to devote "half of each working day to that business until completed." That night,

however, after three men of the committee were laid off for alleged lack of work, the local unions voted to strike and the investigation was dropped.[52]

Pullman's Refusal to Arbitrate

Despite Pullman's promise to investigate shop abuses, he absolutely refused to submit the questions of wages and rents to arbitration. As far as he was concerned, wages could not be raised because the company was already losing on its contracts; rents could not be reduced because the company was not earning its six per cent return on the cost of tenements.

Four times following the onset of the strike, the Pullman Company was implored to arbitrate: first, a proposal from the Chicago Civic Federation in early June; second, an ultimatum from the American Railway Union--either arbitrate or suffer the consequences of a boycott; third, an offer from the Chicago trade unions; and finally a sincere appeal from two mayors in mid-July. Each plea was rejected. Company officials said there was nothing to arbitrate.

The mayors of Chicago and Detroit--with telegrams from 50 other mayors urging arbitration--were not the only public officials to express concern for the cause of labor. In the Senate on 10 July 1894, a Kansas Populist, Sen. William A. Peffer said, "The time has come for employers

However, either alone or in the conditions have left it for adopted that of having the Court unless there is service and the investigations are dropped.[9]

Philosophy Behind an Initiative

Despite Pulliam's promise to investigate, some persons, he absolutely refused to remove the provision of wages and power to subpoena. In the end he had successfully argued could not be realize because the company was already losing on its construction while could not be realized because the company was not benefit in the far and which in and use of leadership.

That claim following the event of the hearing, the Pulliam Company was required to publicize. Thus, a proposal from the Chicago Labor Federation in April, that effected, an alternative law was required, which recognized affiliate or unions the recognized as a national union, or other from the Chicago Trade Unions and Labor's Educate appeal from the Governor in addition. Both also the objective. Company officials said there was nothing to applicants.

The success of Pulliam was Republican—and Pulliam from 20 other members which Pulliam—even the one and public officials to appoint members in the years of Labor in the Senate on 27 July 1944, a Senate resolution, Pulliam is further said, "The time has come for employees

themselves to learn that the best way to handle these situations [labor disputes] is by fair treatment of their men. . . ."[53]

Why did the Pullman Company consistently maintain this dogmatic position, that there was nothing to arbitrate? Pullman insisted that wages must be determined by the law of supply and demand, that management must be free to make economic decisions based upon business reality, and that these decisions must be made in a manner to safeguard capital.[54]

Nevertheless, evidence concerning the issues of rents and wages suggests that Pullman could have at least compromised with his men. He could have slightly raised wages, slightly reduced rents, lowered his eight per cent dividends, or, if necessary, drawn upon his $2,000,000 surplus from fiscal year 1894.

Ostensibly, Pullman was not willing to arbitrate because business conditions did not justify any adjustment in wages or rents. A more basic reason for refusing to arbitrate, however, was his hostility to the idea of conferring with organized labor. (This attitude was equally evident in the refusal of the General Manager's Association to consider an A.R.U. proposal to end the strike.)

When Wickes was asked by the Strike Commission whether employees had the right to have a union represent their cause to the company, Wickes replied: "They have a

right; yes sir. We have the right to say whether we will receive them or not."[55]

Both Pullman and Wickes were fundamentally opposed to the idea of negotiating policy decisions with employees. Presumably, even if Pullman conceded the company was financially able to adjust wages or rents, he would have resisted efforts to arbitrate because a principle was involved. As Pullman expressed it, "A man should have the right to manage his own property."[56]

Vice President Wickes, chief spokesman for the company during the strike, rejected one offer of arbitration in these terms:

> There is a principle involved . . . It is that employers must be permitted to run their business in their own way, and without interference from their employees or from anyone else.[57]

The Pullman Company did not recognize that labor unions had any place or necessity in the "model" town. The limit of a laborer's rights was to work or quit on the terms offered. The Strike Commission declared:

> This position secures all the advantage of the concentration of capital, ability, power, and control for the company in its labor dealings, and deprives the employees of any such advantage or protection as a labor union might afford.[58]

Underlying Issues

Although less frequently discussed by strike participants, the underlying issues of paternalism and a lack of democracy in Pullman, Illinois, contributed significantly to the discontent leading to the strike.[59]

highly you are. We have the right to my business as well as anybody else or not.[41]

Both Pullman and Gibbons were Democratic-party appointees to the task of negotiating policy disputes with employees. Temporarily, when if Pullman succeeded the company was financially able to adjust wages or remedy its social injustices, employees or sympathetic persons in publicity-conscious reformers. As Gibbons expressed it, "if men should have the right to manage his own property."[42]

When President Wilson, after appointees for the railroad during the war, referred men either to arbitration or strike he stated:

> There is a principle involved . . . It is also, employers, such as participated in that which involves in their own body, but national interests have their employees in their employ also.[43]

The Pullman Company did not recognize that labor unions had any place or necessity in the "public" issue. The idea of a industrial citizen was to work or quit on the terms offered. The Pullman manager declared:

> This position involves not the existence of the unionization or anything similar, but the control for the company in the future and the employees or protection of a large union right already.[44]

Publicity Issue

Although less frequently discussed in daily newspaper editorials, the unsettling issues of publication and a lack of decorum in Pullman, Illinois, nevertheless significantly be the disconcerting feeling to the public.[45]

Paternalism

Pullman was a town in which the corporation was omnipresent and exerted a pervasive influence over the lives of residents.

The so-called "Pullman system" was intended to be a harmonious blend of industrial efficiency and a gracious, attractive living environment. In exchange for all the town's attractive features--a theater, a library, parks, gardens, churches and sanitary facilities--the inhabitants paid not only in high rents, but in a sacrifice of individual freedom.

Reverend Carwardine said the town was not what it pretended to be:

> It is a sort of hollow mockery, sham, an institution girded with red tape, and as a solution to the labor problem a very unsatisfactory one . . . while it possesses some excellent features, still its deficiencies overbalance its beauties . . . It is a civilized relic of European serfdom.[60]

What were some of these deficiencies?

(1) Pullman refused to allow employees the right to buy land or build homes in the company town.[61]

(2) Tenants were required to sign a lease having a "ten-day clause." It enabled the company on short notice to get rid of undesirable renters, and served as a powerful incentive to keep Pullman inhabitants from opposing company policies.[62]

(3) As previously mentioned, the Pullman Bank issued two checks to employees, one of which was made out in the

Pullman was a town in which the corporation was omnipresent and exerted a pervasive influence over the lives of residents.

The so-called "Pullman system" was intended to be a benevolent union of industrial efficiency and a wholesome enhancing living environment. It endeavors to provide beside attractive leisure--a church, a library, public gardens, churches and sanitary facilities--the industrial paid has only in high money, but in a majority of individual income.

Industrial Commission said the town was not what it pretended to be:

> It is a land of Indian summer, then, in Pullman--when global mill was down, and is a solution to the labor problem a very satisfactory one ... while it possesses many excellent features, still the definitely organized in Pullman ... it is a civilized cells of Everyone welfare.[8]

That been some of these institutions:

(1) Pullman refused to allow employees who rent to buy land or build homes in the company town.[9]

(2) Workmen were obliged to sign a lease having a "take-or-leave-" in exchange for the opportunity to rent to be get rid of undesirable tenants, and served as a powerful incentive to keep Pullman inexpensive from obtaining unions politics.[10]

(3) As particularly mentioned, the Pullman Town Company has chosen to employees, non of which was made but in the

amount of rent due. Before a worker could leave the bank he was pressured to pay his rent without delay.

(4) There was no system of public relief. Those who were unemployed, too old, or too poor to pay rent were expected to leave.[63]

(5) Although the company normally provided medical care to employees who were injured, if the company determined an injury to be "unavoidable," the employee would be required to pay the full cost of his hospital bills.[64]

(6) To insure that town residents conformed to company policies, a system of espionage and surveillance was maintained. Any deviant behavior was promptly reported to Pullman officials.[65]

In summary, the company subjected Pullman residents to constant corporate control.

Absence of Democracy

Related to paternalism was the absence of democratic procedures by which residents might contribute to the policies affecting the town.

The Pullman Company maintained coercive political control over the town. All local officials, except members of the school board, were appointed by the corporation. When elections were held, and George Pullman felt that his candidates needed more support, he did not hesitate to influence voting.[66]

The First Amendment rights of labor agitators and radicals were often violated; Pullman prevented them from speaking by refusing to let them rent or use public halls.[67]

The Strike Commission said the exclusion of inhabitants from any participation in management of the town may have prevented their grateful acceptance of the advantages of living in Pullman.[68]

Related Issues

Once the boycott and railway strike began, several related issues became prominent. These were discussed primarily by the Strike Commission, the mass media, politicians or historians. They include: (1) the Chicago Boycott and Strike, (2) the "Omnibus Injunction," (3) Federal Intervention, (4) Violence, and (5) the End of the Strike.

The Chicago Boycott and Strike

Why did the American Railway Union decide to boycott? The Pullman strike was a month old when delegates to the A.R.U. convention met in Chicago. None of the grievances expressed by Pullman workers had been resolved, and the company had refused even to consider a discussion of wages or rents.

Many of the men at Pullman had joined the A.R.U. during March and April, 1894, in an effort to gain a more powerful bargaining position *vis-a-vis* the corporation. In

The Civil Rights Commission rights of Indian applicants and employees have been active, considering the cases presented them, and appealing to authorities on the home front on their behalf.[17]

The Service Commission also has jurisdiction of complaints taken from any qualified applicants or employees who have presented their grievance to representatives of the Commission at Sitting in Indiana.[18]

Personal Grievances

Even the Federal and Indian Service Commissions, mentioned treated herein previously, those have jurisdiction primarily by the Service Commission, the same merely provides an investigation. The Indians: (1) the Civil Rights Commission and Service, (2) the Indian Commissioner, (3) the Indian Bureau Commissioner, (4) Congress, and (5) the Sun or the Service.

The Indian Service Commission

Why did the Indian Service Commission Service be required? The Indian Service was a result of a long and hard struggle by the A.F.L. organization and it changed. Even so the government represented by Indian service and some Congressmen, and the company had problems with it attempts a discussion of wages or rights.

Then at the end of Indian and Indian the Indian Service Service Bureau and agents, they, it is a fight to make a more powerful bargaining position [illegible] the organization. In

mid-June, spokesmen for the workers presented the A.R.U. convention with their complaints against the company.

The officers and directors of the A.R.U. counselled against any further escalation of the dispute; they knew that the times were inopportune for a strike. Numerous men were unemployed and stood ready to accept almost any offer of work.[69]

Nevertheless, A.R.U. delegates felt sympathy for the plight of Pullman workers. The union had been successful in its strike against the Great Northern and was overconfident. Acting upon instructions from their locals, the delegates voted unanimously to boycott Pullman cars if Pullman would not agree to discuss settlement of the workers' complaints.[70]

What caused the strike among railroad employees? The boycott became a general railroad strike after the General Manager's Association decided to resist both the A.R.U. and the boycott. The G.M.A. declared it would fire any railroad employee who refused to handle Pullman cars, even though he might be willing to perform all other duties. It began to import workers from the East to fill positions vacated by those who struck or were fired, and initiated legal proceedings in cooperation with the U. S. attorney in Chicago.[71]

The employees of the 24 railroads subject to the unified decisions of the G.M.A. were predisposed to strike

also-ran, spectacular for the medium presented the [illegible] competition with their respective opinion and attitude.

The efforts and attendance of the S.C.C. demonstrated against the further availability of the electrical [illegible] that the times were inappropriate for a revolution. Therefore they were unemployed and [illegible] to attempt change by other means.[67]

Revolutionaries, S.C.C. delegates call upon people for the rights of Italian workers. The value has been successful in its efforts against the owner landlords and non-[illegible] citizens. Seeing open discussions from their leader leading the delegates urged unanimously to inform Italians that if Italians would not agree to discuss settlement of the workers' complaints.[68]

They [illegible] the media using Italians employment. The journal taking a general [illegible] media across the country [illegible] conditions [illegible] to [illegible] S.C.C. and the journal. The Italian delegate it would give the [illegible] employers who refused to bargain Italian workers. [illegible] be able be willing to perform all other duties. It began to impact workers from the time be still [illegible] pressure by those who [illegible] Finally, and initiated legal proceedings to [illegible] with the R. C. Railway in Chicago.[69]

The [illegible] of the S. [illegible] workers to the [illegible] conditions of the C.C.C., were [illegible] to [illegible]

sympathetically. Like the Pullman employees, they too had been the victims of repeated wage cuts and had similar grievances against their employers. When the railroads began firing A.R.U. members for their participation in the boycott, many local unions voted to strike in retaliation.[72]

According to George W. Howard, vice president of the American Railway Union,

> The cause of the trouble . . . between the railroad companies and their employees was the declaration on the part of the general managers of the various roads that they would back Pullman.[73]

As the Strike Commission noted,

> The contracts between the railroads and the Pullman Company as to the Pullman cars created such close relations between them as to increase the natural sympathy of organization between the members of the American Railway Union upon railroads and their brothers at Pullman.[74]

Why did the General Manager's Association decide to resist the boycott? Officially the managers maintained that the boycott was intolerable because it would inconvenience the travelling public and it represented an attempt by a labor union to dictate which cars the railroads could or could not haul. Furthermore, to discontinue the use of Pullman cars would violate existing contracts.[75]

According to historian Gerald Eggert, this statement concerning contracts was an excuse rather than a reason for resisting the boycott:

> The sample contract presented to the United States Strike Commission at the close of the disorders . . . revealed that the companies had complete discretion in the use of Pullmans. The

> contract made no mention of how many Pullman cars, or when, or on what classes of trains they were to be used. It simply provided that whenever sleeping cars were used they had to be leased from the Pullman Company.[76]

One commissioner asked G.M.A. chairman St. John whether the railroads were free to leave Pullman cars off any class of trains they desired. St. John replied, "We are. We are not required to operate any of the Pullman cars upon trains where the cars are not required. It is entirely at the option of the company."[77]

Quite naturally the managers were opposed to discontinuing the use of sleeping cars; it obviously would have been harmful to their business. Nevertheless, they chose to explain their resistance to the boycott, not in these candid terms, but with the rationale that contracts required continued use of Pullman cars.

Perhaps a more fundamental reason for G.M.A. opposition to the boycott was the managers' desire to protect their official prerogatives. The G.M.A. was hostile to the A.R.U. because it threatened those prerogatives.[78]

This hostility to the union was evident in St. John's testimony before the Strike Commission:

> As I understand it, . . . the American Railway Union is an effort to combine within its own order all employees of all branches of organized labor upon the various railroads. . . . I think there is no necessity for an organization of that kind.[79]

To surrender to the A.R.U. boycott might have led to legal action against the managers by Pullman. Certainly the exclusion of sleeping cars would have inconvenienced

> [illegible] by [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

passengers. But more important, in the view of historian Gerald Eggert,

> Surrender would have vastly strengthened the A.R.U. and Debs. Resistance, on the other hand, involved no legal risks whatever and promised to check, if not eliminate the power of the A.R.U.[80]

Debs defended his union before the Strike Commission:

> The General Manager's Association was instituted for the declared purpose of cooperating together in reducing wages. Now, then, we take the view that if they have a right to combine to reduce wages, we have a right to combine to resist the reduction. If a strike ensues . . . they are as much responsible as we are. If they make a reduction that results in a strike, they are at least as culpable as the employees.[81]

The Strike Commission implied that at least part of the blame for the railroad strike could be attributed to both George Pullman and the General Managers,

> . . . employers who obstruct progress by perverting and misapplying the law of supply and demand, and who, while insisting upon individualism for workmen, demand that they shall be let alone to combine as they please and that society and all its forces shall protect them in their resulting contentions.[82]

The "Omnibus" Injunction

The General Manager's Association—an organization the Strike Commission said was illegal and unjustifiable—was determined "to crush the strike rather than to accept any peaceable solution through conciliation, arbitration or otherwise."[83] The G.M.A. accordingly sought to create conditions that would lead to federal intervention.[84]

The railroad managers found the Justice Department

parameters. The were important, in the view of Liberties Derek Rights.

> Interface would have really strengthened the A.C.D. and DPA. Initiatives, on the other hand, involved no legal rights whatever and provided no sheet, if one eliminate the power of the A.C.D.[30]

Lady Patricia did write before the Bills Committee:

> The General Inspectorate Committee was intended for the delayed purpose of consolidating together in reducing wages. Now, then, in view the view that if they have a right to decline to reduce wages, we have a right to enable to insure the reduction. If a strike ensues . . . they are as much responsible as we are. If they make a reduction that results in a strike, they are at least as culpable as the employees.[31]

The Strike Resolution implied that it takes two of the plans for the national strike could be attributed to both George Pollock and the General Inspectorate

> . . . employers who generally proceeded to intervening and eliminating the law of supply and demand, and who, while insisting upon the liberties for themselves, demand that they should be let alone to combine as they please and that society and all the terrors should protect them in their restrictive combinations.[32]

<u>The "Conspiracy" Discourse</u>

The General Inspectorate's inactivities--organization the Strike Resolution said was illegal and objectionable--was designated "of which the strike leaders then to attempt any peaceably realize between conditions, activities or otherwise."[33] The strike, accordingly sought to create conditions that would lead to peaceful harmonization.[34]

The railroad managers found the strike appropriate

to be fully cooperative. The G.M.A., in conjunction with the U. S. attorney in Chicago, Thomas Milchrist, decided that the federal government should first intervene through the courts. It was agreed that a court injunction was needed that would have the effect of making all strike-related activities illegal. This strategy was fully supported by Attorney General Olney.

The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and subsequent Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890, prohibited any combination in restraint of interstate commerce. They also provided the statutory basis for issuing injunctions by U. S. courts to prevent violations of these laws.[85] According to one historian, there is no evidence in congressional debates that Congress ever intended these laws to be evoked against labor. Nevertheless, in April 1894 a federal judge interpreted the Anti-Trust Law by ruling that a strike, when directed against a railroad, was a combination in restraint of interstate commerce, and hence, illegal.[86]

Although the Sherman Act seemed designed to prosecute trusts, Attorney General Olney saw no reason why it should not apply to labor unions. This was quite natural. Olney had been a corporate railroad lawyer. As he himself declared, his motive was to "make it [the strike] a failure everywhere."[87]

In pursuance of this objective, he appointed Edwin Walker as a special U. S. attorney in Chicago. Walker had been legal counsel to the G.M.A.; he was selected for his

to be fully cooperative. The Grievy, in conjunction with the U. S. Attorney in Chicago, Thomas Sullivan, decided that the Federal government should file injunction against the employer. In the spring year a joint injunction was needed that would have the effect of making all organizer-related activities illegal. This injunction was fully supported by Attorney General Olney.

The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and subsequent Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, prohibited any combination in restraint of interstate commerce. Thus also provided the statutory basis for issuing injunctions if it is deemed to prevent violations of these laws.[26] According to one historian, there is no evidence in congressional debate that Congress ever intended these laws to be applied against labor. Nevertheless, in early 1894 a federal court granted the Anti-Trust law be applied when a company, some disturbed employees - activated, was a conspiracy to restrain of interstate commerce, and hence, illegal.[27]

Although the Sherman Act seemed designed to prevent trusts, although Senator Sherman was no reason why it should not apply to labor unions. They had quite adequately. Thus has been a company policies lawyer. As is already discussed, the courts are to force to [the worker] a failure employers.[28]

In pursuance of this policies, in application labor union as a monopoly U. S. attorney in Chicago. Talker had been legal counsel to the Pullman in the delivery for his

job by Olney upon the recommendation of the G.M.A. Walker was thoroughly committed to the cause of the railroads and acted accordingly. Concerning Walker's appointment, Clarence Darrow, who defended Debs at his trial, declared, "The government might with as good grace have appointed the attorney for the American Railway Union to represent the United States."[88]

With the full support of both Olney and the G.M.A., federal attorneys Walker and Milchrist drafted the petition for an injunction under the provisions of the Anti-Trust Law.[89]

Federal courts and the law in the 1890's generally worked to the disadvantage of organized labor, "being better calculated to protect property, including the property of corporations, than to protect the wage earners in their union activities," as one historian explained.[90] Consequently, when Walker and Milchrist approached federal judges Peter S. Grosscup and William A. Woods, they found the judges fully cooperative; the judges even assisted the attorneys in perfecting the bill for an injunction.[91]

As noted earlier in this study, the injunction was extremely comprehensive. It applied to all persons within the jurisdiction of the court who were involved in obstructing the movement of mail or interstate commerce on almost every railroad connected with the G.M.A. One provision enjoined any striker or union official from persuading

job by going upon the reservation at the trial. Judge Ray knowingly overlooked so far gross a violation of sound knowledge. Concerning Indians' experience, Director Sarver, who directed them at his trial, believes, "The government might with as good grace have appealed the address to the American Indian Bureau to represent the Indian Bureau."[96]

Even the full rigmarole of both sides and the trial's federal attorneys failed and Illinois defined and decided for an injunction under the provisions of the Indian-Trust law.[97]

Federal courts and the law in the 1920's generally worked as the disadvantage of Indians. Judge Ray, relentlessly in private property, including the property of superintendents, then to prevent the Sioux Indians in their action against the Illinois Indians.[98] Generally, when trial and district appellate federal judges refer to Indians and Illinois in trouble, they find the judges fully convinced the judges were according the attorney in protecting the full law in injunction.[99]

As never another in this county, the Indians are extremely unsophisticated. In spite of all personal health the jurisdiction of the court who were involved in conducting the interests of well as successful numbers as almost every criminal connected with the Indian. The jurisdiction explained by Sarver or Indian original from attorneys

any employee to quit his job. Any attempt to violate the injunction could result in a citation for contempt and summary punishment by the court.[92]

According to historian Harry Barnard, this "omnibus" injunction was only a means to get the U. S. Army into Chicago.[93] All that was needed to justify the intervention of federal troops was a single, clear violation of the prohibition against interference with the mails. When the injunction was issued, Debs ignored it. But when U. S. Marshal Arnold read the court order to a large crowd at a railway yard, the crowd soon became an angry mob and deliberately blocked the rails with overturned boxcars. The mails were reportedly obstructed. On that basis President Cleveland sent in the regulars.

Despite the fact that there was nothing in any law, express or implied, that a mail train necessarily included Pullman cars, the Justice Department had ruled that a mail train comprised all cars hauled by such a train. Under this ruling railroad officials could claim that Pullman cars were normal components of mail trains. Federal officials, in turn, could declare that any person attempting to detach a Pullman car from such a train was guilty of obstructing the mail.[94]

The A.R.U. claimed that the G.M.A. ordered Pullman cars attached to mail trains, which normally travelled without them, as a means of provoking trouble and arousing

any employee to quit his job. Any attempt to violate the injunction would result in a citation for contempt and summary punishment by the courts.[25]

According to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], this "blanket" injunction was only a means to get the U. S. Army into Chicago.[27] All that was needed to justify the intervention of Federal troops was a minor, token violation of the prohibition against interference with the mails. When the injunction was issued, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] U. S. Marshal Arnold read the court order to a large crowd at a railway yard, the crowd [illegible] [illegible] in anger and deliberately blocked the trains with [illegible] [illegible]. The mails were supposedly obstructed. On that basis President Cleveland sent in the regulars.

Despite the fact that there was nothing in the law, express or implied, that a mail train necessarily included Pullman cars, the railroad management held that a mail train comprised all cars hauled by such a train. [illegible] this ruling [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] that Pullmans were [illegible] [illegible] to mail trains. [illegible] [illegible], it [illegible] [illegible] declare that any person attempting to detach a Pullman car from such a train was guilty of obstructing the mail.[33]

The A.R.U. claimed that the G.M.A. ordered Pullman cars attached to mail trains, which normally traveled without them, as a means of provoking trouble and involving

public opinion against the union. This assertion is debatable. But there is some evidence that railroad officials were determined that no mail train would leave without its regular cars. Any interference with a Pullman car on such a train was construed as obstruction of the mails, in violation of the injunction. Offers of the A.R.U. to run mail trains that excluded Pullman cars were ignored.[95]

As the strike developed labor unions adopted resolutions criticizing the policies of the federal government, condemning the injunction and the use of the U. S. Army. It appeared as though the government had combined with the corporations to crush labor.[96]

One historian suggests the U. S. Government could have avoided taking sides by insisting that railroads move the mail on trains without Pullman cars.[97] Had this policy been followed, it would have been difficult to find strikers in violation of the injunction, hence, there would have been less justification for the use of federal troops.

The "omnibus" injunction not only prohibited interference with the mail, it also enjoined strikers and union officials from urging workers to join the struggle. Because Debs ignored this provision and continued to send out telegrams to local unions, on 17 July 1894 he was cited for contempt. The Strike Commission commented,

> It is seriously questioned, and with much force, whether courts have jurisdiction to enjoin citizens from persuading each other in industrial or other matters of common interest. However, it

public opinion against the union. This conviction is demonstrably, but there is some evidence that employed officials were determined that no small crack should in their eyes upset the regular core. Any inconsistency with a failure not to send a bride has manifested as obstruction of the union, in violation of the injunction. Orders of the A.F.L. to cut mail trains that continued failure may have followed.[7]

In the strike involved other union members, resulting in the injunction and the use of the U. S. Army. It appeared to always the government that unions with the exception to strike taken.[8]

The injunction requires the U. S. Government could have avoided calling aides by insulating the mail service the mail on trains without failure occur.[9] Had this policy been followed, it would have been difficult to find reasons in violation of the injunction. Hence, there would have been less justification for the use of federal troops.

The "soldiers" injunction had that strikers, forbade strike the mail, by giving striking strikers and union officials from asking workers to join the strikers. Because they ignored this provision and continue to call for strike given to local unions, on 27 July 1894 he was cited for contempt. The trial lasted two days.

It is definitely questionable, and with such force, whether courts have any jurisdiction to enjoin citizens from participating with other in industrial or other matters of common interest. However, it

> is generally recognized among good citizens that a mandate of a court is to be obeyed until it is modified and corrected by the court that issued it.[98]

Federal Intervention

As the Pullman Strike evolved into a general strike, Governor Altgeld was closely monitoring the situation in Chicago. He was determined to use his full authority to maintain peace; he conferred frequently with officers of the Illinois militia and was prepared to send 100,000 men to Chicago if necessary.[99]

One historian observed, "Altgeld showed his willingness to prevent any cases of actual rioting but refused to become a convenient pawn for the General Manager's Association."[100] The governor sought to pursue an impartial course, favoring neither labor nor capital.[101] Perhaps, knowing this, the G.M.A. determined to seek the help of the federal government, rather than rely upon a governor known to have pardoned anarchists.

Though Altgeld opposed the use of troops for strikebreaking purposes, he had effectively deployed state militia during the coal strike which preceded the Pullman dispute. There is no reason to doubt that he would have sent state troops to Chicago if called upon to do so by local authorities. On 3 July 1894 Altgeld was unaware of any requirement for military forces in Chicago. At that time, despite the disturbance at Blue Island, there were no serious disorders at Chicago. Yet, when he was subsequently

convinced of the need for troops, the governor initiated the action that led Mayor Hopkins to request their support.[102]

While Altgeld was preparing to send out the Illinois militia, U. S. Marshal Arnold wired Attorney General Olney that the U. S. Army was needed to ensure the passage of mail trains and enforce the injunction. The marshal had not asked local or state authorities for help. And he had made no mention of the availability of state troops in his telegram. Endorsing the message were three respected federal authorities: Judge Grosscup, U. S. Attorney Milchrist, and Special Attorney Walker, all of whom had perfected the injunction at the request of Olney and the G.M.A.[103]

President Cleveland justified the use of the U. S. Army by an explanation that federal officials were determined

> . . . to overcome by any lawful and constitutional means all resistance to governmental functions as related to the transportation of mails, the operation of interstate commerce, and the preservation of the property of the United States.[104]

On the 4th of July 1894, citizens of Chicago discovered that some 1,200 U. S. Army soldiers had been moved into the city the preceding night. (Subsequent reinforcements brought the total up to about 2,000.) Sometime that day, Altgeld learned for the first time that these regulars had been called in. He was surprised and outraged.[105]

Section 4 of Article IV of the United States Constitution provides that the federal government, at the

convinced by the same [illegible] arguments, the President initiated the action that led [illegible] to request [illegible] support.[illegible]

While Algeria was preparing to send out the [illegible] militia, U. S. Marshal Arnold which Kurtzman General [illegible] that the U. S. Army was needed to ensure the passage of mail trains and enforce the injunction. The marshal had [illegible] about legal or moral authorities for help. And he had made no mention of the availability of [illegible] troops in his [illegible]. Concerning the [illegible] were [illegible] Federal injunctions. Judge Drummond, U. S. District [illegible], and Special Attorney Holmes, all of [illegible] permitted the injunction by the request of [illegible] and the U.S.M.[illegible]

President Cleveland justified the use of the U. S. Army in an explanation that Federal officials were [illegible]

> . . . to protect by the lawful and constitutional means all instrumentalities in government. Troubles in relation to the transportation of mails, the enforcement of interstate commerce, and the preservation of the property of the United States.[illegible]

On the 4th of July 1894, citizens of Chicago discovered that some 1,200 U. S. Army soldiers had been sent into the city the preceding night. Chicagoans [illegible] among [illegible] the usual by an [illegible] [illegible] day, Algeria learned [illegible] that [illegible] had been called in. He was surprised and [illegible].[illegible]

Section 4 of Article IV of the United States Constitution provides that the Federal government, at the

request of a state legislature or of the governor (when the legislature is not in session), shall protect that state against domestic violence.[106]

It was not by invoking this clause that the President acted. The legislature of Illinois was not in session and Altgeld had not asked for federal aid. It was rather by virtue of the authority contained in Sections 5298 and 5299 of the Revised Statutes of the United States that the President sent troops to Chicago.[107]

When Altgeld protested the use of the U. S. Army in Chicago, he said the statutes Cleveland had invoked to justify his military policy contemplated the use of federal troops in a state only after militia had been used first.[108]

Section 5299 of the Revised Statutes states, in part, that federal intervention is justified when state authorities ". . . are unable to protect, or, from any cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people . . ." from domestic violence.[109] (Emphasis added.)

In explaining his replies to Altgeld, Cleveland justified his military policy as necessary, not only to protect mails and safeguard interstate commerce, but also because the governor had "refused" to deal with the Chicago situation. The President, however, gave no evidence to support this assertion.[110] As indicated above, the evidence suggests a completely different conclusion—that Altgeld was fully prepared to send in state troops, for lawful purposes, upon request.

request of a state legislature or of the governor (when the legislature is not in session), shall [illegible] with state against domestic violence.[108]

It was not by invoking this clause that the President acted. The legislature of Illinois was not in session and Altgeld had not asked for federal aid. It was rather in view of the authority [illegible] in section [illegible] and [illegible] of the [illegible] of the United States [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in Chicago.[109]

When Altgeld protested the use of the U. S. Army in Chicago, he said the President [illegible] had interfered in [illegible] policy [illegible] the use of federal troops for a purpose only [illegible] and [illegible].[110]

Section [illegible] of the [illegible], it [illegible], that federal intervention is justified when [illegible] exhaustion ". . . not merely in [illegible], but, [illegible] cases, that it be [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] from domestic violence."[111] [illegible].

In evaluating the propriety of Illinois [illegible] justified his military policy as necessary, and did it by [illegible] well and [illegible] [illegible], and also because the governor had "refused" to [illegible] the [illegible] alternative. The President, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] appears this [illegible].[112] In [illegible] [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] fully prepared to [illegible] [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] upon request.

In responding to Altgeld's protests, President Cleveland ignored almost every argument against federal intervention. Almont Lindsey explained,

> The President deemed it better strategy to convey to the nation that the present was no time to quibble over constitutional technicalities and that everybody should unite against the common danger of anarchy.[111]

Commenting on Cleveland's position, another historian concluded:

> Cleveland's account of the episode shows slight knowledge of the situation in Chicago, an utter disregard of the constitutional rights of Illinois, and the contempt which men who think they are right often show toward their opponents.[112]

Governor Altgeld was not the only Illinois official surprised at the arrival of federal troops in Chicago. In testimony before the Strike Commission, Mayor Hopkins commented,

> I want to say that I was not advised or counselled with when they [the U. S. troops] were brought here, and up to that time nobody notified me they were not receiving adequate protection.

Like the governor, Mayor Hopkins believed that if troops were needed, state troops should have been used first.[113]

If U. S. Marshal Arnold or the railroads were having so much trouble with mob rioting, why did they avoid calling on the mayor for police protection? Why did the G.M.A. seek the support not only of federal troops, but also of U. S. deputy marshals?

According to Lindsey, the G.M.A. suspected Mayor Hopkins of sympathizing with the strikers. The managers

sought to build their case for the use of federal armed forces by portraying the mayor and his police as pursuing a very lax policy toward strikers. Special Attorney Walker, closely affiliated with the G.M.A., "endeavored to establish the complete failure of the local government to perform its duty during the early phases of the crisis."[114]

By discrediting the mayor and his police, the G.M.A. evidently hoped to convince the public of the need for U. S. troops to suppress the disturbances.

Contrary to the claims of Walker and the G.M.A., Hopkins probably used every means at his disposal to preserve peace and end the strike. He fully mobilized his police force and issued a proclamation aimed at dispersing mobs. Twice he tried to settle the dispute, once by arbitration with the Pullman Company, and once as a mediator between the A.R.U. and the G.M.A.[115]

According to the Strike Commission, allegations of police negligence were not proved.[116] Before U. S. troops arrived, city police evidently handled all difficulties with relative ease. Superintendent of Police Brennan told the Strike Commission, "In no case at any time during the strike were the police forces insufficient, wherever they went, to disperse any mob found."[117]

Even before Cleveland ordered federal troops to Chicago, Attorney General Olney had authorized a special force of U. S. deputies to help the G.M.A. Some 3,600 men

were hastily sworn in during early July. They were selected by the railroads and deputized by Marshal Arnold.[118]

The railroads even paid the salaries of these deputies. Olney, however, insisted that any railroads which had paid these officers must be reimbursed; he felt this was needed to protect the government from any charge of partiality. The cost of these Chicago deputies to the federal government was about $125,000.[119] The Strike Commission noted,

> [Deputy marshals] acted in the double capacity of railroad employees and United States officers. While operating the railroads they assumed and exercised unrestricted United States authority when so ordered by their employers, or whenever they regarded it as necessary. They were not under the direct control of any Government official while exercising authority. This is placing officers of the Government under control of a combination of railroads. It is a bad precedent. . . .[120]

Violence

After U. S. troops arrived in Chicago, the tempo of violence increased. Property damage, lawlessness, and injuries reached their peak on 7 July 1894. At least 12 persons in Chicago died in strike-related confrontations.

Contrary to popular expectations, the Strike Commission did not place responsibility for violence on strikers. It blamed the railroads, who were determined "to crush the strike rather than to accept any peaceable solution . . .;"[121] and said,

> . . . real responsibility for these disorders rests with the people themselves for not adequately controlling . . . corporations, and for failing to reasonably protect the rights of labor and redress its wrongs.[122]

A report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969) concluded the single most important cause of labor violence in America has been the refusal of management to recognize labor unions for the purpose of collective bargaining.[123]

In more specific terms, this report declared:

> The responsibility for violence rests largely on the behavior of George Pullman. . . . He was unwilling to allow his workers the slightest influence upon the decisions of the company which greatly affected their welfare.[124]

From Pullman's refusal to arbitrate with his men arose the sympathy of the A.R.U. and its decision to boycott.

The A.R.U. decision, in turn, provoked a strong reaction from the G.M.A., which viewed the boycott as an attack on vested railroad interests in Chicago. The 1969 report to the National Commission (Violence in America) asserts, "The immediate cause of violence was the determination of the General Manager's Association to defeat the sympathy strike."[125] The G.M.A. decided to fire any employee who refused to handle Pullman cars.

The special federal deputies--selected and paid for by the railroads under the supervision of the G.M.A.--may also have contributed to the violence in Chicago. According to testimony before the Strike Commission, police officers

caught several deputies engaged in acts of lawlessness and incendiarism. Superintendent of Police Brennan testified that frequently his force had occasion to arrest deputies for indiscriminate shooting.[126]

Apparently, in the haste of recruiting, many applicants were accepted on the sole basis of their appearance, without even a check to determine their citizenship. As a result, many thugs, drunks, and other disreputable persons were sworn in. On July 9 U. S. Attorney Walker even reported that most of the deputies were "worse than useless."[127]

The rioters were not, in most cases, strikers or former railroad employees. Most of the violence, said the Strike Commission, was due to the work of the "lawless elements," augmented by "shiftless adventurers . . . criminals and objectionable foreigners."[128] Unemployment, insecurity, and accumulated resentment against corporate employers apparently combined to form a spirit of restlessness among these "lawless elements." The arrival of U. S. troops probably aroused the indignation of these people and may have provoked the formation of aggressive crowds.[129] As the Strike Commission noted, "The strike presented an opportunity to these elements to burn and plunder, and to violate the laws and ordinances of the city, State, and nation."[130]

The Strike Commission blamed the strikers for such offenses as detaching, side-tracking and derailing railroad

2

cars; it concluded that "strikers were concerned in the outrages against law and order, although the number was undoubtedly small as compared with the whole number out."[131]

Despite evidence that few strikers were involved in rioting and property damage, the G.M.A. credited the strikers with full responsibility for all violence. According to Lindsey, not only the G.M.A., but also the press deliberately built up the impression that strikers instigated violence and anarchy.[132]

As for the A.R.U., the Strike Commission said there was no evidence that the officers of the A.R.U.

> . . . at any time participated in or advised intimidation, violence, or destruction of property. They knew and fully appreciated that as soon as mobs ruled the organized forces of society would crush the mobs and all responsible for them in the remotest degree, and that this meant defeat.[133]

When Mayor Hopkins testified, he even said the A.R.U. had helped the city arrest those who were doing violence.[134]

The role of the U. S. Army in quelling the disturbances was not extensively discussed by the Strike Commission.

Following the strike, the Commanding General of the Army commended the troops for their "vigorous action . . . and . . . great forbearance . . . when subjected to all sorts of insults and indignities, designed to provoke retaliation. . . ."[135] General Miles said the action of federal troops in Chicago, "where mob violence and a reign of terror existed . . . saved this country from a serious rebellion when one had been publicly declared to exist."[136]

court is convinced that "military note conducted in the overview against law and order, although the manner was undoubtedly small as compared with the whole movement."[112]

Judgin evidence that the soldiers were involved in rioting and property damage, the Court, weighing the evidence with full responsibility for all violence, "concluding in liability, not only the rioters, but also the press mechanically, which is the inevitable that military intelligence existence and security."[113]

As for the 1-7-1v, the British commission did there was no evidence that the activity of the 1-7-1.

> . . . as any other participants in or supporters in violation, violence, or obstruction of congress. They were not fully responsible for the act of mob rules which exceeded the original intent of mobs, mobs drove the mobs and all participants are also in the prohibited objects, and that this mobs action.[114]

Some major Sepoy mutiny, the Army and the 1-7-1, had helped the city across these the mob rules.[115]

The role of the 1. 2. Army in quelling the Sepoy was not extensively discussed in the civil commission.

Following the mutiny, the Commission General of the Army commended the troops for their "[illegible] . . . and . . . a great [illegible] . . . when subjected to all sorts of insults and indignities, [illegible] or [illegible] provocations. . . ."[116] General Hitze said the [illegible] General groups in Chicago, "Troops and [illegible] and a [illegible] of better [illegible] . . . [illegible] from a [illegible] reliability when one had been [illegible] in [illegible]."[117]

Governor Altgeld, however, agreed that federal troops and their officers were no doubt good men. But he also said,

> So far as can be learned, their persistence did not prevent the burning of a single freight car in Chicago . . . yet during all this time the impression was made on the country that President Cleveland and the federal troops were saving Chicago![137]

Altgeld might have added that it was the Illinois militia who, on July 7, shot at a mob killing several and wounding more. After that confrontation, violence in Chicago declined.

End of the Strike

The Pullman Strike died during the period July 18 through August 2. According to Debs, the federal injunction caused the A.R.U. defeat. As he declared during his trial,

> The strike was broken . . . not by the Army and not by another power but simply and solely by the action of the United States Court in restraining us from discharging our duties as officers and representatives of our employees.[138]

Contributing to the end of the strike were several other factors. First, a large number of men were unemployed; railroads were able to recruit freely among these jobless workers, thereby replacing A.R.U. members who were fired or joined the strike. Second, many of the skilled workers such as the brotherhoods and Knights of Labor opposed the boycott. Third, organized labor was decidedly a minority interest; most Americans were unwilling to accept unions such as the A.R.U. and evidently suspected them of harboring

Governor Ronald Reagan, speaking from Chicago

Sunday and Labor officials have no doubt gone too, but no

close call.

> So far as the so-called Green Revolution and
> not provoke the turmoil of a violent struggle, and is
> Chicago . . . you should not also have the impression
> when you look at the economic data (inflation, unemployment
> and the internal turmoil which another disruption).

Illegal strike have added that it was the Illinois

militia who, on July 7, when at a cost fifteen thousand and

wounding more. After that, confrontation, involved in

Chicago facilities.

<u>End of the Strike</u>

The Nixon Guide that during the period day it

strongly argued it, presumably in view, the federal intervention

should the Illinois Governor. In an editorial Chicago sun Times,

> The action has worked . . . not to the just and
> not by another power but simply the belief in the
> rights of the public which tends to overshadow
> the time disregarding our duties as citizens and
> responsibilities of the Chicago.

Contributing to the end of the strike were powerful

outer factors. First, a large number of the more responsible

railroad were able to actively trail-away labor leaders

members, thereby isolating them. Second, many of the rank-and-file

or joined the strike. Second, many of the rank-and-file

work on the railroadmen and facilities or labor organized the

lay-offs. Thirdly, economical time and authority a growth

interest and therefore some inclining to accept unions

such as the A.F.L. and accordingly accepted been at serious

subversives and agitators. Fourth, the armed forces, primarily the Illinois troops, were a potent factor in ending the strike.[139]

The leadership that directed the organized effort to crush the strike, however, originated in the G.M.A. Had it not been for the initiative and determination of that organization, the strike might have remained non-violent; and employees might have gained a voice in corporate decision making.

It was the G.M.A. which brought the federal government to bear upon the strike. Neither the G.M.A. nor the government made any attempt during the strike to create a negotiated settlement.

The Strike Commission described the G.M.A. in these terms:

> The Association is an illustration of the persistent and shrewdly devised plans of corporations to overreach their limitations and to usurp indirectly powers and rights not contemplated in their charters and not obtainable from the people or their legislators.[140]

The refusal of the G.M.A. to negotiate with the A.R.U., said the Strike Commission, ". . . seems arrogant and absurd when we consider its standing before law, its assumptions and its past . . . action."[141]

As for the government's evident disinterest in ending the strike peacefully, one historian suggests,

subversives and agitators. Thereby, the broad terms, primarily the Illinois groups, have a potent tactic to deter the active.[17]

The Jacksonville case directed its organized efforts to attack the statute, however, originated in the U.S.A. and it was been for the initiative and determination of that organization, the legal rights have protected non-violent and religious rights have gained a voice in government decision making.

It was the U.S.A. which brought the federal government to bear upon the statute. Neither the U.S.A. nor its government was by attempt during the statute to create a legislative initiative.

The Illinois Constitution Preamble the U.S.A. in their terms:

> The Constitution is an illustration of the practical and idealistic political place of Americans. Since be examined simply illustrations and be long individually members and rights and constitutions in state citizens and may particularly from the people or their legislatures.[18]

The refusal of the U.S.A. to negotiate with the Ku-Klux, said the State Constitution "a a [illegible] and should then be necessary its standing before the, its [illegible] and its just a - a [illegible]."[19]

In the the government's [illegible] to [illegible] the state presentation was [illegible].

> It can only be assumed that Attorney General Olney in 1894 wanted to do more than merely end the disorders; he wanted them halted by giving the railroads a complete victory over the A.R.U.[142]

As noted earlier in this study, it was Olney who, in an apparent effort to arouse public opinion against the strikers, deliberately linked the strike with anarchism.

CHAPTER III—FOOTNOTES

[1]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 38-39. Strike Report, pp. XIX, 347, 352.

[2]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 280.

[3]Buder, Pullman Experiment, pp. 187, 194.

[4]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 46-47. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 288-90.

[5]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 47. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 288-90.

[6]Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 311.

[7]Strike Report, pp. IX-XVIII.

[8]Ibid., pp. L, LII-LIII.

[9]Ibid., p. LIV.

[10]Ibid., p. LVIII.

[11]Ibid., p. LIV.

[12]Ibid., p. LIV.

[13]Ibid., p. XLIX.

[14]Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 312. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 16.

[15]Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 311. McMurry, Burlington Strike, p. 282.

[16]Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 311.

[17]Eggert, Labor Disputes, pp. 2, 244-45.

[18]Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Milton S. Eisenhower, Chairman, Vol. I: Violence in America (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 292.

[19]Strike Report, pp. XXIII, 572-73.

CHAPTER XIII—CONTINUED

[1]Cleveland, Dolores Gordon, pp. 18-19. Trails Beyond, pp. 111, 117, 334.

[2]Lindsay, Pullman Service, p. 320.

[3]Sumner, Pullman Supervisors, pp. 107, 194.

[4]Cleveland, Pullman Service, pp. 46-47. Lindsay, Pullman Service, pp. 319-20.

[5]Cleveland, Pullman Service, p. 47. Lindsay, Pullman Service, pp. 320-20.

[6]Kirk, "Industrial Warfare," p. 312.

[7]Porter Report, pp. 18-XXXII.

[8]Ibid., pp. 1, 112-XXXII.

[9]Ibid., p. 117.

[10]Ibid., p. LXXII.

[11]Ibid., p. 127.

[12]Ibid., p. 117.

[13]Ibid., p. XLIII.

[14]Kirk, "Industrial Warfare," p. 313. Lindsay, Pullman Service, p. 18.

[15]Kirk, "Industrial Warfare," p. 311. Lindsay, Manufacture Service, p. 308.

[16]Kirk, "Industrial Warfare," p. 312.

[17]Sumner, Labor Unrest, pp. 2, 144-45.

[18]Report to the Railroad Commission on the Labor and Operation of Pullman, Union to Elsenberg, Chairman, Vol. 12 (Minutes to Sumner (Washington: In the Commission Pending Hearing Of Cases, 1915)), p. 2.

[19]Porter Report, pp. XXXII, 279-93.

[20]Ibid., pp. XXXII, 579, 584.

[21]Ibid., pp. XXXII-XXXIII, 603-4.

[22]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 97.

[23]Ibid., p. 97.

[24]Strike Report, p. XXXII.

[25]Ibid., p. XXXII.

[26]Ibid., p. 582.

[27]Ibid., p. XXXIV.

[28]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 100.

[29]Strike Report, testimony of Thomas W. Heathcoate, p. 424.

[30]Strike Report, p. XXXIV.

[31]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 98-99.

[32]William H. Carwardine, The Pullman Strike (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1894), p. 71.

[33]Strike Report, testimony of George Pullman pp. 566-67.

[34]Strike Report, p. XXXV.

[35]Ibid., p. XXXVII.

[36]Carwardine, op. cit., p. 68.

[37]William T. Stead, Chicago Today: The Labor War in America (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969; reprint of 1894 edition), p. 181. Stead was the editor of the London version of the Review of Reviews.

[38]Strike Report, p. XXV, testimony of Thomas W. Heathcoate, p. 420. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 92. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 160.

[39]Strike Report, pp. XXXV, 580, 585.

[40]Ibid., p. XXXV.

[41]Carwardine, op. cit., p. 97. Strike Report, testimony of Thomas W. Heathcoate, p. 425; p. XXXV.

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[42]Strike Report, p. XXXV.

[43]Ibid., p. XXXVI.

[44]Ibid., pp. XXXIV, XXXVI, testimony of Thomas W. Heathcoate, pp. 426, 428.

[45]Strike Report, pp. XXXVII-XXXVIII.

[46]Ibid., p. XXV. Carwardine, op. cit., p. 50.

[47]Carwardine, op. cit., pp. 91-108, quotation, p. 109.

[48]Strike Report, p. XXXVI.

[49]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 95.

[50]Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 143.

[51]Strike Report, pp. XXXVI-XXXVII.

[52]Strike Report, testimony of Thomas H. Wickes, p. 186; pp. XXXVI-XXXVIII.

[53]Cited in Miller, Great Debates, p. 388.

[54]Strike Report, testimony of George Pullman, pp. 556-57.

[55]Strike Report, p. XXVI.

[56]Ibid., testimony of George Pullman, p. 556.

[57]Cited in Miller, Great Debates, p. 389.

[58]Strike Report, p. XXVII.

[59]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 90-91. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 154.

[60]Carwardine, op. cit., p. 24.

[61]Strike Report, p. XXII.

[62]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 70.

[63]Ibid., p. 72.

[64]Ibid., pp. 72-74. Strike Report, p. XXII.

[65]Carwardine, op. cit., p. 51. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 90.

[42] Service Company, p. xxxii.

[43] Ibid., p. xxxvi.

[44] Ibid., pp. xxxiv, xxxvi, Lieutenant of Thomas G. Hazlicomate, pp. 430, 432.

[45] Service Company, pp. xxxix-xxxxiii.

[46] Ibid., p. xxi. Commission, op. cit., p. 32.

[47] Commission, op. cit., pp. 1-2, Lt. Thomas Hazlicomate, p. 109.

[48] Service Company, p. xxxvi.

[49] Clemens, Military Service, p. 70.

[50] Ibid., Military Correspondence, p. 310.

[51] Service Company, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

[52] Service Company, Lieutenant of Thomas G. Clemens, p. 1861, pp. xxxiv-xxxvii.

[53] Cited in Stiles, Civil-Military, p. 270.

[54] Service Company, Commission of Thomas Williams, pp. 329-32.

[55] Stiles, Civil, p. 271.

[56] Ibid., Commission of Thomas Williams, p. 329.

[57] Cited in Stiles, Civil-Military, p. 270.

[58] Service Company, p. xxxii.

[59] Clemens, Military Service, pp. 2-70. Stiles, Civil-Military, p. 329.

[60] Commission, op. cit., p. 32.

[61] Service Company, p. xxxii.

[62] Clemens, Military Service, p. 70.

[63] Stiles, p. 70.

[64] Ibid., pp. 70-71. Service Company, p. xxxi.

[65] Commission, op. cit., p. 32. Clemens, Military Service, p. 70.

[66]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 61-63, 76-79, 86.

[67]Ibid., p. 64.

[68]Strike Report, pp. XXI-XXII.

[69]Ibid., p. XXVII.

[70]Ibid., p. XXXIX.

[71]Ibid., pp. XXXIX, XLII-XLIII.

[72]Ibid., pp. XIX, XL, XLIII.

[73]Ibid., p. 6.

[74]Ibid., p. XXXIX.

[75]Ibid., p. XLII.

[76]Eggert, Labor Disputes, pp. 156-57. The sample contract is presented in the Strike Report, pp. 547-48.

[77]Strike Report, p. 223.

[78]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 157.

[79]Strike Report, p. 227.

[80]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 157.

[81]Strike Report, p. 158.

[82]Ibid., p. XLVII.

[83]Ibid., p. XIX-XXX.

[84]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 142.

[85]McMurry, Burlington Strike, pp. 280-81.

[86]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 157-58.

[87]Olney, cited in Cooper, "Military Intervention," p. 228.

[88]Eggert, Labor Disputes, pp. 162-63. Darrow quotation, p. 163.

[89]Ibid., p. 163. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 158.

[90]McMurry, Burlington Strike, p. vii.

[66]Lindsay, [illegible], pp. 50-51, 70-73, 86.

[67]Ibid., p. 64.

[68][illegible], pp. [illegible].

[69]Ibid., p. [illegible].

[70]Ibid., p. [illegible].

[71]Ibid., pp. [illegible], [illegible].

[72]Ibid., pp. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

[73]Ibid., p. 64.

[74]Ibid., p. [illegible].

[75]Ibid., p. [illegible].

[76]Kinney, [illegible], pp. [illegible]. [illegible] contained in personnel in the [illegible], pp. [illegible].

[77][illegible], p. 82.

[78]Kinney, [illegible], p. [illegible].

[79][illegible], p. [illegible].

[80]Kinney, [illegible], p. [illegible].

[81][illegible], p. 121.

[82]Ibid., p. [illegible].

[83]Ibid., p. [illegible].

[84]Lindsay, [illegible], p. [illegible].

[85]Kinney, [illegible], pp. [illegible].

[86]Lindsay, [illegible], pp. [illegible].

[87]Ibid., [illegible] in [illegible], [illegible] p. [illegible].

[88]Kinney, [illegible], pp. [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible], p. [illegible].

[89]Ibid., p. [illegible]. Lindsay, [illegible], p. [illegible].

[90]Kinney, [illegible], p. [illegible].

[91]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 167.

[92]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 156, 161-62; Strike Report, court injunction, pp. 179-80.

[93]Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 288.

[94]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 151.

[95]Ibid., pp. 143, 152, 241. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 183.

[96]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 322-23.

[97]Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 160.

[98]Strike Report, p. XL.

[99]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 182, 200. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 291. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 299.

[100]Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 300.

[101]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 200.

[102]Ibid., pp. 172, 180-85. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, pp. 273-79.

[103]Telegram, Arnold to Olney; Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 25-27.

[104]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 18-19.

[105]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 184.

[106]Strike Report, p. XX.

[107]These statutes are printed in the Strike Report, p. XX.

[108]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 188.

[109]Strike Report, p. XX.

[110]Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 39.

[111]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 189.

[112]Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion, note 32, p. 177.

[113]Strike Report, p. 352.

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[114]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 183-84.

[115]Hopkins' efforts to cope with the strike are described in his testimony, Strike Report, pp. 344-53.

[116]Strike Report, p. XLIV.

[117]Ibid., p. 354.

[118]Ibid., p. XLIV; testimony of Chief Deputy U. S. Marshal John C. Donnelly, p. 340-42.

[119]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 168-69.

[120]Strike Report, pp. XLIV-XLV.

[121]Ibid., p. XIX.

[122]Ibid., p. XLVI.

[123]Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Milton S. Eisenhower, chairman, Vol. I: Violence in America (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 292.

[124]Ibid., pp. 233-34.

[125]Ibid., p. 233.

[126]Strike Report, p. 355. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 217. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 312.

[127]Walker, cited in Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 167.

[128]Strike Report, p. XLIII; related comments, pp. XLV-XLVI, XIX.

[129]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 205. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 311.

[130]Strike Report, p. XLIII; related testimony, pp. 341, 357.

[131]Ibid., p. XLV.

[132]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 218, 275.

[133]Strike Report, p. XLV.

[134]Ibid., pp. 349-50.

[135]U. S., Congress, House, Executive Docs., Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1894, Vol. IV, No. 1, Part 2, 53d Cong., 3d Sess., 1894-95, p. 58.

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[illegible] activity in some sub-sub area [illegible] described in his testimony, [illegible], pp. 146-51.

[illegible], p. [illegible].

[illegible], p. 374.

[illegible], p. [illegible] [illegible] Security, pp. 130-[illegible].

[illegible], pp. 140-[illegible].

[illegible], pp. [illegible]-[illegible].

[illegible], p. 111.

[illegible], p. 71-72.

[illegible] [illegible] on the [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], p. 106.

[illegible], pp. 11-[illegible].

[illegible], p. 217.

[illegible] [illegible], p. 175. [illegible] [illegible], p. 312. [illegible], p. 121.

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[illegible], p. [illegible]-[illegible], pp. 142, 177.

[illegible], p. [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible], pp. [illegible], 371.

[illegible], p. 114.

[illegible], pp. 147-[illegible].

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[136] Ibid., Report of Major General Nelson A. Miles, 1894, p. 109.

[137] Altgeld, cited in Barnard, Life of Altgeld, pp. 310-11.

[138] Debs, cited in Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 310.

[139] Strike Report, p. XLII. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 213-14, 267-68, McMurry, Burlington Strike, p. 279.

[140] Strike Report, p. XXXI.

[141] Ibid., p. XXXI.

[142] Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 189.

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CHAPTER IV

THE JOURNALS INTERPRET THE STRIKE: IMMEDIATE AND UNDERLYING ISSUES

In its opening article on the Pullman Strike, Harper's Weekly remarked, "Such rebellions against social order and the principles of civilization will grow more dangerous, unless the intelligence of the country shall come to understand their causes and find ways to remove them."[1]

This chapter is a discussion and analysis of the adequacy and extent to which the journals attempted to interpret the immediate and underlying issues of the Pullman Strike.

Immediate Issues

Wage Reductions

Why were the workers at Pullman dissatisfied with their wages? Harper's Weekly gave this explanation:

> Possibly the workmen at Pullman have been made too comfortable, and have been cared for too well. They have come to believe implicitly in the stories of the enormous profits of their employer. They doubtless argued that as long as wages had been kept up to a certain scale throughout the past depression, they should be now maintained until better times. This false reasoning was undoubtedly at the bottom of the general dissatisfaction.[2]

Nation, however, explained that wages had declined in response to market conditions associated with the depression and the "iron law of wages." The conditions of

CHAPTER IV

THE ORGANIC ORTHODOXY OF WILLIAM JAMES: INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIALIZING FORCES

In his opening article on the Philippine situation, Dewey's Monist exclaimed, "such conditions cannot arise, never can and the principles of civilization will grow more misunderstood, unless the intelligence of the country shall come to realize about their causes and find ways to remove them."[1]

This chapter is a discussion and analysis of the Dewey-James and attempt to show how James, assumed or intuitively the innovations and modernizing trends of the Progressive Period.

Individualism

Wide Individualism

Why does the conscience of Philippine civilization [illegible] Liberty Monthly? Dewey's Monist gave three main reasons:

> Considering the relations of Christian force and commercialism, we have been asked the question: "Why have some to believe [illegible] in the [illegible] of the American practice of their principles." The question signifies that we look to see the [illegible] have to be a decided [illegible] in our [illegible] dependencies, some doubts of the [illegible] [illegible] better [illegible]. This false principle has [illegible] only at the bottom of the general [illegible].

Dewey, however, explained that [illegible] in response to certain conditions [illegible] with the depression and the "[illegible] fear of [illegible]." The [illegible] of

the market are sometimes hard: "Anybody who fights against them, or who assumes they do not exist . . . will go supperless to bed and . . . get no other rewards for his pains." Pullman has no control over the wages of his employees, hence, it is in their best interest to "grin and bear" the wage cut.[3]

Several journals evidently used a Pullman Company press release explaining how the corporation was losing money. According to the Review of Reviews,

> Mr. Pullman's works . . . had taken several contracts at exceedingly low prices in order to keep the wheels moving. Wages had been cut down on the theory that work at reduced pay would be more acceptable to the Pullman employees than a period of no work and no pay.[4]

Harper's Weekly reported the company "reduced wages, and accepted orders . . . which could not be filled without a severe loss, but which would serve at least to keep the working force employed so as to bridge over the hard times."[5] Forum gave a similar account and commented, "The attempt to make any employer pay wages for producing things which he can sell only at a loss is not commendable. It is a ruinous policy."[6]

In a separate article, however, Forum did mention the fact that salaries of Pullman managers were not reduced when employee wages were sharply cut.[7]

Could the Pullman Company have drawn from its corporate profits or reserve funds to increase wages? Outlook summarized what Pullman said before the Strike Commission:

the owners are sometimes hard: "Anybody who fights against them, or who assumes they do not exist . . . will go unpunished in hell and . . . get no other reward for his pains." Pulling the on screwed with the wages of his employees, hence, it is in their best interests to "give his best" the wage can.[1]

Several Journals privately held a Pullman Company press release explaining the corporation was losing money. According to the Review of Reviews,

> Mr. Pullman's work . . . had taken several occasions as exceedingly the policy in order to keep the wheels moving. Wages had been cut down on the theory that work so rendered any would be more acceptable to the railway employees than a period of no work and no pay.[2]

Harper's Weekly recognized the company "personal wages, and accepted wages . . . which could not be filled without a serious loss, and which would serve as means to keep the working force employed so as to bridge over the hard times."[3] Pullman gave a similar account and concluded, "The wheels be made and employed was worth the production which is can sell only at a loss in the commodities. It is a reasonable policy."[4]

In a separate article, however, Harper's Weekly stated that just reduction of Pullman employees was reduced when employees wages were changed.[5]

Could the Pullman Company have given their men perhaps profits or reserve funds in various ways? Perhaps possibilities were Pullman said in the Pullman Commission.

"The . . . Company has a surplus of more than $16,000,000; . . . it has declared this year a dividend of $2,800,000 on its capital stock of $36,000,000. . . ." Outlook suggested that Pullman's testimony, having indicated such large corporate profits, did much to arouse sympathy for striking workmen.[8]

The Nation, however, denied that Pullman could have drawn upon his profits to increase wages:

> Mr. Pullman has no right to make gratuities of the money of his shareholders, who are largely . . . persons of slender means. . . . he is a trustee and . . . has no right to take an unbusinesslike step . . . he must be the judge of what is business-like and what is not.[9]

Those who believe that workmen are rightly entitled to a share of the profits of their labor, declared Nation, have assumed a belief professed by the "ethical school" of political economy. This doctrine has had a great deal to do with arousing discontent among wage earners; when it became diffused among them, "they at once felt that they were suffering great injustice. . . ." because their share of the profits was not larger.[10]

Concerning the weak financial condition of the construction department, Nation declared:

> No argument for raising wages in a non-paying business can be derived from the fact that some other branch of business [i.e., the operating division] carried on by the same company makes a profit.[11]

In similar tone, expressing full support of the Pullman Company, Independent commented:

"The . . . Company has a surplus of more than $25,000,000; . . . it has declared this year a dividend of $2,880,000 on the capital stock of $36,000,000. . . ." [illegible] suggested that Pullman's testimony, having indicated such large corporate profits, did much to arouse sympathy for striking workers.[9]

The Nation, however, denied that Pullman should have drawn upon his profits to increase wages:

> "Mr. Pullman has no right to make gratuities of the money of his shareholders, who are largely . . . persons of slender means. . . . He is a trustee and . . . has no right to make an unremunerative outlay . . . . He must be the judge of what is remunerative and what is not."[10]

Those who believe that workers are rightly entitled to a share of the profits of their labor, declared [illegible] have accepted a belief professed by the "orthodox school" of political economy. This doctrine has had a great deal to do with arousing discontent among wage earners that [illegible] . . . or because [illegible] of the [illegible] and [illegible].[11]

Concerning the exact financial condition of the construction department, [illegible] declared:

> [illegible] business was as [illegible] with the rent that some other branch of business [illegible], the operating division, carried on by the same company makes a profit.[12]

In similar vein, concerning [illegible] reports of the Pullman Company, Independent commented:

> The wages offered seem to be all that could be afforded. It was a kindness to the workmen for the company to accept orders at a loss, simply to keep them employed. It makes no difference that the company was still paying large dividends. No dividends could be paid on these [construction] contracts. The dividends were paid on . . . the profits of running Pullman cars already built. This is an entirely different kind of business and has a right to a large profit. . . . [These] comfortable dividends . . . have absolutely nothing to do with the wages to be paid to workmen in the car shops.[12]

Both Nation and Harper's Weekly expressed the view that if Pullman had simply closed his shops there would have been no strike.[13]

The Weekly put it this way:

> If the Pullman Company, instead of offering their working-men . . . employment at a reduced rate of wages, had simply said to them, "We are sorry our business has so fallen off that we no longer have employment for you; we are compelled to close the works, and you will have to shift for yourselves until we get profitable orders enabling us to take you back"--if the company had done this . . . in a cold businesslike way, there would have been no trouble.[14]

Outlook concluded its discussion of wages with an opinion similar to that of the Strike Commission, that the men had no right to demand employment at higher wages when the company was losing money.[15]

Harper's Weekly asserted, "The Pullman corporation has always treated its workmen well . . . they have no [sic] real grievance and no justification for the demand they have recently made."[16] Whether Pullman workers were justified in demanding the wages of 1893 is a matter of opinion. But whether the employees had a "real grievance"

is a matter of fact. Clearly, the men at Pullman had several genuine complaints.

Rents

The Review of Reviews explained that

> The chief complication seems to have arisen out of circumstances that . . . [r]educed wages did not bring reduced rents. . . . practically twelve thousand Pullman tenants are at the mercy of their employer, who is also their landlord.[17]

Harper's Weekly again suggested that workers had little to complain of: "Rents were calculated on a five-[sic] per-cent basis, and were lower [sic] than rates current for dirty, unsanitary houses in the slums of Chicago."[18] (According to the Strike Commission rents were 25 per cent higher, and were expected to earn the company six per cent.)

Nation claimed that rents in Pullman were about the same as those in adjoining towns. From this false premise, Nation explained why the company could not have reduced its rents: if the corporation had lowered its rents for those who lived in Pullman, in fairness it would have been bound to make an "equivalent present" to those who lived elsewhere. Neighboring landlords would then have had a grievance, and

> . . . would have had a just claim on the Pullman Company for a sum equal to their diminished receipts. In short, there would have been no end to the absurdities and injustices which would have resulted from any such attempt to make up to the men in rent what they were losing in wages.[19]

in a letter of June. Clearly, she was no Pullman had several genuine complaints.

Food

The Review in Detroit explained that:

> The dining car complaints seem to have arisen out of circumstances that . . . [illegible] seemed old fashioned results. . . . Personally speaking, Pullman employees, who in also start industry.[illegible]

Porter's family again suggested that servers had little to complain of: "Porters were isolated in a five-[illegible] per-cent locale, and were issue [illegible] than rates served for dirty, unsanitary issues in the minds of Chicago."[illegible] Interesting to the racial composition where 25 per cent Negro history and were expected to earn the company six per week.)

Pullman claimed that which it Pullman were about the most so close in difficult issues. Even this claim prevent, Pullman realized that the company would have reduced the rights. In the conversation had assumed the years, for years was [illegible] Pullman, the company is would have been bound to make so traditional problem" to those who Jim's alongside. Indicating [illegible] [illegible] have had a grievance and

> . . . would have had a very claim on the railroad company for a say equal to their contribution to profits. In short, there would have been no need for the conductor and porters which would have resulted from any such attempt to make up the loss in tips when they were taking to wages.[illegible]

According to Independent, it is very likely the rents were too high: "They always lag behind a falling or a rising market; but that is not peculiar to Pullman and will cure itself."[20] (Contrary to this assertion, the evidence clearly indicates that the Pullman corporation determined the rents with no regard for the current market.)

Nation and Independent each expressed the official corporate view; as Nation declared, it was a "fact that no workman was compelled to stay in Pullman. . . ." Independent added, "If the rents are too high tenants need not remain."[21] While this view was, no doubt, a policy of the Pullman Company, the evidence shows that the men believed they were under pressure to reside in the "model" town.

None of the journals commented on such rental abuses as the requirement that tenants must perform all repairs, even those the company chose to have done, or the so-called "ten-day" clause. Nor was there any mention of the pay system by which worker-tenants received two checks, one of which was for rent, the other for the remaining wages.

When Debs asserted that Pullman was starving his employees to death (probably in reference to workers who received wages of several dollars or less on paydays), Nation called his statement "a deceptive lie." In a similar vein, Forum concluded: considering the advantages of the town of Pullman, "and the present low prices of the ordinary requirements of life, it can scarcely be said that the employees were working at 'starvation wages'."[22]

According to *Independence*, it is very likely the state were too light. "They always lay behind a railing or a rising ascent; one lies in very peculiar to Pullman and will over itself."[20] Contrary to this observation, the evidence clearly indicates that the Pullman corporation determined the state with no regard for its current owners.

Bailey and *Independence* both mentioned the artificial corporate story as *Bailey* described, it was a "book that no workman was compelled to read in future. . . ." *Independence* added, "If the years are one high compete room not remain," this view was, no doubt, a policy of the Pullman Company; the evidence shows that the men *felicity* they were under pressure to revolve in the "model" town.

Some of the *Journals* commented on such radical changes as the requirement that company people pretend all employees, even those the company chose to turn down, or the so-called "two-day" clause. For the black by condition of the job system by which workers-towards received two months, one of which was for free, the order for the resulting supply.

Some light concerned that Pullman was recruiting its employees in Detroit (probably in reference to workers who received wages of several dollars or less on payday). *Bailey* called the statement "a deceptive lie." In a similar vein, *Bailey* concluded, considering the advantages of the town of Pullman, "and the present low prices of the necessary requirements of life, it can reasonably be said that the employees were receiving a 'substantial wage'."[22]

Samuel Gompers, in an article for North American, explained why the workers decided to strike. The grievance committee had shown Pullman "that it was absolutely impossible to live on the wages offered; that a middle ground should be sought; that if wages were to be reduced the rents should also come down." When Pullman refused to consider the request, and several men of the committee were fired, the strike was declared.[23]

Review of Reviews expressed an attitude similar to that of the Strike Commission (though published in advance of the Strike Report):

> A temporary reduction of rents on the same percentage as the reduction of wages would have seemed to some employers a kindly concession that would have been repaid by the increased fidelity of the employees. But it could not be demanded as a right.[24]

Shop Abuses

Only one journal reported shop abuses as a significant complaint among the workers, and did so only after hearings by the Strike Commission had begun. From monitoring testimony of witnesses, Independent noted that

> . . . the under officials especially, the foremen, bosses, etc., were very harsh and cruel in their treatment of the laborers, while it was practically impossible to gain access to Mr. Pullman himself and the higher officials; . . . every effort to set forth the actual state of things resulted in the black listing of the complaintants. . . .[25]

The lack of reporting concerning these abuses by the journals may be an indication that little effort was expended

Based therefore, in an attempt for [illegible] employees by the company decided to resign. The [illegible] committee had stated failures which in each absolutely [illegible] possible to live on the wages offered; that a middle [illegible] should be assuring that if wages were to be reduced the [illegible] would also come down. These failures resulted in [illegible] the company, and several men of the committee were [illegible] the strike was declared.[73]

Failure of leadership represented an [illegible] which of the strike committee through [illegible] of [illegible] of the strike leaders:

> A temporary weakening of power on the part of the leadership as the resolution of wages would have seemed to some employees a totally unnecessary step which have been caused by the increased fidelity of the employees. But it would not be demanded as a right.[74]

[illegible]

Only one journal reported also showed an a [illegible] element complained among the workers, and did be only [illegible] leadership by the strike committee [illegible]. [illegible] lack leadership of [illegible]

> . . . the worker [illegible] [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible], etc., were [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] of the leadership, which is now [illegible] responsible to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] and the [illegible] [illegible] . . . [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the actual [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] . . .

The lack of reporting [illegible] [illegible] by the journals may be an indication that little action was [illegible]

in trying to uncover the immediate issues prior to the A.R.U. boycott in June. As noted earlier in this study, once the railway strike was underway, at least one journal said all discussion of the issues involved must wait until the "rebellion" was suppressed.

Pullman's Refusal to Arbitrate

Why did the Pullman workers insist on arbitrating with the company? According to Arena, the men at Pullman were seeking something more than simply higher wages and reduced rents: they "claim that in the consideration of the distribution of their joint product, they shall be consulted . . . They demand that as producers of wealth they shall possess some degree of rational control over the distribution of that wealth."[26] If this interpretation is correct, then as Nation pointed out, workers were indeed professing the doctrine of the "ethical school" of political economy.

Pullman, in refusing to comply with requests to arbitrate, said the company could not pay more for the manufacture of a car than the price he could obtain for it from the railroads. A writer for North American accepted this assertion uncritically and declared, "Every business man must admit that this answer is conclusive and logical."[27]

Nation was absolutely positive there was no way Pullman could have arbitrated the matter of wages:

> A decision in favor of the employees would not put the company in funds. It would not furnish new orders for cars at higher prices than before. As a decision adverse to the company could not be be complied with in any event, an arbitration would have been not merely useless but a downright mockery. . . .[28] (Emphasis added.)

It was fortunate, reported Nation, that Pullman refused to arbitrate with his men; had he not rejected the "anarchistic conceptions" of the grievance committee, it

> . . . would have turned the whole controversy into a question of details—as, for instance, whether the rents of the houses were fair or not, whether the company could have paid higher wages than it did pay, or whether it would have been safe to draw from its reserve fund. . . .[29]

Several journals commented on Pullman's rejection of subsequent proposals to arbitrate. On each occasion, as Forum noted, "The company declared that there was no question that it could submit; that the men demanded higher wages, and that it could not pay them except at a serious loss."[30]

None of the conservative journals, naturally, presented much in the way of investigative reporting aimed at assessing whether or not it was true that higher wages for the men would entail a "serious loss."

Once the railway strike had begun, Nation suggested that any attempt to secure arbitration in the midst of such a "social convulsion" was absurd: there was

> . . . intense excitement throughout the whole country, and the general feeling that the existence of the Government and society was at stake . . . to give in to the strikers . . . at any point would be a deadly blow to the liberty and rights of property. . . .

A decision in favor of the employees would not put the company in ruins. It would not forbid the orders for more at slower prices than before. If a decision adverse to the company could not be acquiesced with in any event, it would have been not merely unwise but a condition necessary. . . . (Emphasis added.)

In one instance, reported [illegible], when failure refused to arbitrate this [illegible] the "constitutional sovereignty" of the grievance committee, it

> . . . would seem impossible the public convenience from a standpoint of availability, for instance, whether the result of the issues were right or not, whether the company could keep public happy when it did not, or whether it would have been able to draw from the reserve labor. . . .[illegible]

Several journals commented on railroadmen's rejection of management proposals to arbitrate. In each instance, as [illegible] noted, "The company realized that there was no question that it could operate even the non-unionized labor wages, and that it could not pay that amount at a profit loss."[illegible]

Some of the counter-claim [illegible], nationally, presented much in the vein of [illegible] editorial alleging at searching whether or not it was time [illegible] higher wages for the men would mean a "vicious [illegible]."

[illegible] the railway [illegible] that [illegible] expressed that any attempt to [illegible] compulsion in the [illegible] of such a "social [illegible]" was [illegible]. There was

> . . . [illegible] sentiment throughout the state country, and the general feeling that the [illegible] were at the [illegible] was [illegible] . . . to place it in the [illegible] . . . at any point would be a [illegible] blow to the liberty and rights of property. . . .

Hundreds of thousands of the best American citizens, declared Nation, rejoiced that Pullman was unyielding.[31]

Harper's Weekly explained that if the Pullman workmen had not heeded the advice of labor agitators, "most of whom have nothing to lose by the disturbances they foment, some sort of an agreement would be readily reached between them and their employer."[32] This particular judgment is clearly deviant from available evidence; in view of Pullman's deep-seated antagonism to organized labor, it seems highly unlikely that Pullman would ever have reached such an agreement.

Why, even when the mayor of Chicago asked Pullman to arbitrate, was the offer flatly refused? The answer, according to Nation was that "labor disputes are generally very simple, and nobody can possibly settle them but the parties to them." Specifically, the question of how much loss the company could safely incur in any given period, "must necessarily be left to the judgement of those who are charged with the responsibility for its affairs, and not to a mayor and a board of aldermen or any popular assemblage."[33]

Review of Reviews disagreed with Nation:

> Mr. Pullman owed it to the country to keep on good terms with his employees: . . . upon the request of the Mayor and the Common Council of Chicago, he should have been quite willing to consider some plan of arbitration of differences.[34]

Industry of Minnesota at the last Institute meeting, Mr. Alfred Dalton, replied that Pullman was unsatisfactory.[11]

Burgess's letter explained that if the Pullman workman had not heeded the advice of labor agitators, many of whom have contacts by lines by the Minneapolis Union Council, some more of an agreement would be reality existing between that and labor employer.[12] This particular letter is clearly contains that evidence evidence in view of Pullman's deep-rooted antagonism to organized labor, it seems highly unlikely that Pullman would ever have reached such an agreement.

But, even when the mayor of Duluth urged Pullman to arbitrate, the site offer fairly reluctant. The company according to Dalton was that "these figures are somewhat very simple, and nearly the possibly result than the parties to them." Significantly, the question of how much less the company could satisfy labor is not given serious, "must necessarily be left to the judgment of those who are charged with the responsibility for the activity, and not to a mayor and a board of aldermen in any possible circumstance."[13]

Letter of Burgess disagreed with Dalton:

> Mr. Pullman said it to the country is very as good terms with his employees . . . upon the request of the mayor and the Common Council of Duluth, he should have been quite willing to consider some plan of arbitration of differences.[14]

Both Pullman and his associate, Wickes, stressed that they would not arbitrate because a principle was involved: a man should have the right to manage his own property. This theme was prevalent among conservative journals. Independent expressed it this way:

> The Pullman company cannot and ought not to be compelled to arbitrate. . . . A man who intends to submit to the decision of arbitrators cannot be forced to accept arbitration. One must decide for himself the conditions on which he will work or pay for work; otherwise we have no liberty.[35]

In contrast to the interpretations of Nation, Independent, and Harper's Weekly, which viewed the strike from a laissez-faire perspective, were several journals which regarded the dispute from a more "liberal" editorial posture. These tended to be the Review, Arena and Outlook. They argued on both moral and practical grounds that Pullman ought to have, and could have arbitrated. Their interpretations tend to match more closely those of the Strike Commission.

Review of Reviews stressed Pullman's moral obligation to arbitrate:

> There can be no doubt whatever as to the logical soundness of Mr. Pullman's point of view. But there are times when it is an exceedingly gracious thing to waive one's rights. . . . From his own unbending and consistent standpoint, Mr. Pullman could not have consented to arbitration. . . . Under public laws permitting the creation of commercial corporations, the Pullman Company was invested with various privileges. The extension of the Pullman car service to more than a hundred thousand miles of roads was made possible by the public franchises granted to railway corporations. . . . To very many people it seemed clear that he ought not to have allowed his local quarrel to go

Both Fullman and his associate, Fisher, argued that they would not arbitrate because a principle was involved: a man should have the right to manage his own property. This stand was practical among conservative Democrats. Independent argument is this vein:

> The Fullman company claims and might use so be compelled to arbitrate. . . . I am not the issue to submit to the decision of arbitrators cannot be forced to accept arbitration. One must decide for himself the conditions on which he will work or pay for work; otherwise we have no liberty.[27]

In contrast to such interpretations of *Taylor Independence*, and *Warren's speech*, which viewed the strike from a *laissez-faire* perspective, many several *journals* which regarded the dispute from a more "liberal" editorial position. These tended to be the *Dallas News*, *Times* and *Herald*. They argued on both moral and practical grounds that Fullman ought to have, and could have arbitrated. Their interpretations tend to most have identify those of the Dallas Commission.

Texas at Dallas argued Fullman's moral obligation to arbitrate:

> There can be no doubt whatever as to the logical consistency of Mr. Fullman's policy of refusal where are times when it is an unreasonable position either to which man's rights . . . from his own knowledge and considered conclusion. Mr. Fullman could not have consented to arbitrate. . . . Under quality laws governing the relations of commercial corporations, the Fullman company was interested with public principles. The decision of the Fullman for service is such that a business concerns which of trade was not publicity by the public transactions granted to public corporations. . . . In very many people it seemed almost that Mr. Fullman had an have affected his level quarrel to p

> on unsettled . . . until it had assumed continental proportions and brought wide-spread loss and harm to the nation which had enriched him and his company.[36]

Arena asserted that Pullman had no excuse for not helping his men financially. The corporation was not "unable" to raise pay or lower rents. Pullman could have drawn from

> . . . that immense reserve fund and those large dividends just paid, created out of the whole Pullman community in previous years of undenied prosperity, remaining solely in the hands of Pullman and his associates. . . .[37]

Outlook, after summarizing the reasons Pullman refused to arbitrate (from a press release issued by the company), commented:

> Mr. Pullman's statement leaves some vital facts out of consideration. . . . Are there one, or two or three corporations? Does one and the same organization . . . constitute the Pullman Palace-Car Company . . . the Pullman Manufacturing Company . . ., and the Pullman Landlord Company . . .? If the latter be the case, it will be very difficult for Mr. Pullman to persuade the public that he and his associates were acting otherwise than in a wholly selfish way in reducing the wages of their men 25 per cent, and upwards, while keeping the rents of their men unreduced, and declaring a quarterly dividend on their stock of 2 per cent.
>
> . . . it would appear that the Pullman Company imposed the losses of a hard season on its workingmen without taking its fair proportion of them itself. . . . This does not . . . give the employees a right to demand arbitration. . . . But it does subject the corporation which . . . takes the profits of good times for itself, to public obloquy.[38]

As noted in the preceding chapter, the Strike Commission was critical of Pullman for his refusal to

> an unreality . . . until it has assumed concreteness, practicalness and brought wide-spread loss and harm to the nation which has sacrificed him and his company.[4]

Irons observed that Pullman had no excuse for not holding his own financially. The corporation was not "unable" to raise pay as labor rents. Pullman could have drawn from

> . . . that labor-saving product that gives labor distinctly just pay, remember, of the yield. Pullman economics is involved, more or less, in the prosperity, practically speaking, in the life of a Pullman and his investment. . . .[5]

Unlike, after examining the reasons Pullman refused to arbitrate (from a great relative level of the company), concluded:

> Mr. Pullman's statement before this tribunal (with one of conciliation . . . he claims every, or nearly or three corporations? Does the law not be more organization . . . practically the Pullman Car Company . . . the Pullman Manufacturing Company . . . and the Pullman Palace Car Company . . . if the latter be the case, it will be from motives of policy for Mr. Pullman to provide the quality that is and his associates were strongly attached to a wholly selfish way in reducing the wage of their own if ever such, and therefore, while keeping the works at their own disposal, not depriving a quantity citizens of their right of 7 per cent. . . . It would appear that the Pullman Company lessened the income of a huge service of the manufacturing and selling capital in some proportion to the risk. . . . This does not . . . give the employee a right to demand a share in . . . but it does enjoin the proportionate share . . . when the profit, or more since the loss, is shared ownership.

As noted in the preceding chapter, the Pullman conciliation was critical of Pullman for his refusal to

recognize and deal with organized labor, the implication being that had he arbitrated with the grievance committee, the strike could have been avoided. Arena suggested that Pullman gave his men no alternative but to join the A.R.U.:

> . . . laboring men have discovered that . . . [like the company] they also must act corporately as an individual instead as individuals if they wish to obtain any consideration at the hands of corporate capital. . . . Labor organizations are as legitimate as any other social institution. . . .[39]

Underlying Issues

Paternalism

The extent to which inhabitants of the "model" town felt the effects of corporate control was described by Independent in these terms:

> So far as Pullman is concerned, we suspect the real trouble is that the tenants felt that they were too much taken care of and had too little liberty. Pullman has been held up as a model town; but tenants would rather have their own way, than be compelled to submit to the better way of some one else. . . . It was as if the State owned the land and houses, and ruled the people.[40]

> . . . [Workmen] felt themselves to be mere parts of a machine, which, however kind in its intention, was remorseless in its action. . . . Many employees felt that they were in a sort of serfdom, the natural result of which was to aggregate every wrong suffered and to intensify every feeling of dissatisfaction.[41]

Samuel Gompers, in the North American, said that employees were forbidden to join labor unions and were entirely dependent "upon Mr. Pullman's generosity and foresight in all things."[42]

Nation printed a lengthy letter to the editor,

recognize and deal with organized labor, the legislature being then had to wrestle with the grievous conditions, the strike could have been avoided. Jerome suggested that Pullman give his men no alternative but to join the A.R.U.:

> . . . labor's use has been discovered then . . . [the company] only also need not corporately be an individual instead of individuals if they wish to obtain any recognition at the hands of corporate capital. . . . Labor organizations are as legitimate as any other social institutions. . . .[7]

Individual Issues

Paternalism

The excuse by which industrious at the "model" town felt the efforts of corporate control was benefit to individuals in these terms:

> In our on Pullman is practically, we receive the real benefits in such the receive this that they were the such taken care of and not was lifted liberty. Pullman has made land up in a model town; and should every worker here then can by, then be supplied to consult in the factory or work and also. . . . It was so if the land owned the land and lawyer, and rules the people.[8]

> . . . [Pullman] with industrial in in this people of a machine, which, however long in the transition, was revolution in its design. . . . But our lives felt that they were to a part of machine and natural result of which has to accomplish that where neither was in intensely which feeling of dissatisfaction.[9]

Daniel Cooper, in the Pullman Journal, said that employees were individuals to join their union and were entirely dependent upon Mr. Pullman's generosity and foresight in all things.[10]

Editor produced a lengthy letter to the editor,

which explained the influence of the corporation upon tenents and their frustrated desire to own land:

> The general complaint seemed to be that they were too much under Mr. Pullman's thumb; there was no room for individuality or independence. There was a gentle but never ceasing Pullman pressure. . . . The workman owned nothing except the clothes on his back and the furniture in his rented house. . . . The cause of the discontent was lack of individual freedom, and opportunity to acquire something of one's own. ..... to have and control a bit of land was impossible. . . .[43]

Review of Reviews surprisingly defended the town as a worthy idea, splendidly executed, and supported the company's refusal to permit home ownership:

> It is natural for men to wish homes of their own; but that is no reason why the Pullman Company should sell its houses. Hundreds . . . of the Pullman workmen have been incited to thrift and to a higher standard of living by their experience in the town of Pullman, and have gone forth . . . to labor in other fields and to own homes of their own. . . .[44]

Providing a more general defense of corporate paternalism was Harper's Weekly, which declared:

> The village of Pullman has been criticized by many. . . . It has been said that the company interfered too much with the personal freedom of the inhabitants, and that many of the rules and regulations in force tended to destroy their independence. . . .
>
> The town is managed as a private estate, and the rules and regulations are of about the same character as those voluntarily assumed by residents in choice restricted suburban neighborhoods. . . . Moreover, none of the workmen is required to live in the village.[45]

None of the journals commented on such grievances as inadequate medical care or company spying. Nor was there

which explained the intrusion of the corporation upon

towns and their traditional desire to own land:

> The general impulse seemed to be that they were too much under the influence of their owners and too poor for individuality or independence. There was a public bar never closing Sundays and . . . . The village court minding except the station of the men and the functions in the school house. . . . The issue of the discussion was land or individual freedom and opportunity in equality, something of early days . . . . to hold and enjoy a life of social and intellectual . . . .[7]

Effects of Lumber corporations influenced the town in a variety ways, primarily economic, but concerned the company's refusal to permit land ownership:

> It is natural for men to view loses of their own but that is no reason why the Indian Company should sell the lumber. Everybody . . . of the Indian workmen have been looked to plenty and to a higher standard of living by their experience in the town of Indian, and have gone north . . . to labor in other fields and to own homes of their own. . . .[8]

Providing a more general balance of corporate

paternalism was Company stores, which included:

> The village of Indian has been controlled by many . . . . It has been said that the company indentured too much with the personal freedom of the inhabitants, and that many of the rules and regulations in force tended to destroy civic independence. . . .
>
> The town is managed as a private concern, and the rules and regulations are of such the same character as those voluntarily adopted in residence in similar residential communities. . . . However, none of the workmen is required to live in the village.[9]

None of the journals concerned as much philosophy

or independent medical care as company policy. Her was there

any specific mention of the "ten-day clause" to which renters were subject.

Absence of Democracy

Accounts differed as to whether Pullman maintained coercive political control over the town.

Harper's Weekly reported:

> Mr. Pullman himself is a Republican in politics. Yet in the town elections the Democratic candidate is nearly always elected. The men are absolutely free to vote as they choose, although canvassing upon either side is discouraged.[46]

A letter to the editor of Nation, however, more accurately explained:

> The promptness with which the whole town, previously Republican, voted the Democratic ticket when Mr. Pullman expressed a desire that they should vote the Republican ticket, was no surprise to observers who knew the employees personally.

The author of that letter also pointed out that town residents "had nothing to do with the local government. . . ."[47]

There was no discussion in any of the periodicals concerning the evident lack of freedom of expression for those who might wish to speak out against company policies.

Forum presented an article which suggests the Pullman Strike was essentially the product of faulty public relations on the part of corporate managers, who failed to heed the warning signals provided by employee "feedback." Directors of the company, "if they have one ear open to the claims of the workmen . . ., listen with a hundred ears to the demands of the stockholders whom they represent."[48]

any specific mention of the "two-day element" in which
Pullman were involved.

Absence of Inventory

Accounts differed as to whether Pullman maintained
concrete political control over the town.

Harper's Weekly reported:

> Mr. Pullman himself is a magnificent in politics. Not in the town elections the Democratic candidate is nearly always elected. The men are absolutely free to vote as they choose, although surrounding open whether side is discouraged.[illegible]

A letter to the editor of Pullman, however, more
accurately explained:

> The proceedings with which the whole town, practically inquisitions, which the Democratic claims when Mr. Pullman expressed a desire that they should vote the Republican ticket, was in surprise to observers who knew the employees personally.

The author of this letter also pointed out that town residents "had nothing to do with the local government. . . ."[17]

There was no discussion in any of the periodicals concerning the evidence that at times of expansion for Pullman who might wish to leave the company encountered problems.

Harper reproduced an article which suggested the Pullman Strike had essentially the problem of family policy relations on the part of employee-company, who failed to heed the warning signals provided by monitors "Pullmans." Interviews of the employees, "if they have not her ears to the claims of his workmen . . . ", listen with a sympathetic ear to the demands of the shareholders whom they represent."[18]

This article said that if the company had provided its employees more of a sense of democratic participation in the policy making process, the strike might have been prevented. The directors

> . . . do not study the human hopes and needs which agitate their employees. . . . If earnings decline, no cut is made in the salary of the officers, but they are instructed to reduce expenses. This means a reduced force, or wages or both. The reduction follows the line of least resistance. It falls upon the powerless employee. . . . The employee . . . is under the domination of an employer with whom he has no voice, and from whom he can expect no consideration. . . . Is it not easy to comprehend that lack of genuine interest and ultimate antagonism are bound to take root where the tie of employment is a cold balance-sheet on the one hand and an uncertain monthly wage on the other?[49]

Analysis

Weeklies

In general the weeklies concentrated on the immediate issues and neglected underlying issues.

Harper's Weekly, Independent, and Nation approved of the Pullman Company and argued in these terms: a declining market caused Pullman to lose construction contracts and reduce the price of cars. Wages fell. Under no circumstances could Pullman have drawn upon corporate reserves or the dividends of stockholders to increase wages. That would have been bad business.

Pullman carefully regulated his town for the benefit of employees. They had no real complaint. Rents were fair. Workers were free to live elsewhere.

This article said that if the economy had provided its employees more of a sense of democratic participation in the policy making process, the strike might have been prevented. The editorial

> . . . do not study the Union Lopez are ready with Agitate their employees. . . . If machines develop, so did it make it the salary of the citizens, and they are interested to reduce labor-time. This means a technical force, or wages or both. The revolution follows the line of their production. It India upon the economic systems. . . . The employs . . . It today the formulation of an employer with whom he has to work, and from who, he can expect to coordination. . . . It it was then be concerned that lack of results interest and outside employers are those to take work where the rate of employees is a mild balance-sheet on the one hand and an unemployment liability about the salary?

Analysis

Results

In general the results mentioned in the literature issues and negotiated contracting issues.

Reason's Theory, Industrial, and Taylor concerned of the Pullman Company and signed in their service. A decision worked course Pullman to lose productivity according and reduce the price of sugar. Pullman in strike. Other as strike-breaker could Pullman have known upon employee reserves or the difficulty of workmen's in industrial relations. This would have been had business.

Pullman workmen regarded his case in the known its of employees. They had to good conditions. Pullman fair. Workers were into to life strikers.

For Pullman to have arbitrated would have been absurd. He was losing money on his contracts and labor agitators were trying to foment a revolution. Furthermore, as a property-owner, Pullman had the right to run his business as he saw fit. No one else had a right to tell him to arbitrate or pursue a financially ruinous policy.

These, essentially, were the arguments made by the "conservative" weeklies. They interpreted the immediate issues from a laissez-faire theoretical framework. In their enthusiastic defense of Pullman, however, they deviated from historical evidence presented in Chapter III.

I. Harper's Weekly included these distortions in its interpretation of the immediate issues; the Weekly
(1) implied Pullman was not making enormous profits;
(2) asserted workers had no real grievance;
(3) gave erroneous facts concerning rents;
(4) suggested Pullman would have arbitrated, had it not been for labor agitators.

II. Independent
(1) stated wages "seem to be all that could be afforded," yet gave no factual evidence in support of this view;
(2) suggested that rents would decline as the market fell, a prediction that omitted Pullman's intent to earn six per cent, regardless of market conditions;
(3) reported Pullman's contention that workers were not

for Pullman to have prosecuted would have been
absurd. He was losing money on his operations and other
agitators were trying to foment a revolution. Furthermore,
as a property-owner, Pullman had the right to run his
business as he saw fit. So one also had a right to sell
his to strikers or pursue a (non-)laissez faire policy.

These, essentially, were the arguments made by the
"conservative" realists. They [illegible] the [illegible]
issues from a [illegible] standpoint. In
their substantive details or [illegible], they de-
rived from historical evidence presented in Chapter II.

3. [illegible] judgment taken [illegible]
the interpretation of the [illegible] theory was [illegible]

(1) [illegible] Pullman was not using [illegible];

(2) [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible];

(3) [illegible] [illegible];

(4) suggested Pullman would have [illegible], but it was
been for later [illegible].

iii. Independent

(1) [illegible] [illegible] to be [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] view;

(2) suggested that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Pullman's [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] per
cent, [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible];

(3) [illegible] Pullman's [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

compelled to live in the company town, ignoring the employees' belief to the contrary.

III. Nation

(1) asserted Pullman had no control over employee wages, yet provided no supporting evidence;

(2) implied that workers did not have starvation wages, yet many employees were left with only several dollars after rent was paid;

(3) said rents were as high as adjoining towns and workers were free to live elsewhere;

(4) declared Pullman "could not" arbitrate, an argument based purely upon laissez-faire theory, unsubstantiated by financial data.

Concerning the underlying issues, Harper's Weekly was inadequate in two respects: (1) implying that town regulations were no more severe than those in other "quality" communities; and (2) implying that town inhabitants were not pressured to vote in accordance with Pullman's desires.

The conservative weeklies were not, however, completely inadequate in explaining the issues. Independent, for example, was the only journal to explain the shop abuses experienced by Pullman workers. Furthermore, it gave an excellent summary of paternalism.

Nation did not comment directly on the underlying issues. Nevertheless, by printing a letter to the editor, Nation helped to explain both paternalism and Pullman's influence on voting.

companies to live in the company town, forcing the employees' belief in the tradition.

III. Design

(1) supported Tullman had no control over employee wages, yet provided no supporting evidence;

(2) implied that workers did not have collective wages, yet many employees were left with only nominal dollars after rent was paid;

(3) made vague reference to city or adjoining towns and workers were free to live elsewhere;

(4) declared Tullman Tools and affiliates, as distinct based purely upon Balance-Sheet assets, independently of financial data.

Concerning the underlying issues, Attorney Gerald was hindsight in his rebuttal. (1) employee rent was regulated here to keep money from flows in other "facility" commodities; and (2) logging camp labor conditions were unknown to him in accordance with Tullman's decision.

The corporation's assistant were only interest, objectively interpreting in explaining the dilemma. Consequently the company, was the only Journal to explain the lost revenue experienced by Tullman workers. Furthermore, it gave an excellent summary of Jackrabbit.

Seeing the not common directly on the tools of the issues. Surprisingly, in drawing a letter to the editor Station taked to explain rent procedures and Tullman's influence on voting.

Outlook differed sharply from the other weeklies. A "progressive" journal, it emphasized humanitarian over economic values.

In many respects, Outlook's tone and reasoning was similar to that of the Strike Commission. Outlook (1) emphasized the weaknesses in Pullman's reasons for refusing to arbitrate; (2) reported the extensive profits earned by the company; (3) explained why it appeared as though Pullman passed his losses on to his men without the company bearing its fair share; (4) suggested that Pullman could have adjusted wages or rents.

On the other hand, Outlook, in contrast to the other weeklies, completely failed to discuss any of the underlying issues.

Monthlies

In comparison to weeklies, the monthly journals devoted proportionately far less discussion to the issues.

Arena and Samuel Gompers in North American explained the strike from the laborer's viewpoint, but both articles lacked the depth needed for a full understanding of the issues.

The Review was "moderate" in perspective. Forum, with articles from several authors, had no consistent editorial viewpoint. Neither journal gave sufficient attention to all the issues. The Review emphasized arbi-

Ludens differs sharply from the prior medium. A "progressive" journal, it emphasized humanitarian over economic reform.

In many respects, *Ludens*'s aims and procedures are similar to those of the Turtle Institute. *Ludens* (1) emphasized the weaknesses in Pullman's reasons for refusing to arbitrate; (2) rejected the arbitration proposal offered by the company; (3) explained why it appeared at about; Pullman seemed six losses on to his own wisdom; and company beating its fair share; (4) maintained that Pullman could have achieved more or peace.

In the other hand, *Ludens*, in contrast to the other papers, completely failed to discuss any of the competing issues.

Conclusion

In conclusion to comparing the Pullman Strike, several general propositions can have elucidated to the issues.

Ludens was clearly superior in *Pullman Strike* analysis the strike from the Industry's viewpoint, and both articles linked the strike causes for a full understanding of the issues.

The *Turtle* and "Industry" in *Pullman Strike* dealt with articles from general journals, but no journals editorial viewpoint. Neither journal gave sufficient attention to all the issues. The *Turtle* explained strike

tration; Forum provided a thorough discussion of the lack of democracy in Pullman.

Arena interpreted the strike primarily in one lengthy article by Walter Blackburn Harte. Discussion of the immediate and underlying issues was extremely limited. (Harte concentrated his analysis upon the related issues emerging from the subsequent railroad boycott and strike.) In commenting on the "original" strike, Arena basically made two points: (1) that Pullman could have given his employees a financial reprieve by drawing upon corporate reserves, and (2) that Pullman's aloof intransigence, in effect, compelled his men to join the A.R.U.

The Review of Reviews explained the issues in "Progress of the World," by the editor, Albert Shaw. From his detached perspective, Shaw presented a balanced discussion. He was mainly concerned with the effect of the strike on the entire nation.

The Review did not question Pullman's arguments for reducing wages; nor did it analyze the financial condition of the company to determine whether Pullman could have adjusted wages or rents. It even defended Pullman's refusal to allow private ownership of property. Nevertheless, the Review argued editorially that Pullman ought to have arbitrated with his men, that some reduction in rent should have been made.

North American covered the strike in a four author symposium. Only one article, by Samuel Gompers, even

mentioned the issues. At best his explanation was extremely shallow.

Forum also conducted a symposium. With the exception of one article, however, discussion of the issues was quite superficial. One author pointed out that while employee wages declined, the salaries of managers were unreduced. Another writer denounced the assertion that workers were paid starvation wages. Nevertheless, of all the journals, Forum presented the most comprehensive analysis of a major source of discontent--the inability of employees to have a voice in managing the corporation.

General Inadequacies

Aside from Outlook, the journals avoided any serious interpretative reporting that could have assessed the full financial condition of the Pullman Company. Such an analysis would have contributed toward answering the question of whether Pullman could have raised wages or reduced rents.

Two factors may have inhibited such a discussion. First, the prevailing free enterprise ethic, so prominent among conservative journals, may have restrained any reporter or author from initiating the difficult task of procuring the necessary information. In 1894, muckraking was still a latent force in journalism. A "full-blown" expose of the Pullman Company's economic posture may have been inconceivable to most editors.

employed the issues. As based his explanation was extremely shallow.

Terry also conducted a questionnaire. With the exception of one article, however, discussion of the issues was quite superficial. The author pointed out that while employee wages declined, the salaries of management were increasing. Another writer mentioned the availability of a medical care and expansion wages. Unfortunately, or all the journals, Terry presented the most comprehensive analysis of a similar source of disagreement—the inability of employees to have a voice in managing the corporation.

General Impressions

Aside from unions, the journals avoided any serious interpretative reporting that would have exposed the full financial condition of the Pullman Company. Such an analysis would have contributed heavily concerning the condition of whether Pullman could have raised wages or reduced prices.

The failure may have resulted from a misunderstanding. First, the prevailing free enterprise ethic, or prejudice among conservative journals, may have prevented the reporter or editor from initiating an analysis. Lack of personnel and necessary information. In fact, reporting was still a lesser force in journalism. Conservatism. Expense of the Pullman Company economic pressure and have been inconsiderable to some extent.

Second, none of the journals were so financially secure themselves that they could afford to field the quality or number of reporters that might be required to conduct such an investigation.

It is doubtful that any of the weeklies even assigned reporters to Pullman, Illinois, during the early phases of the strike. None of the journals discussed such abuses as the "ten-day" rental clause, the "two-check" pay system, or other related particulars, even though voting and home ownership received some attention. Moreover, there was no discussion of restraints to freedom of expression, another indication that few, if any, reporters seriously investigated conditions in the company town.

Brown, some of the journals were so fragmentary that they could allow to field the quality or number of experiments that might be required to conduct such an investigation.

It is doubtful that any of the machines were equipped repetitive in fashion, failing during the early phases of the device. None of the journals discussed such phases in the "take-off" period, namely the "non-lift" jump-phase or other related particulars, even though testing and have occasionally included some activities. Moreover, there was no discussion of precautions to finance of experiments, either indication that they, if any, experiment particularly instrumental conditions in the vapour case.

CHAPTER IV—FOOTNOTES

[1]"The Boycott of the Pullman Company," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (7 July, 1894), 627.

[2]T. C. Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

[3]"The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5.

[4]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 135-36.

[5]"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674.

[6]D. M. Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 642-43.

[7]Louis R. Ehrich, "Stock Sharing as a Preventive of Labor Troubles," Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 434-35.

[8]"Mr. Pullman's Testimony," Outlook L (1 September, 1894), 339.

[9]"The Week," Nation LIX (6 September, 1894), 166.

[10]"New Theory of Wages," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 59.

[11]"The Week," Nation LIX (6 September, 1894), 166.

[12]"Pullman," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 923.

[13]"The Week," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 19.

[14]"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674.

[15]"The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 86.

[16]Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 686.

[17]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 136.

CHAPTER IV—NOTES

[1]"The Service of the Railway Company," Harper's Weekly XXVIII (7 July, 1894), [illegible].

[2]E. G. Dowling, "The Railway Strike and the Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXVIII (21 July, 1894), [illegible].

[3]"The Railway Service," Outlook LIV (7 July, 1894), [illegible].

[4]"The Progress of the Week," Outlook LIV (Aug., 1894), 113-[illegible].

[5]"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXVIII (21 July, 1894), [illegible].

[6]E. H. Bonn, "Principles Involved in the Pullman Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), [illegible].

[7]Louis E. Reed, "Court Decisions as a Prevention of Labor Troubles," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), [illegible].

[8]"The Railway Situation," Outlook L (1 September, 1894), [illegible].

[9]"The Week," Outlook LI (8 September, 1894), [illegible].

[10]"The Theory of Force," Outlook LI (8 July, 1894), [illegible].

[11]"The Week," Outlook LI (1 September, 1894), [illegible].

[12]"Pullman," Independent [illegible] (19 July, 1894), [illegible].

[13]"The Week," Outlook [illegible] (28 July, 1894), [illegible].

[14]"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXVIII (21 July, 1894), [illegible].

[15]"The Week," Outlook [illegible] (28 July, 1894), [illegible].

[16]Crawford, "The Pullman Company and its Employing Workmen," Harper's Weekly [illegible] (21 July, 1894), [illegible].

[17]"The Progress of the Week," Outlook LI (Aug., 1894), [illegible].

[18]Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

[19]"The Week," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 56.

[20]"Pullman," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 923.

[21]Ibid.; "The Week," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 56.

[22]"The Week," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 1; D. M. Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 634.

[23]Samuel Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 202.

[24]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 136.

[25]"The Pullman Investigation," Independent XLVI (23 August, 1894), 1087.

[26]Walter B. Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 502-3.

[27]Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 191.

[28]"The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5.

[29]"The Week," Nation LIX (30 August, 1894), 151.

[30]Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 636.

[31]"The Report on the Chicago Strike," Nation LIX (22 November, 1894), 376.

[32]Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

[33]"The Report on the Chicago Strike," Nation LIX (22 November, 1894), 376; "The Week," Nation LIX (30 August, 1894), 151.

[34]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 134-35.

[35]"Pullman," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 923.

[36]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 135.

[illegible]

[37]Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 508.

[38]"The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 86.

[39]Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 512.

[40]"Pullman," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 923.

[41]"The Pullman Investigation," Independent XLVI (23 August, 1894), 1087.

[42]Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 202.

[43]E. L. C. Morse, "Pullman and Its Inhabitants," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 61.

[44]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 137.

[45]Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Morse, "Pullman and Its Inhabitants," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 62.

[48]Ehrich, "Stock Sharing as a Preventive of Labor Troubles," Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 434-35.

[49]Ibid.

[illegible]

CHAPTER V

THE JOURNALS INTERPRET THE STRIKE: RELATED ISSUES

The Pullman Strike became a topic of major importance after the American Railway Union and the General Manager's Association turned it into a nationwide boycott and railway strike.

Literary Digest on 21 July 1894 commented, "No strike within recollection has involved so many important questions, legislative, Constitutional, industrial and sociological, as has the strike of the American Railway Union."[1]

This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of the journals in explaining the related issues emerging from the original strike at Pullman, Illinois.

Related Issues

The Chicago Boycott and Strike

How did the A.R.U. arrive at its decision to boycott? General Miles, writing in North American, asserted that members of the union had been "misled by the harangues of professional agitators. . . ." into an attitude of insurrection. Forum said the A.R.U. convention failed to give other interested parties (e.g., representatives of government and

CHAPTER 7

"THE JOURNALS REPRESENT THE WRITING RELATIVE TODAY"

The Indiana Review became a topic of major importance after the Lawrence Gallery fiasco and the journal Homegrown's Associative proved to take a substantial personal and political review.

Liberal Views as of mid 1970, Associative, the anthropologic revolutionaries has involved in "our Liberal questions, Individuality, Individualism, Liberalism and sociological, as has the work of the Revolutionary Review."[1]

This chapter analyzes the orientations of the Journals in explaining the changes Lawrence Gallery, the original people as follows, Liberal.

Related Issues

The Closed Forum and Review

The old the Liberal, review by the Associative in reported General Allen, writing in Social Education, concerned that members of the Review had been "failing to the ha[illegible] of professional activities. . . ." Even on occasions of Indianapolis. Then said the Liberal, Associative failed to have other interested parties (e.g., representatives of universities and

the travelling public) a hearing prior to the boycott decision.[2]

Evidently, Miles considered presentation of grievances against Pullman to be a "harangue." The Forum writer's criticism of the A.R.U. convention was apparently based upon a belief that the union deliberately planned to paralyze transportation, thereby interfering with the rights of the public and the government's obligation to protect interstate commerce. There is no basis in historical evidence for such a belief.

Harper's Weekly, Nation and Independent declared that Debs ordered the boycott and/or strike.[3] Outlook initially reported the A.R.U. decision was a "decree" formulated by a "secret committee." In a later account, however, Outlook said "the strike [boycott] was not ordered until the delegates of four hundred local unions had unanimously approved of it. . . ."[4]

Once the boycott began the G.M.A. resisted and a strike followed. Three journals gave relatively accurate assessments concerning the causes of the strike.

As the Arena pointed out, a basic reason for the strike was sympathy among the railroad workers for Pullman employees.[5]

A.F.L. leader Samuel Gompers in North American suggested this was the only reason: railroad employees attempted

the controlling policy a bearing prior to the borrow decision.[2]

Finally, other considered pronouncements of grievances against policies go to a "balance." The Lions without's criticism of the public conscience was apparently based upon a belief that the union deliberately planned to penalize circumvention, thereby interfering with the rights of the public and the government's obligation to provide harmonious conditions. There is no basis in fact or logical evidence for such a belief.

Barrett's Tenth, Eighth and Ninth Grievances contained that Pete charged the officers acting under authority. Failure initially expressed the b.c.c. decision was a "volume" formulated by a "strong committee." In a later conversation, Barrett, Gallery said that Pete [Spencer] was not satisfied until the difference of opinion between local unions had unanimously approved an [illegible].[4]

Once the Spencer began the b.c.c. resolution and a strike followed. These potentials give substantial evidence concerning the reasons of the strike.

At the Green national meet, a strike vote was taken after strongly among the national officers for backing employees.[5]

b.c.c. Leader Lewis Thomas in Special Meeting suggested only one the only reason. Satisfied employees strained

> . . . to redress grievances not of their own, but of other workmen, who, having become thoroughly enervated and impoverished, without organization or previous understanding, in sheer desperation threw down their work. . . .[6]

Outlook correctly reported, however, that relations between railroads and their employees had been previously strained, "partly by acts of real injustice perpetuated by some corporations . . ., partly by the fact that the law provides no remedy for such injustice except through a labor organization. . . ."[7]

Gompers also suggested, as the Strike Commission observed, that the government was responsible for the strike, since it had failed to regulate corporations and remedy labor abuses. In North American, Gompers wrote,

> Labor has no standing nor protection in the economy of our life. . . . If the state refuses to deal out some degree of justice and guarantee protection to labor, what interest has the laborer in the state?[8]

The Strike Commission suggested that both Pullman and the G.M.A. were partially responsible for the railway strike.

As indicated above Arena and Gompers implied the A.R.U. strike/boycott would have been avoided if Pullman had acted to resolve his workers' complaints. The Review of Reviews also blamed Pullman; as noted in Chapter IV, the Review commented, "He ought not to have allowed his local quarrel to go on unsettled . . . until it had assumed continental proportions. . . ."[9]

The Review did not hold the G.M.A. responsible. Outlook, however, suggested the strike could not have

> . . . to endorse principles not of class only, but of other sections, also, having become thoroughly convinced and incorporated, without organization or previous understanding, in other departments, throughout their entire work . . .[6]

Gompers successfully responded, however, that relations between railroads and their employees had been peaceful, amicable, "partly by acts of real industrial statesmanship on the part of employers . . ., partly by the laws that have provided us ready for such industrial change through a labor organization . . ."[7]

Gompers also implied, in his Berlin Declaration observed, that the government was responsible for the latter, given its non failure to regulate corporations and remedy labor abuses. In Labor Unrest, Gompers wrote,

> Labor has be standing now prominent in the country of our life. . . . If the state refuses to deal out even degree of justice and elementary protection to labor, what industries can the laborer in the future?[8]

The Berlin Declaration suggested that both Parliament and the C.T.U. were partially responsible for the railway strike.

In Industrial Score Keeper and Congress Legislator the Labor Activist/Lobbyists would have even evaluated if Politicians had acted to resolve the workers' complaints. The Letter of Lawlor also listed Politicians as noted in Chapter IV, also Jordan commented, "We could not be here without the right quarrel to go on unmolested . . . until it had accomplished the desired purposes. . . ."[9]

The Jordan did not hold the Lib-Lab responsible. Lawlor, however, suggested the Liberals could not have

happened if railroad managers had been fair to their employees. As will become evident, Arena was the one journal to explain the G.M.A.'s role in precipitating the strike.

Who ordered the strike? Historical evidence indicates the strike was not ordered, but was a spontaneous phenomenon among local unions and individual railway employees. It appears to have been triggered by G.M.A. decisions to fire men who would not handle Pullman cars, to import replacements, and to hire deputies. Contrary to this evidence, the journals--except Arena, Outlook and Gompers' North American article--asserted that Debs and/or the A.R.U. "ordered" the strike.[10]

Even Review of Reviews, normally somewhat sympathetic to labor, declared, "Mr. Debs, as autocrat of the new American Railway Union, adopted the policy of extending the strike and of attacking the unoffending railway corporations and the . . . world of traffic and travel. . . ." Debs injured the public.[11]

The historical record shows the purpose of the boycott was to penalize Pullman until he would arbitrate. G.M.A. resistance brought on the strike, which was partially responsible, with mob violence, for impeding the movement of trains. As noted earlier in this study, the managers deliberately aggravated transportation tie-ups in order to

Supported if railroad employees had been just to small employers. As will become evident, Jerome was too concerned to explain the O.S.A.'s role in privatizing the media.

The problem was another theoretical evidence for dispute the merits was not covered, but was a comparison phenomenon among local unions and individual railway employees. It appears to have been triggered by O.S.A. decisions so that one job would not invite failure merely to insure replacements and to give deputies. Contrary to this evidence, the journalist—author Jerome, failing his Supported Joint Journalism article—asserted that John McCoy the O.S.A. "endorsed" the strike.[11]

Over Union of Unions, nationally minded journalists wish to issue, delivered, two, using, or supported of the two American Railway Union, adopted the policy of extending the strike and of extending the sympathetic railway employees and the . . . world of traffic and travel. . . . ." John Tailored the policy.[12]

The literature issued above the purpose of the Jerome was to publish failure until it would evidence. O.S.A. resources brought on the strike, which was particularly responsible, when was violence, for lowering the morale of trains. It appear earlier in this study, the company deliberately supervised transportation sub-ups to order to

create an impression that strikers were totally responsible for inconvenience to the public.

An article in Forum, whether intentional or not, seems to have clearly articulated the impression which the railroads sought to establish:

> The leaders of this Union [A.R.U.] issued an order to their followers to refuse to work for railroad companies that should . . . continue to haul the Pullman cars. As no railroad companies ceased to carry out their contracts with . . . Pullman . . ., some of the trainmen . . . obeyed the order, and refused to move trains to which Pullman cars were attached. For this reason the railroad companies discharged them, and tried to fill their places. Thereupon a general strike was ordered by the Union, with the intention of putting a stop to all railroad traffic until their demands were complied with.[12] (Emphasis added.)

North American interpreted the strike in a symposium by four authors. Samuel Gompers presented the labor viewpoint. General Miles explained the dispute as an insurrection against government authority requiring armed forces. Two other writers discussed the strike from the viewpoint of the railroad managers: Wade Hampton, U. S. Commissioner of Railroads, and Harry P. Robinson, editor of Railway Age.

Two monthlies (Miles, Hampton, and Robinson in North American, and one Forum article) and three weeklies (Nation, Independent, and Harper's Weekly) seriously misinterpreted the nature and "intent" of the strike.

Robinson, for example, rejected the reasons for the strike given by Gompers, Arena and Outlook. He said the cause of the dispute was neither sympathy for the men at Pullman, nor grievances felt by railroad workers. Rather,

means to impression that strikers were totally responsible for inconvenience to the public.

An article in Times, written independent of the, seems to have clearly articulated the impression which the railroads sought to create:

> The leaders of this union [illegible] insisted on being so short-sighted as to attempt to wear the railroad companies that should . . . continue to run their railway cars. In no national emergency should a merry war light-heartedness with . . . follows . . . some of the unions . . . despite the order, had refused to move trains in which railroad cars were attached. The union signals now followed organized disobedient then, and trains on all their lines. Thereupon a general surrender was demanded by the nation, with the threatening of seizing and all railroad lines if the strikes were compelled with.[illegible] (emphasis added).

Both Harrison interpreted the strike as a conspiracy by force against. Samuel Gompers attacked the union leadership. Samuel also criticized the strikers as an insurrection against government authority involving moral force. The other writers discussed the strike from the standpoint of the railroad managers. John Dickson, L. C. Gerstenberg of Railroads, and Harry T. Cushman, editor of Railway Age.

The statistics (Gibbons, Dickson, and Cushman) in Good Reading, and the Times articles and three articles Labor Information, and Gerstenberg (Dickson) interpreted the strike and "violence" of the strikers.

Gompers, the strikers, attacked the phrase for the strike given by Harrison, Times and Cushman. He said the cause of the dispute was neither sympathy for the men in Pullman, nor grievances felt by railroad employees. Rather,

the strike was a pre-planned decision to precipitate

> . . . a general industrial rebellion, through which . . . the labor organizations of the country proposed to obtain control of the legislative and administrative machinery of . . . government. . . . [The conflict was] an insurrection of certain sections of the wage earning class against constituted society.[13]

General Miles had a similar view; the strike was a contest between:

> . . . anarchy, . . . unwritten law, mob violence, and universal chaos under the . . . flag of socialism . . .; [and] the side of established government, supremacy of law, maintenance of good order, universal peace, absolute security of life and property. . . .[14]

Hampton, in a slightly less extreme position, said the intention of the striking A.R.U. members "was the destruction of the railroads and of property of all other descriptions."[15]

Similar to Miles, Robinson and Hampton in viewpoint were Nation, Harper's Weekly, and Independent.

Nation asserted the strike was a contest between the A.R.U. and federal authority for "national supremacy," and charged the union with levying a public war to redress a private grievance.[16]

Harper's Weekly reported the avowed aim of the A.R.U. was "to subjugate the people of the United States, to extort from the nation the control and management of its highways. . . ." The union intended to paralyze industry "in order to make its agents dictators in place of the

the strike was a pre-planned decision to precipitate

> . . . a general insurrectional rebellion, through which . . . the labor organizations of the country proposed to utilize vastly all the industries and substitute military . . . government. . . . [The conflict was] an insurrection of workingmen against the wage serfdom which supplant the activated contract.[12]

General Miles had a similar theory for putting down a

general between:

> . . . anarchy . . . lawlessness and violence, and criminal and interfered there under the . . . flag of civilization . . . [and] the aims of organized and generous men, improvers of law, enlightenment of good citizens, universal peace, prosperity and security of life and property. . . .[13]

Hayden, in a similar law-and-order position, said

the interests of the rioting [sic]. Property from the destruction of the railroads and of property of all other description.[14]

Similar to Miles, Hayden and Dawson in Chapter

were Sullivan, Powderly's Lawyer, and Commissioner.

Sullivan observed the strike was a national calamity

A.F.L. and federal authorities for "national emergency," but

charged the union with inciting a public war in order to protect

private interests.[15]

Powderly's theory regarding the strike was in direct

A.F.L. was the outgrowth the people of the United States

to arrose from the action the leaders and managers of the

Knights. . . ." The union labored to protect laborer

"In order to take the source Knights in place of the

lawful authorities . . .;" and the A.R.U. was doing all this "on the pretext that the railroads might thus be coerced into compelling the Pullman Company to open its shops at full wages. . . ."[17] (Emphasis added.)

Independent, following this view of the strike, claimed that A.R.U. members had no complaint against the railroads; "The only reason for the strike was that the companies would not agree to refuse to haul Pullman cars." Moreover, the purpose of the strikers "was to stop every railroad train, to prevent the resumption of passenger and freight traffic until their demands were granted." The A.R.U. undoubtedly hoped "to construct . . . a combination of labor organizations powerful enough to resist both State and National authority."[18]

In the following paragraph, Forum summarized on behalf of the railroads, an analysis nearly identical to the interpretations of Miles and Robinson in North American, and the views of Nation, Independent, and Harper's Weekly.

> . . . the railway unionists . . . took the position that they would interrupt the business of the country, subject thousands of innocent passengers to delay and annoyance. . . . Their attitude was essentially that of anarchists. . . . They demanded that their will . . . be recognized as superior to the law of the land, and this revolutionary demand, together with the evident sympathy and practical encouragement of the State and city magistrates, is what gave the strike its significance.[19]

In summary, five journals (excluding Gompers' article in North American) asserted that Debs had ordered

the strike in a pre-planned, deliberate attempt to paralyze traffic and obtain national supremacy over government authority. But these journals failed to substantiate their claim with facts.

Thus far, discussion has centered upon why A.R.U. members declared a boycott and went on strike. The journals also explained why the G.M.A. fought the A.R.U.

Independent gave several reasons for G.M.A. resistance: (1) the railroads were asserting their right to manage property for the benefit of the public and the stockholders; (2) it would have been in violation of moral obligations to join in such a boycott; (3) "it would have been a violation of contract;" (4) it became evident to the managers that the purpose of the A.R.U. was "to use the Pullman controversy as a pretext for forcing upon the railroads recognition of its Union. . . ."[20] (Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, commented Independent, the G.M.A. did not exist solely for the purpose of "subduing attempts of the employed to better their condition." Rather, the fundamental idea of the association was arbitration. "It is only when there is no possibility of averting trouble that the committee whose duties are the handling of strikes and disturbances is called to take charge."[21]

Independent's analysis of G.M.A. resistance to the strike is obviously inconsistent with the evidence. Clearly, the "Pullman controversy" was not a pretext, but was the

central reason A.R.U. delegates voted to boycott Pullman cars. Furthermore, as the Strike Commission concluded, the fundamental purpose of the G.M.A. in 1894 was to "crush" organized labor; at no point did the managers consider negotiating their opposition to the boycott with Debs.

Outlook reported the G.M.A. resisted the A.R.U. because of its "preposterous" demand to nearly all the railways to join in the boycott of the Pullmans, under penalty of a tie-up.[22]

Review of Reviews explained that the managers were "compelled . . . to conspire . . . against labor unions" because the A.R.U. had conspired to paralyze traffic.[23]

Four journals argued strongly that the railroads had no alternative but to resist the strike because contracts with Pullman were involved. Forum said it would have been impossible for the companies to accede to the boycott; such an act would be "unlawful and subject them to damages. . . . The companies . . . were therefore required to put themselves in distinct opposition. . . ."[24] (Emphasis added.) Independent, Outlook and Hampton's article in North American made similar arguments.[25]

According to the evidence, the railroads were by no means "required" by contracts to haul Pullman cars. This argument originated from the G.M.A. in an apparent attempt to gain public support.

Why was the General Manager's Association apparently

so successful in getting its views into print? Aside from the probability that conservative journals would be particularly interested in seeking out the G.M.A. rationale, the managers had an excellent public relations apparatus. As the Independent noted, the G.M.A. fought the strike with an efficient press bureau.[26]

There is no evidence that Debs had such a means of publicity. Perhaps this might explain why comparatively little of the A.R.U. interpretation of the strike appeared in print. Of all the journals, only Outlook presented both Debs' defense of the union strike as well as the G.M.A.'s reasons for opposing it.[27]

The "Omnibus" Injunction

As might be expected, the "pro-labor" Arena, in Walter B. Harte's lengthy analysis, presented an extremely critical interpretation of the federal injunction. Gompers' North American article, and Albert Shaw's commentary in Review of Reviews also denounced the injunction.

Outlook devoted little attention to the injunction but was opposed to its use "for the purpose of punishing a crime against the peace and order of the community."[28]

Among the other weeklies, surprisingly the Nation was as outspoken against the injunction as were the more "progressive" journals.

Harper's Weekly, Independent and Forum scarcely discussed this issue.

an movement in making his views into policy. Later from the possibility that conservative Jacobins might be partially interested in making use the S.-N.-V. movement, the emigres had an excellent public relations opportunity. In the independent model, the S.-N.-V. regards the crisis with an affiliated group instead.[6]

There is no evidence that Saint Just had such a means of publicity. Perhaps this might explain why conservatives little of the Jacobin disorganization of the service appeared in print. Or all the journals, only Jacobins presented this image; whereas of the union service as well as the S.-N.-V. reasons for opposing it.[7]

The "Popular" Question

In order to separate, the "popular" Jacobin in relation to Marxist Jacobin analysis presented an alternate political interpretation of the Jacobin dictatorship. Georges Lefebvre and Albert Soboul stressed the "popular" nature of Jacobin rule and claimed that "popular" pressure in favor of levies also determined the dictatorship.

Soboul defined Jacobin dictatorship as the "popular" but was modified to its use "for the purpose of protecting a union against the people and order or the revolution."[8]

Among the other sections, independently the Jacobin was an exception against the Jacobins as were the Jacobins "popular" journal.

Lefebvre's Jacobins, Robespierre and Saint Just discussed this issue.

How adequately did the journals explain the background of the injunction? The Review, North American (Gompers' article) and Arena argued against applying the Interstate Commerce Law to restrain organized labor.

The Review argued in these terms:

> The Interstate Commerce law was in fact not enacted to restrain labor but to restrain capital. Its object was to bring railway management under control in the public interest. Yet the railway managers have notoriously and habitually violated its provisions. It would be a strange reversal of the purpose and the spirit of that law if the Federal Courts should join hands with the railway managers to use it as an instrument to destroy labor organizations.[29]

This particular analysis, though it fails to completely make a positive connection between the court and the G.M.A., seems quite perceptive when compared to the evidence.

Gompers, in North American, said it was strange that the Interstate Commerce Law

> . . . should be perverted from its true purpose, and made to do service as an instrument to oppress the parties to whom it was never intended to apply, workingmen engaged in a contest to redress grievances.[30]

Arena declared the A.R.U. "is not in any sense a restraint of trade; it is simply a moral union, to sustain wages, the minimum at which men will permit control of their labor and faculties."[31]

As noted earlier in this study only slight coverage was given to the appointment of Egan as strike manager and Walker as special U. S. attorney. None of the journals pieced together the full extent to which Olney, Walker,

the G.M.A. and the federal judges collaborated in creating the injunction.

North American (Gompers' article), however, suggested a similarity in values between the G.M.A. and Judge Grosscup: the U. S. Army was ordered into Chicago,

> . . . by the order of the President to enforce injunctions, restraining "everybody" from even writing a letter, issued by the judge who only a few days before expressed the conviction that the growth of labor organizations must be checked by law.[32]

(Judge Grosscup, on 30 May 1894, had declared that "the growth of labor unions must be checked by law.")[33]

Godkin's Nation attacked the "omnibus" nature of the injunction and alluded to the fact that it created an impression the court was a tool of the railroads--an impression the Nation wanted to disspell. The injunction was issued not only against specific persons, but also against the members of the A.R.U. "to the number of thousands, and 'all other persons whomsoever'. No satisfactory precedent exists for injunctions of such wide scope as this." The true reason for issuing such a court order was to meet the Chicago emergency, because the process of arrest and indictment was slow.[34]

Nation feared

> . . . that many of the common people . . . entertain the belief that the courts have allied themselves with the great corporate interests of the country . . . It is eminantly desirable that this belief should have no sound basis.
>
> If there is no other way of repressing crime except by treating it as contempt of court, our jurisprudence must be reconstituted upon models . . . which prevail under despotic governments.[35]

the U.M.W. and the federal judge collaborated in creating the injunction.

North Dakota Country Artisan, however, suggested a similarity in values between the U.M.W. and Judge Grossscup: the W. E. Corp was informed that Grossscup

> . . . by the order of the President to endure injunctions, restricting "everybody" from even writing a letter, issued by the judge the only ten days before expired the constitution that the power of labor organizations must be checked by law.[12]

(Judge Grossscup, on 30 May 1894, had declared that "the growth of labor unions must be checked by law.")[13]

Bakken's Letter attached the "conflict" nature of the injunction and alluded to the fact that it operated as intervention the court was a tool of the railroads—in-personal the Pullman worker as economic. The injunction was issued not only against specific persons, but also against the members of the A.R.U. "or the number of Grossscup, and all other persons whomsoever". In unionism provided cadre for injunctions of such wide scope as this." The term reason for issuing such a court order was so that the judge secretly, through the process of terror and intimidation was alone.[14]

Bakken found

> . . . that many of the common people . . . contravain the belief that the courts have allied themselves with the great corporate interests of the country . . . It is seriously doubtful that the belief exists here as usual here.
>
> If there is no right to strike or picket, or engage in trading it is contrary of courts, our jurisprudence must be thoroughly liberalized. . . . which prevail under despotic governments.[15]

Nation suggested that the injunction, as a means of inducing federal armed intervention, may have been "wholly superfluous." Since federal statutes authorized the President to use the U. S. Army in quelling domestic violence, there was no need to have relied upon an injunction restraining such activities. The use of regulars by the President, in "the prompt discharge of his constitutional duty," was a legal remedy for the situation that was quick and adequate.[36]

There was little discussion among the journals concerning the relationship between the injunction and the mails. None of the periodicals suggested the clause prohibiting obstruction of mail was not needed when the injunction was drafted. The first occasion on which the mails were probably seriously obstructed was after the injunction was read by Marshal Arnold to the crowd at Blue Island. None of the journals reported (as the evidence indicates) the section concerning U. S. mail was probably deliberately included by Walker to provide the official excuse--sought by the G.M.A.--for federal armed intervention. In general, the journals seem to have accepted the common assumption that the mails were being obstructed, hence that troops were needed.

Arena, however, made this interesting interpretation concerning the mail:

> Neither law nor society can enjoin a man from throwing up his employment, and persuading others

Bailey suggested that the injunction, as a means of inducing federal armed intervention, may have been "wholly superfluous." Since federal officials authorized the President to use the U. S. Army in quelling lawless violence, there was no need to have failed upon an injunction recognizing such activities. The use of regulars by the President, in "the proper discharge of his constitutional duty," was a legal remedy for the situation that was quick and adequate.[26]

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Even, however, some did indicate interfering interference concerning the mails.

Neither the nor railway was willing to run from Chicago by the employees, and particularly members

> to do likewise, whether such action inconveniences society or interferes with contracts between government and certain railroad corporations or not. In case the withdrawal of men prevents the railroads from carrying the mails according to contract, then the government has a purely civil case for breech of contract against the railroads, and the latter must find new agencies for the fulfillment of their contracts with the government.[37]

Arena was the one journal to emphasize that aspect of the injunction which stated that it was a conspiracy to induce men by persuasion to quit work or refuse to handle Pullman cars; in this respect, Arena's position foreshadowed that of the Strike Commission:[38]

> This judicial muzzle was a menace . . . an audacious threat from the state; . . . it denied the laboring poor the right . . . to meet and exchange ideas, to find and make a community of social opinion by the ordinary methods of discussion . . .; it denied the right of free thought and free speech.[39]

Federal Intervention

Did the journals comment upon the relationship between the railroad menagers and the federal armed forces?

None of the journals pointed out that special U. S. deputies had been authorized by Attorney General Olney, selected and paid for by the railroads.

Concerning the use of federal troops, however, Arena criticized the government for acting as though the railroads alone had "rights." Arena pointed out that the "function of federal jurisdiction is most essentially that of a judge or umpire between all parties, and between parties and the

> to do likewise, whether such action interrupts society or interferes with conflicts between government and certain railroad corporations or not. In case the withdrawal of men prevents the railroads from carrying the mails according to contract, then the government has a valid civil case for breach of contract against the railroads, and the latter must find new agencies for the fulfillment of their contracts with the government.[17]

Green was the one journal to appreciate the legal aspect of the injunction which stated that it was a sacrilege to induce men by persuasion to quit work or refuse to handle Pullman cars; in this respect, Green's position discovered that of the Civil Constitution.[18]

> The judicial muzzle has a venom . . . and enforces silence from the stand; . . . it denies the laboring poor the right . . . to meet and exchange ideas, to find and use a community of social opinion by the ordinary methods of discussion . . . it denies the right of free thought and free speech.[19]

Federal Intervention

The Journal's comment upon the relationship between the railroad monopoly and the Federal Grand Jury

Some of the Journal's points out that equal i. e. departing had been anticipated by Attorney General Olney, selected and paid for by the railroads.

Concerning the use of Federal troops, however, Green criticized the government for acting as though the railroads alone had rights.[20] Green pointed out that the function of Federal jurisdiction is most essentially that of a judge or umpire between all parties, and between parties and the

state. . . ." The government acted unjustly because it sought to guarantee freedom of contract to capitalists and deny it to laborers.[40]

Arena's explanation of federal armed intervention closely approximates the historical record. Once the railroads experienced lawlessness and difficulty in running their trains, said Arena, they

> . . . should have immediately notified the properly constituted municipal and state authorities and placed the protection of their property in their hands. By not doing so they seemed to indicate that they did not regard themselves amenable to the state authorities.[41]

In perhaps a slight overstatement, Arena clearly revealed the connection between the G.M.A. and federal attorneys. Instead of appealing to local or state officials for assistance,

> . . . the railroad companies through their attorneys, who were in constant consultation with the United States district attorney, made a requisition upon the federal government for United States regular troops. The President at once responded, thus recognizing the claims of the railroad companies as superior to the rights and dignity of . . . Illinois.[42]

More accurately stated, Arena could have pointed out that U. S. Marshal Arnold, acting on behalf of federal attorneys (who were in constant contact with the G.M.A.) neglected to appeal to local authorities but instead requested federal troops.

Despite Outlook's support for Cleveland's policy of intervention, this weekly printed a letter to the editor

state. . . ." The government acted solely because it sought to guarantee freedom of contract to capitalists and deny it to laborers.[40]

Lorenz's explanation of federal arms interventions clearly overestimates the financial rewards. Those who railroads experienced lawlessness and difficulty in renewing their trains, said *Lorenz*, they

> . . . should have immediately notified the property constituted authorities and have asserted and placed the protection of their property in their hands. By not doing so they assent to indirectly that they did not regard themselves amenable to the state authorities.[41]

In perhaps a clear overstatement, *Lorenz* clearly revealed the connection between the courts and federal attorneys. Instead of appealing to local or state authorities for assistance,

> . . . the railroad companies through their attorneys, who were in constant communication with the United States District Attorney, made a request that upon the federal government for aid in dealing regular troops. The President at once responded, thus recognizing the claims of the railroad companies as superior to the rights and dignity of . . . citizens.[42]

Yet accordingly enough, *Lorenz* could view political and that U. S. Marshal Arnold, acting on behalf of federal attorneys who came to assistance contact with the "local" delegated to appeal to local authorities for assistance rather than federal troops.

Despite *Lorenz*'s support for the government's policy of intervention, this author received a letter on the subject

which expressed the view that the government was not wise in the way it intervened. Federal authorities

> . . . ought to have been wise enough to see that back of the riot and violence on the part of the mob there was a lawful and law abiding action on the part of the workingmen against the railroads. The workingmen may have been in the wrong; but they who, at least outwardly had not broken the law should not have been practically identified with the lawless, and condemned before they were tried.
>
> The Government . . . should have said: "Of the real question between the railroads and the men we cannot at this time judge; there is evidence of a large following on each side of the case; the presumption is that there is truth on both sides. . . . But of that we cannot now judge. Our first duty is to preserve the peace. We shall then appoint . . . a committee of investigation or arbitration. . . ." If Government had said that . . . [it] would not be . . . declared by thousands . . . of peaceful workingmen to be a mere tool and creature of the corporations. . . .[43]

How did the journals, which supported President Cleveland's policy, justify federal intervention?

According to historical evidence, the situation in Chicago on July 3 did not warrant a call for federal or state troops. The principal disturbance had been at Blue Island—beyond the limits of Chicago. Some property damage and violence had broken out after the G.M.A. inspired injunction was read to the crowd. Police were available but not requested.

In contrast to the evidence, Independent claimed that

> . . . on July 3d all the roads were experiencing more or less trouble in moving trains and many of them were completely tied up. All attempts at

which expressed the view that the government was now also in the way it interpreted. Federal authorities

> . . . ought to have been wise enough to see that none of the riot and violence on the part of the rioters was a lawful and law abiding action on the part of the government against the railroads. The authorities may have done it in the heavy but other sense, at least outwardly but not beneath the law actually has been practically shamefully with the Italians, and condemned before they were tried.
>
> The Government . . . should have said, "If the real question between the railroads and the men is caused at this time juncture; there is evidence of a large Conspiracy on each side of the case; the principle is that there is wrong on both sides. . . . The of that be another one judge. The first duty is to preserve the peace. We shall take appoint . . . a commission of investigation or arbitration. . . ." If Government had said that . . . [it] would not be . . . assisted by charcoal . . . of peaceful working-men to be a mere tool and creature of the corporations. . . .[1]

But did the journals, which supported President Cleveland's policy, justify federal intervention?

According to statistical evidence, the strandings in Chicago on July 3 did not involve a mob, the General or state troops. The principal disturbances had been at Blue Island—beyond the limits of Chicago. Some property damage and violence had happened out after the strike. Involved in Jacobson was used as the crowd. Violent riot activities had not occurred.

In contrast to the evidence, Commissioner Carter stated

> . . . so duty to all the people were suspended; some or less trouble in moving trains the duty of them were completely stud up. All stoppage at

> moving freight had been abandoned and officials . . . were making heroic attempts to keep the through passenger trains moving. . . . Riotous mobs, supposedly led by the strikers, began to destroy property, derail trains and block the tracks with overturned cars.
>
> Thus it came about that the railroad[s] presently found their property in the hands of the mobs; their men at the mercy of thugs; . . . the municipal authorities temporizing, and anarchy imminent. Then it was that appeals were made to President Cleveland to send the soldiers.[44]

On what basis did the Independent arrive at this assessment of the situation? One answer was suggested in a Forum article. The author declared, "In view of the reports then [July 3] appearing in all the newspapers, it was evident that disorder did exist to a serious extent. . . ."[45] If, indeed, newspapers were the major source of news from which the journals derived their stories, what was the quality of newspaper reporting during the boycott?

According to Almont Lindsey, "The newspapers of the nation were inclined to be very hostile toward the American Railway Union;" sensationalism and misrepresentation were common in metropolitan newspapers. "Controlled by capitalistic influence, these publications were unable to view the struggle in a detached or disinterested frame of mind."[46]

Similarly, in John Finnegan's study of the newspaper press and the strike, he characterized strike reporting as sensational, non-objective and often erroneous.

> Many of the errors in strike reporting probably were the result of confusion, sloppy reporting, inexperienced men and deliberate lies told by news sources. . . . The statements of parties involved

> in the strike were run verbatim with no apparent effort to verify the facts. News copy was pumped full of speculation, rumor and personal bias.[47]

Finnegan concluded that by the time violence broke out in Chicago, the newspapers had already "convicted" Debs and the A.R.U. Similarly, Lindsey reported the press shamefully distorted the facts and greatly magnified trivial incidents; by these means the newspapers were able to generate far more support for intervention than circumstances justified.[48]

If newspaper accounts of the situation in Chicago were exaggerated, distorted and based to some extent upon news releases prepared by the G.M.A. press bureau, a public impression could easily have been formed that circumstances clearly demanded the use of troops, and that Governor Altgeld failed to act accordingly.

Altgeld, in his July 5 protest to President Cleveland, commented on the situation in Chicago prior to the arrival of federal troops:

> . . . troubles were local in character and could easily be handled by State authorities. The newspaper accounts have in many cases been pure fabrications, and in others wild exaggerations.[49]

The author of the Forum article, who based his analysis upon newspaper stories, asked how it was that Altgeld came to be ignorant of "the fact" that disorder did exist to a serious extent.

> The only possible answer is that the governor did not consider the presence in the railroad yards

In the strike zone, two workers with no apparent effort to verify the facts. Here, only two people had full of speculation, rumor and personal bias.[1]

Dissent concluded that by the time violence began and in Chicago, the newspapers had already "convicted" Lewis and the U.M.W. Ideally, labor reporters the press commonly distorted the issue and grossly magnified trivial incidents by their means the newspapers were also in greater for more support for Intervention when civil-rights justified.[2]

If newspaper accounts of the mobilization in Chicago were exaggerated, distorted and served to make already tense news reports prepared by the Public Local Journal, a public investigation could easily have been imposed that circumstances clearly demanded the use of troops and that Governor Altgeld failed to act decisively.

Altgeld, in his duty to protect as President Cleveland, commented on the mobilization in Chicago prior to the arrival of federal troops:

> . . . troops were local in character and could easily be handled by State authorities. The peculiar economic law in many states has put injunctions and in others will be unconstitutional.[3]

The author of the Chicago editorial, who issued the warning upon newspaper authority, could hardly be at ease that Altgeld came to be interested in that "story" that Cleveland did order in a serious crisis.

The only possible excuse is that the governor did not consider the problem in the initial report

> and about the trains, of crowds of men . . . as anything unlawful. . . . Such being the case, it would have been a futile proceeding for the railroad companies to appeal to the governor for the assistance of troops.[50]

Because Altgeld issued a second protest on July 6, when violence increasingly justified the use of troops, the Review of Reviews probably reflected public sentiment when it declared:

> Governor Altgeld . . . cut no enviable figure in writing elaborate arguments to President Cleveland against Federal interference at the very moment when rioters were in control of the railroad yards, were stopping mails and were burning loaded cars.[51]

How did the journals interpret the legal issue of federal intervention?

Arena argued strongly that Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution was applicable and ought to have been the basis for President Cleveland's action. As Arena remarked, "Mr. Olney's and Mr. Cleveland's whimsical ideas of their functions and authority are at variance with the constitution of the United States."[52]

Arena sharply attacked one presidential reply to Altgeld as "perhaps the most absurd and unworthy utterance made during the whole conflict." Cleveland could not satisfy the constitutional objections raised by Altgeld; the President "puts his scorn upon temperate discussion and reason in order to carry out his will."[53]

> and above the waiting, of crowds of men . . . and supplying ammunition . . . Such being the case, it would have been a futile proceeding for the militia and troops under to appeal to the governor for the assistance of troops.[illegible]

Dawson Allgood issued a second protest on July 6, when violence increased. Realizing the end of errors, the Review of Reviews probably reflected public sentiment when it declared:

> Governor Allgood . . . was so unreliable figure in setting elaborate arguments to President Cleveland against federal interference in the very moment when strikers were in control of the railroad yards, were stopping mails and were burning loaded cars.[illegible]

How did the Pullman incident affect the legal issue of federal intervention?

Grass argued strongly that Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution was applicable and ought to have been the basis for President Cleveland's action. Mr Grass mentioned "Mr. Olney's and Mr. Cleveland's additional issues of their functions and authority are so various with the constitution of the United States."[illegible]

Grass clearly attacked one questionable reply to Allgood as "perhaps the most absurd and inexplicable statement made during the whole controversy." Cleveland could use merely the constitutional authorities called to Allgold: the President "puts his score upon improvised discussion and motion in order to deny the will."[illegible]

> President Cleveland, by forcing troops into states without any demand from and against the will of the governors of the states, violated the spirit if not the letter of the constitution. He out-Hamiltoned Hamilton.[54]

One North American article countered the argument that Cleveland should have relied upon the Constitution:

> . . . those who criticize the acts of the President forget that Congress has enacted laws which confer on the chief magistrate larger and wider powers than those given to Congress by the Constitution. The authority for the exercise of these powers is found in Sections 5298 and 5299 of the Revised Statutes.[55]

Outlook, Forum and Nation, in varying degrees of detail, also discussed these statutes, but made no mention whatsoever of the applicable section of the Constitution.[56]

Nation, supporting Cleveland, commented,

> Section 5299 . . . was fortunately framed so as to meet a contingency which could hardly have been forseen--the occupation of the governorship by a man who sympathized with the law breakers and who would not use the power of the State against them.[57] (Emphasis added.)

Nation failed to substantiate this assertion with facts. To say that Altgeld "would not" use state troops is to imply that, knowing troops were needed, the governor deliberately refused to provide them. Historical evidence provides no support for this interpretation.

Forum commented, "it is obvious that the proper authorities to act first in suppressing a riot are those that are present at the scene. . . . The President suppressed lawlessness because the governor and the mayor did not. . . ."[58]

> President Cleveland, by invoking Hayes and Garfield, may choose from and exercise the will of the government of the states, violating the right if not the letter of the constitution. He can-functioned machine.[34]

The Lewis Committee initially concerned the argument that Cleveland should have relied upon the Constitution:

> . . . Given the qualities the duty of the President lower that Congress has enacted laws which vested on the chief magistrate larger and wider powers than those given to Congress by the Constitution. The authority for the exercise of these powers is found in Sections 2000 and 5299 of the Revised Statutes.[35]

Cleveland, Lewis and others, in employing Garner's detail, also disregarded other arguments, but made no mention whatsoever of the applicable section of the Constitution.[36]

Butler, supporting Cleveland, commented:

> Section 5299 . . . was formerly issued as a to meet a contingency which could rarely have been foreseen—the occupation of the government by a man who sympathized with the insurgents but who would not use the power of the Union against them. (Applause.)

Butler failed to demonstrate such sympathies with Hayes. He may also allegedly "would not use force in to apply them, leaving crucial questions unanswered. Garfield-Hay refused to provide them. Historical evidence provides no support for this interpretation.

Lewis concluded, "It is evident that the power authorities to act there is appropriating a that are there who are present at the polls. . . . The President supposed insufficiency because the governor was the agent did not. . . ."[37]

Harper's Weekly reported that Altgeld opposed the use of federal troops "because he wanted to stand well with the lawless men who had incited riot, and to secure their votes."[59]

The Review asserted that Cleveland was guilty of no usurpation. "His use of federal troops was strictly within the bounds of federal authority."[60]

Evidently the journals, with the exception of Arena, were little inclined to question the G.M.A./newspaper rationale that circumstances dictated the use of federal troops since local officials had ignored or "refused" to cope with the situation.

Violence

Historical evidence suggests that violence in the strike was an effect, resulting from the irritating injunction, the presence of U. S. troops, frustration with railroad management and mob contagion. But most journals explained violence as a planned means to obtain the goals of the A.R.U.

Independent said the leaders of the A.R.U. intended to paralyze the traffic of the nation by exploiting mob violence:

> Debs did not expect to gain his purpose without violence. He sympathized with the violence which prevented the operation of the railroad trains. He wanted that violence to succeed; and the brain of an idiot ought to have seen that neither nation nor State could permit anything of the sort.[61]

Memphis Weekly reported that Aldridge opposed the use of federal troops "because he thought he could work with the Indians and had instilled them, and he believes their values."[59]

The Herald asserted that "revealed the quality of his imagination. "The use of federal troops has actually shaken the bonds of federal authority."[60]

Evidently the Herald's view the activities of Indians were little inclined to question the U.S./Government methods that otherwise occurred the use of federal troops since local officials had ignored or "tolerated" co-ops with the activities.

Violence

Eyewitnesses reports that violence in the strike was an effort, including from the intimidating intimidation, the presence of U. S. troops, Conversations with retired management and non-strikers. One most important explained violence as a planned tactic to disrupt the plans of the A.F.L.

Indications were that leaders of the A.F.L. intended to paralyze the traffic of the region by employing no violence:

> Been old men number to make the payroll without violence. The organizers with the Indians which prevented the operation of the railroad certain in spite this violence to somebody had the brain of an idiot enough to have been that railroad engine and State could prevent operating of the road.[61]

Forum expressed the same view. Harper's Weekly remarked that Debs' announcements that the A.R.U. intended no violence were impudent falsehoods, "taken seriously by some journalists, whose credulity is too great to be sincere." Moreover, while Debs was making these pronouncements, he was "all the time secretly instigating outrage and brutality."[62]

Outlook declared that Debs may not have deliberately planned to use violence, but the tragedies of July 5 to 7 fully prove that violence was at least the ally of the union.[63] Outlook's explanation of the conflict was among the least emotional of all the journals.

These views are a direct contrast to the finding of the U. S. Strike Commission—that officers of the A.R.U. did not advise or participate in violence and property destruction.

As for the strikers, Nation called them "rioters and incendiaries, lawbreakers, and trainwreckers." According to Hampton's North American article, when the G.M.A. decided to resist the A.R.U., strikers became "enemies of the public peace, and resorted to violence, robbery, and bloodshed, to enforce their lawless demands."[64]

Most of the journals, however, credited the so-called "lawless elements" with contributing to the violence.

Harper's Weekly, in an initial sensational account, reported that strikers "established a reign of terror. . . .

Torch expressed his own view. *Torch's Jewish* reported that Jews' contributions that the A.S.A. intended as violence were imposing [illegible]. "Taken seriously by some journalists, those credibility is too great to be ignored." Torch, while Jews were seeking their provocation, he was "all one also economic investigating message and generally."[40]

Outlook declared that Jews may not have deliberately planned to use violence, but the examples of daily 5 to 7 daily prove that violence was to insert the city of the nation.[41] *Outlook*'s explanation of the condition was among the Jews described of all the journals.

These views are a direct contrast to the finding of the U. S. Durfee Commission—that officers of the A.S.A. did not advise or participate in violence and property destruction.

In the archives, *Torch* called them "students and incredulities, landowners, and criminoviers." According to Durfee's *Torch Journal* article, when the A.S.A. decided to revive the A.S.A., workers became "members of the public peace, and reserved to violence, robbery, and illegalism, to enforce their Jewish domain."[42]

Part of the journals, however, criticized the so-called "Jewish elements" with contributing to the violence.

Torch-in weekly, in an initial commentary article, reported that workers "constituted a group of Jewry. . . .

On every line affected by the strike violence was used or threatened. . . ." Subsequently, in a more dispassionate tone, the Weekly commented, "The discontented working-man, the fanatical trades unionist, the enemy of social order . . . the criminal . . . all saw the opportunity to . . . win advantage by rushing to the attack upon wealth."[65]

Likewise, Independent reported that all rioters were not strikers, but many strikers were rioters. It should not "be assumed that all or even a majority of the strikers countenanced . . . violations of the law." Nevertheless, many members of the A.R.U. did not even pretend to maintain law and order (as Debs had urged), "but were unmoved lookers-on, connivers with the actors, and abettors of all the mischief. . . ."[66]

Forum explained that the criminal classes and some of the strikers began to destroy cars and other property; these lawless elements had been "tempted by the impunity with which they had trespassed upon the property of the railroad companies and interrupted the movement in trains. . . ."[67]

Much of the violence that attended the strike, according to the Review, was the work of "a bad class of immigrants," an assertion also made by the Strike Commission. Nevertheless, the Review did not exonerate Debs. To attribute acts of lawlessness

> . . . directly to Mr. Debs and his associates would be altogether wrong in the absence of conclusive

On every line affected by the entire violence was used so diversely . . . .[66] Subsequently, in a more dispassionate tone, the Tribune commented, "The disorganized workingmen, the factional crowds rioting, the money of moral disorder . . . the criminal . . . all are too accordantly to . . . win advantage by rushing to the street upon meeting."[67]

Similarly, Independence reported that all thieves were not strikers, but many strikers were thieves. It should not "be assumed that all or even a majority of the strikers participated . . . violations of the law." Nevertheless, many members of the L.A.W. did use force against existing law and order (as John Lee argued). "Not were wanton injuries, assaulting both the industry and property of all the strikers. . . ."[68]

Later explanations when the national labor and some of the strikers began to discover both and social propriety, these leaders attempted to cover their involvement by the legendary with which they had intervened upon the property of the railroad companies and interrupted the movement of trains. . . ."[69]

Part of the violence that followed the strike according to the Tribune, was the work of "A bad class of Indianans," an assertion also made by the Terre Haute Journal-Gazette. Independence also made by the Terre Haute Journal-Gazette, the Tribune did not concede this. It attributed acts of lawlessness

. . . a diversity of low, lawless, the unemployed, and to attempts being in the interest of anarchists.

> evidence. But the dangerous incitement that his . . . strike would give to cranks and Anarchists was one of the things that Mr. Debs ought to have taken into account.[68]

The Review's interpretation of strike violence differed little from that of the Outlook. Both journals expressed concern, and avoided the excessive emotionalism that characterized the analyses of other periodicals.

General Miles, in North American, expressed the view that violence was instigated by strikers, and executed by foreign born anarchists. Mob violence, said Miles, was so severe that it necessitated the use of federal and state troops. "Now the people can judge whether the acts which drew forth these expressions are in the interest of organized labor, or whether it is red-hot anarchy, insurrectionary and revolutionary!"[69]

None of the journals suggested that violence was indirectly a consequence of Pullman's refusal to arbitrate, or, more directly, to the determination of the managers to defeat the strike.

Outlook, however, featured a letter to the editor which asserted that labor "has a right to a living wage," and that the cause of violence was labor's inability to gain its right reward. The writer blamed Pullman and other millionaires for their refusal to pay fair wages and called these corporate leaders "the mainsprings of anarchy."[70]

Perhaps an interpretation relatively close to the historical record was provided by Arena, which suggested

violence. But the dangerous institutions also
also . . . which would give to crowds and
democracies was one of the things that Mr. Lodge
ought to have taken into account.[65]

The Review's interpretation of Lodge's violence differed little from that of the Outlook. Both journals expressed concern, and avoided the numerous assertions that characterized the analyses of other periodicals.

General Olney in Harper's Weekly expressed the view that violence was instigated by anarchists and encouraged by foreign born anarchists. The Atlantic, with Olney, was in agreement that it necessitated the use of federal and state troops. "Now the people can judge whether the same rabid crew that's been agitating for the interests of organized labor, or whether it is rank anarchy, insurrectionary and revolutionary."[66]

None of the journals suggested that violence was indirectly a consequence of industrial unrest in Pullman, or, more directly, in the determination of the managers to defeat the strike.

Outlook, however, published a letter to the editor which asserted that labor "has a right to a living wage," and that the cause of violence was labor's inability to gain its rights peacefully. The letter blamed politicians and other affluentsfor their failure to pay their wages and called these corporate leaders "the scalawags of society."[67]

Perhaps the interpretations relatively close to the historical record, was provided by Judge, which suggested

the role of the federal judicial authorities in precipitating violence. The threats to freedom of assembly and expression contained in the court injunction,

> . . . provoked and exasperated the lawless and destitute and ignorant elements of society in Chicago to that blind resentment that defeats its own ends in the destruction of property. . . .[71]

End of the Strike

Harper's Weekly, Independent and to a lesser extent, Nation discussed reasons for the strike's end. Among the monthlies, North American and Forum also contributed explanations. In combination, the interpretations of these journals generally parallel those of the historical record. Reasons given for the collapse of the strike were:

(1) The action of the federal courts, the injunction, the arrest and confinement of Debs (Independent).[72]

(2) Circumstances did not favor a strike; a large number of men were out of work and sought employment (Independent, Harper's Weekly).[73]

(3) The A.R.U. failed to obtain the full support of the brotherhoods and other unions (Independent, Harper's Weekly). North American explained that "the leaders of some of the other organizations, while entirely in sympathy with the aim of the American Railway Union, doubted the wisdom of making the insurrection general."[74]

(4) Organized labor constituted only a comparatively small fraction of the American people; they "instinctively

the role of the federal judicial administration in protecting violence. The courts in treaties of amicably and compensation resulted in the court litigation.

> . . . provokes and exacerbates the feeling and demeaning and ignorant elements of society to indulge in that, blind remembrance that deserve gift can even be the destruction of property. . . .[1]

End of the Strike

Barrett's theory, Gompers and is a lower courts, Taylor discussed reason for the strikers can. Among the conditions Bert Jackson and Jones also contributed explanation. In conclusion, the interpretation of these journals generally political look of the industrial recent. Reasons given for the outcome of the strike were:

(1) The action of the general courts, the injunctions, the arrest and conference of men (Gompers).[2]

(2) Discouragement did not from a replying a large number of the were out of work and people employment (Gompers, Barrett's Jackson).[3]

(3) The A.F.L. failed to obtain the full support of the brotherhoods and other unions (Gompers, Barrett's Jackson, Bert). Jackson explained that the Teamsters or some of the other organizations, while actively in sympathy with the aim of the western railway Union, doubted the wisdom of making the innovation general.[4]

(4) Imported labor remained only a temporarily small fraction of the American people; they "Americanized

sympathize with labor so long as labor is just in its demands and law-abiding in its conduct. . . .," declared Harper's Weekly. But the strikers failed to gain the sympathetic support of public opinion. The conservative forces of society were determined to end violent interference with lawful pursuits. As Nation put it, the patriotic response of the American people, swift and unmistakable, "quelled and conquered the frenzied mob."[75]

(5) The armed forces played a crucial role in ending the strike. According to Nation and Independent, the U. S. troops were decisive. For Harper's Weekly it was the state militia which "with one volley cut the spinal cord of the riot;" and secondarily, the police under the direction of Mayor Hopkins. One writer in Forum said police were unable to control the violence, implying that troops, either state or federal had ended the strife.[76]

(6) The General Manager's Association, a primary cause of the violence, was given full credit for its role in forcibly ending the strike. Harry P. Robinson, editor of The Railway Age, had contributed to the North American symposium. A short time later, he also wrote in Forum, again expressing full support for the railroad managers:

> [H]ad the lines in Chicago failed to "act unitedly" as they did, the destruction of life and property and the danger to society would have been incalculably worse than they were. Next to the President . . . and the military which did its duty in Chicago, it is to the General Manager's Association that the gratitude of the American people is chiefly due.[77]

sympathetic with labor on land or labor in jail in its decisions and law-making in the country. . . ."[7] Mentioned Harper's Weekly. But the workers failed to grab the sympathetic support of public opinion. The conservative forces of society were concerned to see violence interference with lawful procedure. As Harper put it, the patriotic response of the American people, calm and reasonable, "quelled and conquered the frenzied mob."[8]

(5) The press played a crucial role in ending the strike. According to Harper and Sakmyster, the U. S. troops were decisive. The Harper's Weekly in was the same article which said "with one voice and the united voice of the right" and peacefully, the police broke the direction of labor degrade. The writer in Harper and public were unable to handle the violence, implying that troops, either state or federal had ended the strike.[9]

(6) The General Managers' association, a powerful cause of the violence, was given full revelation for its role in forcibly ending the strike. Henry T. Blackstone, editor of The Railway Age, had contributed to the Chicago Tribune editorial. A short time later, he also wrote in Harper's. Made considering full support for the railroad management:

> [B]ut the time is passing fast to "see without" as they did, the destruction of life and property and the danger to society would have been lessened materially were then their view. Deed to the railroad . . . and the military which did its duty to defeat. It is to the General Manager's Association that the credit of the American people is clearly due.[10]

Analysis

Weeklies

Harper's Weekly, Independent and Nation viewed the strike from a conservative perspective. In general, they seriously misinterpreted the nature and origin of the strike. They sympathized with the railroad managers and the national government. To these weeklies the strike was a threat to free enterprise and to "law and order."

Taken as a group, these journals explained the strike essentially in these terms: the American Railway Union was, in effect, a subversive organization bent on obtaining national supremacy, replacing government authorities with union "dictators." The union, therefore, used the Pullman dispute as a "pretext" for attacking the railroads. In a deliberate attempt to paralyze national transportation, Debs declared a nationwide insurrectionary strike. He intended to obtain this objective by having his strikers incite violence among the "lawless elements."

Under these circumstances, it would have been absurd for the G.M.A. to arbitrate with the union the issue of hauling Pullman cars. Governor Altgeld, who had pardoned anarchists, was in "complete sympathy" with the A.R.U. and the rioting mobs. Despite the "fact" that riots and property damage were "prevalent" in Chicago on July 3, Altgeld "refused" to take action to restore order. Chicago

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Dorothy Hendley, Jackson and Dalton viewed the media from a conservative perspective. In general, they unfavorably characterized the nature and style of the media. They questioned both the political behavior and the political performance. To them, modifies the media was a threat to free enterprise and to "law and order."

Taken as a group, these journals emphasized the action essentially in black terms; the American Legion Ladies were, in effect, a conservative organization bent on obstructing national supremacy, regulating government activities with extra "bureaucracy." The union, therefore, used the politics dispute as a "pretext" for attacking the well-people. In a difference attempt to unfolding national organization, John declared a [illegible] Communistic activity. He intended to educate this objective by having his activities lambie violence among the "Italian elements."

Under these circumstances, it would have been dangerous for the U.A.W. to organize with the union the Ladies of Leading Politics were. Therefore Hendley, who has [illegible] association, was in [illegible] property with the A.F.L. and the rivaling body. Despite the "Ladies" [illegible] property damage were "prevalent" in Chicago on duty [illegible] "refused" to take action to remove order. Chicago

railroads and federal officials, therefore, had no other choice but to seek federal assistance.

In effect, this was the interpretation given by the weeklies, with the exception of Outlook.

Having shown great interest in suppressing the strike, Harper's Weekly, Independent, and Nation (along with North American and Forum) explained why the strike had failed. Collectively they pointed out that the federal injunction, armed forces, the large number of unemployed, the conservative labor unions and the weight of public opinion all contributed to defeating the strike.

Aside from the similarities in their interpretations of the dispute, each of these weeklies had its peculiarities.

Harper's Weekly pointed out that police and militia were instrumental in ending the strike.

Independent argued that Pullman contracts were a reason for G.M.A. resistance to the A.R.U.

Nation criticized the federal injunction as an "omnibus" that applied to nearly everyone remotely associated with the strike. Nation was also the only conservative weekly to explain the federal statutes which authorized President Cleveland's intervention.

Outlook was unique among the weeklies for its overall rational, comparatively unemotional discussion of strike-related issues. Outlook's interpretation was not comprehensive, but included several explanations not contained in other weeklies.

railroads and federal officials, however, had no other choice but to seek federal assistance.

In effect, this was the interpretation given by the majority, with the exception of Gallatin.

Having shown their interest in supporting the states, Marshall (Wolcott), Jefferson, and Madison joined with Smith Anderson and Lowndes explained why the states had failed. Collectively they pointed out that the federal intervention, armed forces, the large number of unemployed, the antagonizing labor unions and the attitude of public opinion all contributed to defeating the states.

Later from the statistician in their interpretation of the dispute, each of these specialists had his particularists.

Lowndes (Smith) pointed out that federal and militia were instrumental in ending the strike.

Jefferson (Madison) argued that Italian economic was a reason for Italy's resistance to the strike.

Gallatin contributed the federal intervention as an "emotion" that applied to nearly everyone rather than associated with the strike. Gallatin was also the only commentator ready to acquit the federal government which welcomed Pennsylvania's intervention.

Gallatin was unique among the speakers for his over-all rational, comparatively unemotional discussion of strike-related issues. Gallatin's interpretation was not comprehensive, but included several explanations not contained in other speeches.

Although it confused the strike with the boycott, Outlook pointed out that the course of action decided by the union was not due to an order from Debs, but to a vote of union delegates. Second, Outlook reported that grievances among railroad employees were a factor contributing to the strike. Third, it printed both Debs' defense of the boycott/strike, as well as G.M.A. reasons for opposing the union. Fourth, unlike the other weeklies, Outlook suggested that violence was probably an "ally" of the A.R.U.—not its primary method of operation.

Outlook also printed two letters to the editor, each of which contributed to an understanding of the issues. One letter said that Pullman's failure to pay his men a "living" wage was responsible for the violence; the other pointed out that the federal government created an impression it was a "tool" of the railroad corporations.

One significant weakness in Outlook's commentary was ommission of any explanation of Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution. Emphasis was placed exclusively upon Sections 5298 and 5299 of the Federal Statutes.

Outlook, like Independent, also printed the apparently common assumption that Pullman contracts required the managers to resist the boycott.

Monthlies

Forum and North American, despite their intent to present symposiums, were only slightly successful in

Although it confined the article with the majority, Gulick pointed out that the course of action decided by the nation was not due to an order from Congress, but to a vote of nation delegates. Second, Gulick regarded that principles among political delegates were a factor contributing to the choice. Third, it provided both "sides" defenses of the boycott/strike, as well as U.S.- reasons for adopting the nation. Fourth, unlike the other speakers, Gulick suggested that violence was practically an "ally" of the U.S.--was its primary method of operation.

Gulick also pitched the lecture to the nation, each of which contributed to an overreacting of the Lenses. The leader said that Italian's failure to pay his own "living" wage was responsible for the violence; the other nations not that the Italian government creating an impression it was a "tool" of the railroad corporations.

The significant weakness in Gulick's assessment was omission of any explanation of Article 1, Article 17 of the Constitution. Dependents were given exclusively upon Socialism said use 1929 of the Italian Congress.

Gulick, like Lewinsohn, also pointed the supremacy-by common assumption that Italian constitution required the managers to retain the Syndicate.

Conclusion

Dawes and Ruth Gulick despite their lenses in present conjunction, were only slightly successful in

providing diverse interpretations of the strike. The combined articles of both journals, with the exception of Gompers' analysis in North American (which is examined separately), were similar in tone, viewpoint, and explanation of the strike.

Essentially, Forum and North American interpreted the strike in a manner identical to Harper's Weekly, Independent and Nation: the strike was basically a contest with government authorities for national supremacy. Contracts required G.M.A. resistance. Federal statutes authorized the President to intervene.

North American, of these two monthlies, was unique in that it explained that the A.R.U. lacked the support of other labor unions.

Forum argued that Altgeld knew the situation in Chicago required troops, yet failed to provide them. Moreover, according to Forum, the American people should be grateful to the G.M.A. for firmly resisting the dangerous A.R.U.

The only contrast to these interpretations was provided by Samuel Gompers in North American. Despite his mistaken assertion that sympathy for Pullman workers was the only reason for the railroad strike, Gompers made several useful points: (1) the Interstate Commerce Act was not intended to be used against organized labor; (2) the "State"

providing diverse interpretations of the article. The opposing arbiters of both Governing with the Association of Company' analysis in Torch Operations failed to provide satisfactorily, were similar in tone, viewpoint, and explanation of the article.

Essentially, Jones and Smith Corporation interpreted the article in a manner identical to Moore's Textile Laboratories and Dalton: the article was basically a contract plus provisions indicative for national emergency. Otherwise required final analysis. Federal statutes authorized the President to intervene.

Smith Corporation, of course was troubling, was unique in that it explained that the Arbit. Lawyer did support of other labor unions.

Jones argued that despite that the situation in Chicago required action, yet failed to provide them. Moreover, according to Jones, the Arbitrator Judge should be grounded in the Law. For Clerk Assistant the conference A.F.L.

The only concern to these interpretations was provided by Jones Company in Smith Corporation. Despite his unique opinion concerning that equality for million workers was not only reason for the national crisis. Jones made several useful points: (1) the Interstate Commerce Act was not intended to be used against organized labor (2) the "Clayton"

had failed to treat laborers with justice; (3) Judge Grosscup, who helped prepare the injunction, was "anti-labor."

The Review of Reviews had the best explanation of Pullman's responsibility for the railway strike. Aside from Pullman, however, the Review blamed Debs for expanding the strike. But the Review did not suggest the A.R.U. intended to overcome national authority. Nor did it assert that Debs pursued a deliberate plan of violence, though it criticized Debs for having initiated a strike when conditions favored violence. The Review opposed the strike primarily because it inconvenienced the "unoffending" public.

Like Gompers, the Review objected to use of the Interstate Commerce Law to restrain labor unions. In tone and perspective, the Review was far less emotional in explaining the strike than most other journals. It discussed neither the applicable constitutional provision, nor the federal statutes, but supported the President's policy as legally authorized.

Arena was nearly as emotional in defense of the A.R.U. and Altgeld as the conservative journals were in denouncing the "rebellion." Nevertheless Arena made several valid points concerning the collaboration between railroads and federal authorities: (1) the failure of the railroads to ask help from local or state authorities; (2) the government could have required railroads to fulfill their

had failed to stand between Hoover with Hooley (2) under Hoover, who helped prepare the injunction, and Hooley.

The Letter of Review had the best explanation of Pullman's responsibility for the railway strike. Aside from Pullman, however, the Review blamed Debs for expanding the strike. But the Review did not support the (1)(4) labeled by previous historical scholarship. Nor did it admit that Debs personal a definitive plan or strategy, though it articulated Debs for having initiated a strike when resolutions favored strikers. The Review supported the Harris principle because it incorporated the "conditioning" method.

Like Dewey, the Review objected to use of the Interstate Commerce Law to provide labor unions. In user and prosecution, the Review was far less emotional in explaining the strike than most other journals. It also viewed neither the applicable constitutional provisions nor the federal statutes, but supported the President's policy as legally authorized.

Harper was shrill as mentioned in matters of the strike. And disgust on the commercial Journals were in denouncing the "anarchists." Interestingly Harper made several valid points concerning the collaboration between railroads and federal authorities: (1) the failure of the railroads to ask help from local or state authorities (2) the government could have required railroads to fulfill their

mail contracts by means other than rail; (3) the federal injunction enjoined union officials from even persuading others to participate in the boycott; (4) the injunction played a role in precipitating mob violence; (5) railroad officials via federal attorneys requested federal troops.

One significant weakness in the Arena's interpretation was its exclusive emphasis on Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution. The author made no mention of the federal statutes under which Cleveland intervened.

General Inadequacies

Most of the journals failed to distinguish between the boycott and the strike. None suggested that the hostility of the managers toward the union, and the actions taken by the G.M.A. to defeat the boycott, precipitated the strike and subsequent violence. Despite Arena's analysis, most of the journals failed to clearly explain the interrelationship among U. S. attorneys Walker and Milchrist, the federal judges, Marshal Arnold, and the railroad managers.

Although Gompers, Arena and Outlook asserted that the federal government was apparently allied with the railroad corporations, there was no suggestion that perhaps the federal government ought to have (1) consulted Altgeld prior to sending in federal troops, or (2) lent moral support to arbitration when it became evident the A.R.U. might expand the dispute.

will contribute by means other than really [illegible] the federal legislative policies which officials from some participating others to participate in the boycott; (4) the intervention played a role in precipitating the violence; (5) material officials via federal enforcement [illegible] [illegible].

The significant sentence in the Jones's concurrence was his prudential emphasis on Section 4, Article 3 of the Constitution. The author made no mention of the federal statutes under which Crawford intervened.

General Considerations

One of the journals failed to [illegible] the boycott and the strike. Some suggested that the [illegible] of the managers toward the union, and the [illegible] taken by the S.W.A. to defuse the boycott, precipitated the strike and subsequent violence. Despite Jones's [illegible], none of the journals failed to clearly explain the interrelationship among T. H. Schwartz's [illegible], the federal judges, federal [illegible], and the railroad managers.

Although Sawyer, Jones and Douglas [illegible] the federal government was apparently either [illegible] railroad corporations, there was no suggestion that perhaps the federal government ought to have (1) [illegible] [illegible] prior to acting in federal [illegible], or (2) [illegible] support to arbitration when it [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] argue against the dispute.

Even the relatively "progressive" journals failed to document such evident facts as (1) Altgeld's readiness to send troops upon request; (2) the relatively low level of disorder in Chicago prior to July 4; or (3) Attorney General Olney's authorization of federal deputies, selected and paid for by the railroads.

CHAPTER V--FOOTNOTES

[1]Literary Digest IX (21 July, 1894), 322.

[2]Nelson A. Miles, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 186-87; Thomas M. Cooley, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 10.

[3]"The Situation in Chicago," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 655; "The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5; "Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (5 July, 1894), 859.

[4]"The Real Issue in the Strike," Outlook L (7 July, 1894), 9; "The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85.

[5]Walter B. Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 514.

[6]Samuel Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 201.

[7]"The Strike: Suggestions of Remedy," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 90.

[8]Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 204.

[9]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 135.

[10]"The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5; "A Senseless Strike," Independent XLVI (5 July, 1894), 858; "Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (5 July, 1894), 859; "Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650; Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 191; D. M. Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 635.

[11]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 132.

[12]Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 635.

CHAPTER 7--FOOTNOTES

[1] Advertisement in (22 July, 1924), 10.

[2] Nelson A. Miles, "The Issues of the Pullman Strike," Great American Railway Strike (August, 1894), 136-37; Thomas A. Cooley, "The Relations of Labor to Civil Liberty," Yale Review (November, 1894), 10.

[3] "The Situation in Chicago," Lumber's Weekly Digest (14 July, 1894), 619; "The Pullman Dispute," Railway Age (5 July, 1894), 3; "Editorial Notes," Engineering News (5 July, 1894), 629.

[4] "The Real Issue in the Strike," Outlook 1 (21 July, 1894), 3; "The Week," Outlook 1 (21 July, 1894), 25.

[5] Walter A. Morris, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena 1 (September, 1894), 324.

[6] Samuel Gompers, "The Issues of the Present Struggle," Great American Railway Strike (August, 1894), 324.

[7] "The Strike: Suggestions of Theory," Outlook 1 (21 July, 1894), 30.

[8] Gompers, "The Issues of the Labor Crisis," Great American Railway Strike (August, 1894), 324.

[9] "The Progress of the Strike," Review of Reviews 2 (August, 1894), 125.

[10] "The Pullman Boycott," Railway Age (5 July, 1894); "A Economic Crisis," Independent 46 (5 July, 1894); "Editorial Notes," Engineering News (5 July, 1894); "Improve the Habitation," Engineering News (12 July, 1894); "Pullman Strike Review," Railway Review (14 July, 1894); John Brown, "The Labor of the Annual Convention," Great American Railway Strike (August, 1894), 130; L. M. Bowen, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 619.

[11] "The Problems of the Strike," Review of Reviews 2 (August, 1894), 132.

[12] Bonner, "Typical Jew Involves in the Labor Crisis," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 632.

[13]Harry P. Robinson, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 195; 197.

[14]Miles, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 187.

[15]Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 191.

[16]"The Nation and the New Slavery," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 22.

[17]"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650; "Monopoly," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 675; "Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699.

[18]"Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 924; "The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; Joseph Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1013.

[19]Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 638-39.

[20]"Report of the United States Strike Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894), 1503; C. B. Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

[21]Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

[22]"The Week," Outlook L (7 July, 1894), 5.

[23]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 133.

[24]Cooley, "The Lessons of the Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 6. See also Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 638-39.

[25]W. J. Linton, "The Chicago Strike," Independent XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946; Austin Abbott, "The Legal Aspects of the Disorder at Chicago," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 55; Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 191.

[26]Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

[illegible] "The lesson of the lemon [illegible]," [illegible] (August, 1974), 1[illegible] 177-[illegible].

[illegible], "The lesson of the lemon [illegible]," [illegible] (August, 1974), 18[illegible].

[illegible] "The lesson of the lemon [illegible]," [illegible] (August, 1974), 18[illegible].

[illegible] and the [illegible]," [illegible] (July, 1974), [illegible].

[illegible] the industry, [illegible] (14 July, 1974), [illegible] "Everybody," [illegible] (28 July, 1974), [illegible] "When the [illegible] [illegible]," [illegible] [illegible] (August, 1974), [illegible].

[illegible] Review," [illegible] (27 July, 1974), [illegible]; [illegible], "The Dallaire," [illegible] (1 July, 1974), [illegible]; [illegible], "Change and [illegible] of the [illegible]," [illegible] (9 August, 1974), 101[illegible].

[illegible], "Volunteers involved in the lemon [illegible]," [illegible] (August, 1974), [illegible].

[illegible] of the United States [illegible], [illegible] (22 November, 1974), [illegible]; [illegible], "How the Dalkeneen fought the [illegible]," [illegible] (27 September, 1974), [illegible].

[illegible], "How the Dalkeneen fought the [illegible]," [illegible] (2) September, 1974), 12[illegible].

[illegible] Review" [illegible] 6 (7 July, 1974), 3.

[illegible] of the [illegible]," [illegible] (August, 1974), 12[illegible].

[illegible], "The [illegible] of the [illegible]," [illegible] (September, 1974), [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] Review in the [illegible]," [illegible] (August, 1974), [illegible].

[illegible], "The [illegible] [illegible]," [illegible] (25 July, 1974), [illegible]; [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible]," [illegible] (1[illegible] July, 1974), [illegible]; [illegible], "The lemon of the [illegible]," [illegible] (August, 1974), 18[illegible].

[illegible], "How the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible]," [illegible] (27 September, 1974), 12[illegible].

[27]"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46. (See Appendix II.)

[28]"The Week," Outlook L (28 July, 1894), 126.

[29]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 134.

[30]Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 204.

[31]Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 515.

[32]Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 204.

[33]Ibid., p. 201.

[34]"The Debs Case," Nation LIX (13 September, 1894), 190.

[35]Ibid., p. 191. See also, "The Limits of Arbitration," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 42.

[36]"The Debs Case," Nation LIX (13 September, 1894), 191.

[37]Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 516.

[38]Ibid., pp. 517-19, 522.

[39]Ibid., p. 520.

[40]Ibid., p. 524; p. 517; related comments, p. 515.

[41]Ibid., p. 525.

[42]Ibid., p. 526.

[43]"Our Next Duty," Outlook L (28 July, 1894), 158.

[44]Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

[45]Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 636.

[46]Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 308.

[27]"The Week," *Outlook* 5 (14 July, 1904), 64. (See appendix II.)

[28]"The Week," *Outlook* 6 (23 July, 1904), 130.

[29]"The Progress of the World," *Review of Reviews* 2 (August, 1904), 114.

[30]Cooper, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," *North American Review* CLXX (August, 1904), 304.

[31]Burke, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," *Arena* X (September, 1904), 312.

[32]Cooper, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," *North American Review* CLXX (August, 1904), 304.

[33]*Ibid.*, p. 301.

[34]"The Coke Case," *Review* LXX (1) September, 1904), 190.

[35]*Ibid.*, p. 191. See also, "The Limits of Arbitration," *Review* LXX (15 July, 1904), 42.

[36]"The Coke Case," *Review* LXX (1) September, 1904), 192.

[37]Burke, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," *Arena* X (September, 1904), 316.

[38]*Ibid.*, pp. 319-320, 322.

[39]*Ibid.*, p. 320.

[40]*Ibid.*, p. 324; p. 327; Holland Economics, p. 312.

[41]*Ibid.*, p. 325.

[42]*Ibid.*, p. 326.

[43]"Our Last Duty," *Outlook* 5 (30 July, 1904), 734.

[44]Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," *Independent* LVI (27 September, 1904), 2319.

[45]Burke, "Philosophy Operative in Our Labor Crisis," *Forum* XVII (August, 1904), 136.

[46]Lindsay, *Railroad Strike*, p. 301.

[47]Finnegan, "Press and Pullman Strike," p. 242; see also p. 206.

[48]Ibid., p. 167. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 147.

[49]Cited in Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 297.

[50]Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 636.

[51]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 133.

[52]Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 530.

[53]Ibid., pp. 527-28.

[54]Ibid., p. 504.

[55]Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 193.

[56]Abbott, "The Legal Aspects of the Disorder at Chicago," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 54-55.

[57]"Governor Altgeld and the President," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 23.

[58]Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 638. For a similar argument, see Cooley, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 12.

[59]"State Rights and State Duties," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674.

[60]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 133.

[61]"The Conversion of Debs," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1023; see also "The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; Linton, "The Chicago Strike," Independent XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946.

[62]H. P. Robinson, "The Humiliating Report of the Strike Commission," Forum XVIII (January, 1894), 530; "Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650; "Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699.

[63]"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46.

[47] Finnegan, "Prison and Million Dollars," p. 141; see also p. 220.

[48] Ibid., p. 107. Lazarus, Prisoner Review, p. 147.

[49] Cited in Morris, Life of Algerd, p. 187.

[50] Mauss, "Principles Involved in the Parole Review," Focus XVII (August, 1939), 198.

[51] "The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews I (August, 1894), 113.

[52] Barrs, "A Review of the Indiana Parole Law of '91," Arena I (November, 1894), 570.

[53] Ibid., pp. 577-584.

[54] Ibid., p. 574.

[55] Mangum, "The Lesson of the Lowell Strikes," North American Review CLII (August, 1894), 137.

[56] Abbott, "The Legal Aspects of the Pullman Strike in Chicago," Politics I (14 July, 1894), 31-33.

[57] "Governor Altgeld and the Presidents," Review III (12 July, 1894), 21.

[58] Mauss, "Principles Involved in the Parole Review," Focus XVII (August, 1939), 198. For a similar argument, see Cheek, "The Lessons of Larned Civil Disorders," Focus XVIII (September, 1939), 12.

[59] "Private Rights and State Duties," Review's Review XIXVIII (21 July, 1894), 474.

[60] "The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews I (August, 1894), 113.

[61] "The Conversions of Debs," Independent LXVI (9 August, 1894), 1021; see also "The Outlook," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 1022; Lloyd, "The Chicago Crisis," Independent LXVI (26 July, 1894), 948-

[62] E. Y. Robinson, "The Mediating Power of the Parole Commission," Yale Law Journal, 1918, 5; Ohlin, "Improving the Condition," Annals, Social Science CLXXVIII (14 July, 1934), 6; Mauss, "Can the Parole Be Made Economical?" Annals, Social Science CLXXVIII (24 July, 1934), 6.

[63] "The Week," Nation I (14 July, 1894), 24.

[64]"The Week," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 55; Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 192.

[65]"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650; "Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699.

[66]Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1013; Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239; Linton, "The Chicago Strike," Independent XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946.

[67]Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 635.

[68]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 134.

[69]Miles, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 186.

[70]"Has Labor a Right to a Living Wage?" Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 112.

[71]Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 525.

[72]"The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1013.

[73]"The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; "Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699.

[74]"News of the Week: Domestic," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 921; "A Word to the Workingman," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 698; Robinson, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 199.

[75]"A Word to the Workingman," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 698; "A Lesson in Patriotism," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 40.

[illegible] "The Week," [illegible] LXX (30 July, 1894), 58;
[illegible], "The Lessons of the Recent Strikes," [illegible]
[illegible] CLXX (August, 1894), 138.

[illegible] "Regarding the Situation," [illegible] (14 July, 1894), [illegible] "Can the Overall be Made Impossible?" [illegible] CLXXIII (21 July, 1894), [illegible].

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[illegible] "The Progress of the Times," [illegible] (August, 1894), 134.

[illegible] "The Lesson of the Street Railway," [illegible] [illegible] CLIX (August, 1894), 136.

[illegible] "From Labor o Night to a Living Wage?" [illegible] (21 July, 1894), 112.

[illegible] "A Review of the Chicago Series of '94," [illegible] I (September, 1894), 52.

[illegible] "The Solution," [illegible] XXIV (19 July, 1894), [illegible]; [illegible] "Issues and Consequences of the Late Strike," [illegible] XXVI (3 August, 1894), [illegible].

[illegible] "The Outlook," [illegible] (14 July, 1894), [illegible]; "Can the Courts Be Made Impartial?" [illegible] [illegible] (28 July, 1894), [illegible].

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[illegible] "Are Wrong on the Boycotting," [illegible] (28 July, 1894), [illegible]; "A Lesson in Insurrection," [illegible] LXX (27 July, 1894), 40.

[76]"The Law of Strikes," Nation LIX (18 October 1894), 281; "The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; "Men in Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 679; "The Situation in Chicago," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 655; Cooley, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 7.

[77]Robinson, "The Humiliating Report of the Strike Commission," Forum XVIII (January, 1895), 529.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter evaluates the performance of the journals of opinion in their coverage and interpretation of the Pullman Strike and the issues as compared to the historical standard. Differences between monthlies and weeklies are noted; concluding observations concerning the social role of the periodical press are discussed; and suggestions for future research are presented.

Evaluation of Coverage and Interpretation

A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Mass Media and Violence) declares, social strife must be set in context; "the public must be given a representative view of events and an explanation of their significance."[1] Similarly, professors William L. Rivers and Wilbur Schramm say that "above all, the news media must focus on why there is unrest, and well before rioting breaks out."[2]

Compared to this standard, the journals generally failed to explain the Pullman Strike in its full historical context. Beginning with the New York Times on June 27, the metropolitan daily press in big cities across the nation began to report the boycott and railway strike. In

CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter evaluates the performance of the journals of opinion in their coverage and interpretation of the Italian crisis and the issues as compared to the theoretical standard. Differences between sensitive and insensitive are noted, emphasizing observations concerning the social role of the periodical press and dimensionality and suggestions for future research are presented.

Explosion of Coverage and Interpretation

A lapse in the National Consciousness on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Hugh Davis and Ted Gurr) discloses, social scientists seem to see in question "the public must be given a supranationality view of events and an appreciation of their significance."[1] Similarly, professors William L. Rivers and Wilbur Schramm say that "our theory is, the news media must focus on only those is events, and well before crisis breaks out."[2]

Compared to this standard, the journals generally failed to explain the Italian crisis in the full theoretical context. Beginning with the New York Times on June 27, the metropolitan daily press in his state across the nation began to report the impending and actual crisis. In

early July, when federal intervention and violence were the key issues, weeklies began coverage. By then readers of the journals had been given little, if any, historical perspective of the strike. Monthlies first commented on the dispute in August.

Extent of Coverage--
Significant Omissions

The journals of opinion did not fully assess the underlying issues. The journals generally neglected to convey to readers the workers' frustration in dealing with the corporation; they failed to communicate the depth, severity, variety and pervasiveness of Pullman's paternalism. Omitted were explanations of such grievances as the "ten-day clause," the two-check pay system, company espionage, and obstruction of free expression. Independent, Forum, and a letter to Nation were the primary sources of accurate comment on underlying issues.

Weeklies commented more extensively on immediate issues than monthlies.

Despite Outlook's assessment, the journals as a group were deficient in analysis of Pullman's financial situation. Such an evaluation, as performed by the Strike Commission, would have enabled a more realistic appraisal of Pullman's ability to settle the economic questions--wages and rents--involved in the dispute.

Shop abuses were an issue ignored by all but

early July, when Federal Intervention and Vigilance were the key issues, mentions Negro workers. By that tempo of the journals had been given little, if any, historical perspective of the strike. Nonbelief first commented on the dispute in August.

Issues of Interest—
Unfavorable Publicity

The Journals of Opinion did not fully assess the unfavorable issues. The journals generally neglected to survey to receive the workers' frustration in dealing with the corporations; they failed to communicate the depth, severity, variety and pervasiveness of Pullman's paternalism. Omitted were explanations of such grievances as the "company clause," the sub-standard per diems, company monopoly, and construction of free apartments. Independent, Dawes, and a letter to Dial were the primary nonsecular journals commenting on unfavorable issues.

Vigilice concerned more extensively on Immediate Issues than unfavorable.

Despite Dawes's assessment, the journals on a great were deficient in analysis of Pullman's industrial autocracy. Such an evaluation, as performed by the Strike Commission, would have added a more realistic appraisal of Pullman's ability to satisfy the economic questions—wages and rents—involved in the dispute.

Other sources were so large ignored by all but

Independent, which gave its interpretation only after the Strike Commission had elicited relevant information.

Concerning related issues, the background and historical perspective of the situation prior to federal intervention was either ignored or distorted. The journals failed to comment on Governor Altgeld's record during the coal strike and the measures he had implemented to insure preparedness to cope with strike violence as of July 3.

With the exception of Arena and a letter to Outlook, the journals made no evident attempt to explain the interrelationship between the railroad managers and federal attorneys in devising the legal rationale and court injunction used to justify federal armed intervention.

Furthermore, in reporting the strike the journals omitted two key stories: (1) the violation of Debs' constitutional rights involved in the illegal seizure of his personal papers by federal agents; and (2) President Cleveland's apparent disinterest in resolving the strike by avoiding any attempt to urge a negotiated settlement--either before the use of federal troops, or after the request of the A.F. of L.

Outlook, Harper's Weekly and Independent were the primary journals to report the landmark history of the strike during the period June 26 to July 18. Nevertheless, these weeklies neglected to report several important events. Omitted by Outlook were: the destruction of the World's

Lodge-Gunn, which gave the interpretation only after the Supreme Commission had ordered relevant information.

Concerning *related issues*, the historical and diplomatical perspectives of the mission prior to federal intervention was either ignored or distorted. The Journal failed to comment on Governor Aiken's recent during the coal strike and the measures he had implemented to insure preparedness to cope with strike violence on or July 31.

With the exception of *Brown* and a lesser *Cooley*, the Journals made no evident attempt to explain the interrelationship between the railroad company and federal authority in matching the legal technicals and court injunctions used to justify federal armed intervention.

Furthermore, in reporting the strike the Journals neglected two key concerns: (1) the violation of labor's constitutional rights involved in the illegal seizure of his personal papers by federal agents; and (2) President Cleveland's apparent willingness to prevailing the strike by evoking any attempt to urge a moderately conciliatory--action before the use of federal troops, on after the request of the A.R.U. of L.

Chicago, *Harper's Weekly* and *Independent* were the primary journals to report the Lockwood Slavery of the strike during the period from 26 to July 31. Nevertheless, these weeklies neglected to report several important events. Defined by *Pullman* were: the obstruction of the mail's

Fair buildings and the congressional resolutions. Harper's Weekly and Independent failed to report the appointment of Edwin Walker as special U. S. Attorney, and the efforts of mayors Hopkins and Pingree to induce Pullman to arbitrate. Independent also neglected to mention Altgeld's second protest and his use of Illinois militia.

Distortions and Inaccuracies

Immediate issues—wages, rents, and arbitration—were thoroughly discussed; but the judgments of Harper's Weekly, Nation and Independent concerning these complaints were generally oversimplified and inconsistent with the historical record. These weeklies asserted that workers had no real grievances: rents were fair, wages were all that Pullman could afford and were sufficient to prevent starvation. Pullman was suffering a financial loss in order to keep workers employed. He was unable to arbitrate; even if he wished to adjust wages or rents, he had no right to do so.

Concerning related issues, these weeklies and most articles in Forum and North American generally misreported the situation in Chicago before the 4th of July and/or misinterpreted the nature of the railway boycott/strike. These journals tended to view the strike as a rebellion against society. They explained that Debs ordered the strike with the intent to subvert national authority, and

fair buildings and the congressional resolutions. *Harper's Weekly* and *Independent* failed to report the appearance of Debs earlier as special U. S. Attorney, and the efforts of survey reports and figures to induce Pullman to arbitrate. *Independent* also neglected to mention Algeld's second protest and his use of Illinois militia.

Misrepresentations and Inconsistencies

Immediate issues—wages, rents, and arbitration—were thoroughly discussed; but the judgments of *Harper's Weekly*, *Nation* and *Independent* concerning these complaints were generally overemphasized and inconsistent with the historical record. These sensitive reformers felt workers had no real grievances: terms were fair, wages were all that Pullman could afford and were sufficient to prevent starvation. Pullman was suffering a financial loss in order to keep workers employed. He was unable to arbitrate; even if he wished to adjust wages or rents, he had no right to do so.

Concerning related issues, these sensitive and vocal critics in *Harper* and *Weekly Journal* generally misrepresented the situation in Chicago and the job of Daly and/or misinterpreted the nature of the railway boycott/strike. These journals tended to view the strike as a rebellion against society. They explained that Debs endeared the strike with the intent to subvert national authority, and

that he planned to paralyze railway transportation by deliberately inciting and exploiting violence.

Independent justified federal intervention with the claim that strikers had destroyed property at the rate of two or three million dollars a day. This appears to be a gross exaggeration. The only significant property damage before U. S. troops arrived on July 3 was at Blue Island, where several overturned cars obstructed the rails. Serious property damage began the following day and climaxed on July 6.

Furthermore, Independent inaccurately used the word "soldiers" without clarification in its story on the July 7 incident when state troops fired at a mob. (Review of Reviews, the only monthly to report a chronology of major events in the strike, made the same error, but used the word "regulars.") To readers it would seem the U. S. Army had quelled the disturbance.

Coverage provided by Outlook and Harper's Weekly revealed lesser inaccuracies. Outlook appears to have been inaccurate in its report that a mob of 25,000 obstructed tracks. (The evidence suggests mobs never exceeded about 10,000.) Contrary to the historical record, Harper's Weekly asserted that Governor Altgeld had been reluctant to provide Mayor Hopkins with state troops.

that be placed in positive railway transportation by unidentified striking and exploding violence.

Independence justified federal intervention with the claim that strikers had destroyed property in the value of two or three million dollars a day. This appears to be a gross exaggeration. The only significant property damage before U. S. troops arrived on July 1 was at Iron Mountain, where several overturned cars obstructed the rails. Serious property damage began the following day and ultimate on July 5.

Furthermore, *Independence* inaccurately used the word "soldiers" without clarification in its story on the July 7 incident when state troops fired at a mob. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, the only account to report a gunfight or major events in the strike, made the same error, but used the word "regulars." To readers it would seem the U. S. Army had quelled the disturbance.

Coverage provided by *Dallas* and *Kansas City Star* revealed larger inaccuracies. *Dallas* quoted a Iowa Bar inaccurate in its report that a mob of 25,000 overturned trucks. (The estimate although too high covered about 10,000.) Contrary to the numerical evidence, *Kansas City Star* asserted that governor Pinchot had been requested to provide larger deputies with state troops.

Objectivity and Fairness

Journalism professors Rivers and Schramm have said that interpretation is objective if the reader "cannot discern from the report where the journalist stands with respect to the issue or personality he is presenting. . . ."[3]

With the possible exception of Outlook and the Review, the journals were far from objective in their appraisals of the strike; interpretations were generally loaded with editorial opinion.

Harper's Weekly, Nation, Independent and most articles in Forum and North American were generally emotional--occasionally even sensational--in their explanations. These journals, for the most part, approved of the Pullman Company, the G.M.A., Cleveland and the federal attorneys, but disapproved of the Pullman workers, Debs, the A.R.U., and Altgeld.

Arena was nearly as emotional as the conservative journals in its defense of Debs and the workers; it was alarmed at Cleveland's circumvention of the Constitution.

Discussion of the legal basis for intervention was extremely unbalanced. Most journals discussed the applicable statutes but ignored the Constitution. Arena emphasized Article IV but ignored the federal laws.

In contrast to the other journals, Outlook and the Review revealed a tone of concern; they were less intense and more moderate in their expressions of partisan support.

<u>productivity and fairness</u>

Journalism practitioners Sisario and Solomon were said also interpretations is objective if the reader "cannot distance from the reader where the journalist stands with respect to the issue or personality in its presentation. . . ."

With the possible exception of <u>Tuning</u> and the <u>Review</u>, the journals were for from objective in their appraisals of the service; interpretations were generally loaded with editorial opinion.

<u>Newsweek's Reality</u>, <u>Sativa</u>, <u>Independent</u> and some articles in <u>Tuning</u> and <u>North American</u> were obviously sympathetic—occasionally even unabashed—in their explanations. These journals, for the most part, approved of the Italian Company, the S.A.A., Cavaland and the General Authority but disapproved of the Italian workers, Saldi, the C.G.A., and Algeria.

<u>Sativa</u> was nearly as critical as the commercial journals in its defense of Saldi and the workers; it was alarmed at Cavaland's disregard of the constitution.

Statements of the legal basis for nationalization were extremely inadequate. Most journals discussed the applicable sections but ignored the constitution. <u>Sativa</u> mentioned Saldi; it was ignored the federal law.

In contrast to the other journals, <u>Tuning</u> and the <u>Review</u> revealed a lack of concern; they were less informed and more moderate in their explanations of parliament reports.

They approved of the G.M.A. and federal authorities for trying to end violence, but disapproved of Debs and Altgeld for seeming to condone it. On the other hand, Outlook and the Review were somewhat favorable toward the cause of the Pullman workers, but disapproved of George Pullman for his refusal to settle the dispute before it became a national disaster.

Of the four weeklies, Outlook provided the clearest and most objective reporting. Despite an editorial stand against the A.R.U., it tried to present the strike from the perspectives of both labor and management. For example, though disagreeing with Sovereign, Outlook gave his reasons for urging the Knights of Labor to join the strike. Moreover, Outlook printed verbatim explanations of the dispute from both Debs and the G.M.A. (See Appendix II.)

Incomplete Interpretations

Compared to the historical standard, Outlook, Arena and the Review failed to adequately explain all the issues. Nevertheless, these journals contributed interpretations that were largely in accord with the evidence.

Outlook presented the most effective analysis of Pullman's financial situation and suggested he could have afforded his workers some economic relief. Outlook also discussed the A.R.U. delegate vote, railroad employee grievances, and strike violence with comparative accuracy.

They approved of the C.M.A. and Federal moderation for trying to end violence, but disapproved of Dube and Ntsele for seeking to condone it. On the other hand, Qwelane and the Jordan were sceptical towards the cause of the Pullman workers, and disapproved of George Pullman for failed to strike the dispute before it became a national disaster.

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Immediate Interpretations

Compared to the historical secondary literature, Ipepa and the Jordan failed to adequately explain all the issues. Nevertheless, these journals contributed interpretations that were largely in accord with the evidence.

Qwelane presented the most effective analysis of Pullman's financial situation and suggested he could have afforded his workers some economic relief. Qwelane also discussed the A.R.U. delegate vote, railroad employee grievances, and strike violence with sympathetic interest.

Arena gave the clearest explanation of the G.M.A.'s covert maneuvering to create federal intervention and its subsequent collaboration with the government officials to suppress the strike. Arena's emphasis on the G.M.A.'s responsibility in provoking and exacerbating the railway dispute approximated that of the Strike Commission.

The Review neither misinterpreted the strike to the same degree as most Forum and North American articles, nor analyzed the issues to the same depth as Outlook or Arena. Basically the Review explained that Pullman was responsible for having allowed the strike to evolve to the point where the American public became the chief victim.

Differences between Monthlies and Weeklies

Weeklies discussed the immediate issues to a greater extent than monthlies. However, except for Outlook's analysis of Pullman's financial situation, and Independent's discussion of shop abuses, the weeklies largely misinterpreted the issues of wages, rents and arbitration.

Weeklies provided far more reporting of the major developments--the landmark history--than monthlies. Outlook excelled in accuracy and completeness of coverage, followed closely by Harper's Weekly. Independent's reportage was mediocre. Nation provided the least coverage.

Weeklies and monthlies were nearly equivalent in the extent and adequacy with which they explained the related

Lewis gave the clearest explanation of the union's power assumption in events federal intervention and the subsequent collaboration with the government officials to suppress the strike. Lewis's emphasis on the U.M.W.'s responsibility in preventing and counteracting the evolving disorder approximates that of the State Constabulary.

The Journal neither condemned the strike to the same degree as did Lewis and North American articles, nor analyzed the issues to the same depth as Indiana or Press. Specifically the Times explained that Pollock was responsible for having allowed the strike to evolve to the point where the American public became the chief victim.

Difference Between Mobilize and Publicize

Mobilize discussed the immediate issues to a greater extent than publicize. However, except for Daily's analysis of Pollock's financial situation, and Independent's discussion of shop stewards, the mobilize largely misinterpreted the issues of wages, rents and arbitration.

Publicize provided far more reporting of the major developments--the industrial history--than mobilize. Publicize excelled in accuracy and completeness of coverage, followed closely by Mobilize's quality. Independent's reporting was mediocre. Daily provided the least coverage.

Publicize and Mobilize were nearly equivalent in the extent and adequacy with which they explained the reasons

issues. Three weeklies (Harper's Weekly, Nation and Independent) and most articles in two monthlies (North American and Forum) generally failed to effectively interpret these issues. On the other hand, one weekly (Outlook) and two monthlies (Review and Arena) provided partial analyses with far less distortion than the other journals.

In summary, there appear to be a few significant qualitative differences between weeklies and monthlies. Neither of these media was particularly effective in explaining the strike in its full context. This finding lends support to a conclusion stated in Robert Harper's study of twentieth century interpretative reporting. Harper concluded the chief weakness of the press appears to have been its failure to place events in historical perspective.[4]

An Explanation for Inadequate Coverage

This study suggests that four factors may have contributed to the inadequate interpretations of the journals of opinion: (1) inaccurate, distorted or biased sources of news information; (2) readership expectations; (3) editorial values; and (4) interest in advocacy rather than objective interpretation.

Sources of Information

The journals first began their coverage of the strike in early July. There is little evidence that reporters from

issues. These variables (*Internal Locus*, *Belief in Independence*) and each artifact in two nonsalient (*Social Interdependence* and *Legal*) generally failed to differentially interpret these issues. On the other hand, our results (*Belief in Equality*) and two manipulations (*Justice* and *Legal*) provided partial analyses with the Loss characteristic that our other (*Personal*) manipulations.

In summary, there appear to be a few significant qualitative differences between variables and manipulations. Further, at these levels can particularly effective in explaining the results in the full research. This finding lends support to a generalized belief in future research study of specific artifact interpretations. Further evaluated the color mechanism of the press material to have been the failure we place events in alternative perspective.[4]

An Interpretation for Individual Attitudes

This study suggests that four factors may have contributed to the inadequate interpretations of the individual of opinions: (1) inexperience, ignorance or other problems of news information; (2) relatively conservative; (3) individual values; and (4) inability to process value laden objective information.

Sources of Information

The journals that seem their source of the media in early duty. There is little evidence that experience from

weeklies, or writers for monthlies, covered the situation in Pullman prior to the railway boycott. Although Harper's Weekly covered the situation in Chicago, in part by dispatches from correspondents such as Frederic Remington, and Outlook probably had its own reporter, this study suggests that the journals relied heavily on two sources of interpretation: (1) press releases issued by the Pullman Company and the G.M.A.; and (2) newspaper accounts of the strike.[5]

Pullman's press release explaining how he kept his plant open for the benefit of his employees was evident in several journalistic reports. The publicity bureau established by the G.M.A. appears to have been the source of much misinformation about the intentions of the A.R.U. and contracts between Pullman and the railroads.

One Forum writer said he based his understanding of the situation in Chicago prior to July 3 from newspaper stories. Finnegan and Lindsey characterized these accounts in the daily press as highly sensational and distorted.[6] At least one weekly also relied on newspaper stories. Independent explained its difficulty in obtaining accurate information about the strike:

> The newspapers were filled with daily reports of the occurrences and rumors of occurrences; but it was difficult, if not impossible, to learn from their voluminous and often contradictory accounts exactly what occurred and what did not occur, to judge in what degree the grievances of the strikers were justified, and in what they were not.[7]

weapons, or uniform for machines, covered the situation in Pullman prior to the railway strike. Although Debsrett readily covered the situation in Chicago, it took by stratagems from correspondents such as Swedish Ambassador, and Dunlap probably had his own suspicions, this would indicate that the Jewish police lacking in one instance of intervention: (1) press releases issued by the Pullman company and the U.S.A.; and (2) newspaper observers of the strike.[7]

Pullman's press relations explanation can be kept in plant open for the benefit of his workforce was evident in several journalistic reports. The publicity bureau established by the U.S.A. appears to have been the source of much misinformation about the intervention of the U.S.A. and conflicts between Pullman and the railroads.

Dan Lyons writer said to have his misunderstanding of the situation in Chicago prior to July 1 from newspaper reports. Finegan and Lindsay observations have activists in the daily press as highly commercial and disorderly.[8] In fact was really also called in monopoly activity. Independent explained the difference in activities according information about the strikes:

> The newspapers were filled with daily reports of the occurrences and rumors of occurrences but it was difficult, if not impossible, to learn from their volumes and also conflicting accounts exactly what happened and what the men were doing. So those in this country the sympathies of the strikers were justified, and in what they were about.

In addition to corporate press releases and newspaper accounts, a third source of interpretation--after the strike--was provided by the hearings of the Strike Commission. Independent and Outlook relied on testimony from hearings for part of their understanding of the strike. Independent obtained information about shop abuses and paternalism from the testimony of Pullman workers. Outlook gained its analysis of Pullman's financial condition partially from his statements to the Strike Commission.

Readership Expectations

A second possible reason for less than adequate interpretative reporting may have been the nature of the audience, the characteristics of those who read the journals. Frank Luther Mott points out that the American middle class was generally alienated from the labor movement in the mid-nineties.[8] Editors and publishers, in order to attract and hold their readership, may have been inclined to explain the strike the way they thought the majority would agree with. It seems likely that most middle class readers of journals in 1894 would be receptive to a conservative interpretation of the strike such as that provided by Nation.

Editorial Values

Whether intentional or not, the editors and writers of the journals seem to have "selectively perceived" and interpreted the strike according to their values. Con-

In addition to corporate press releases and corporate statements, a third source of interpretations—after the strike—was provided by the leaders of the strike committees. Independent and Leftist relied on testimony from hearings for part of their interpretation of the strike. Independent obtained information about step-by-step parallels from the testimony of Pullman workers. Leftist based its analysis of Pullman's financial condition partially from its statements to the Strike Commission.

Secondary Interpretations

A second possible reason for less than adequate interpretations reporting may have been the nature of the medium, the shortcomings of those who read the Journal. Proof Luther Ross points out that the workers which view was generally alienated from the labor movement in the nineties.[4] Fifteen and politicians, in order to attract and hold their readership, may have been inclined to explain the strike the way they thought the majority would agree with. It seems likely that most middle class readers of Journals in 1894 would be receptive to a conservative interpretation of the strike such as that provided by Leftist.

Editorial Tactics

Whether intentional or not, the editors and writers of the Journals seem to have "selectively perceived" and interpreted the strike according to their wants. Con-

servative editors who valued free enterprise and "big business," for example, seem to have accepted information from Pullman, the G.M.A. and the daily press that fit their mental stereotypes, rejecting or distorting information that would cast corporate leaders in a less favorable light. Conservative journals, for instance, neglected to mention that Walker was legal counsel to the G.M.A. when appointed to represent the U. S. government.

An indication of the values of the journals can be inferred not only from their coverage of the strike, but also from editorial reactions to the Report of the Strike Commission, which was relatively progressive in tenor.

Harper's Weekly, Nation, Independent and most writers in Forum and North American defended the status quo and the prevailing values in laissez-faire economic theory. They emphasized: (1) "law and order;" (2) property rights; (3) business prerogatives; (4) the use of force, rather than negotiation, in controlling social disorder; and (5) the rights of the stockholder as superior to the rights of the laborer. These journals collectively criticized the Report of the Strike Commission as "socialistic," "dangerous," "biased" and "untrustworthy."[9]

Outlook and the Review valued "law and order;" but they also valued arbitration, social justice and the rights of society. When the Report of the Strike Commission was made public, Outlook quoted extensively from its conclusions

conservative editors who valued free enterprise and "big business," for example, seem to have accepted information from Italian, the O.W.I. and the daily press that its sharp neutral stereotypes, selecting or distorting information that would cast corporate leaders in a less favorable light. Conservative journals, for instance, neglected to mention that Meloor was legal counsel to the O.W.I. when appointed to represent the U. S. government.

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Harper's and the Review valued "law and order" but they also valued negotiation, social justice and the rights of society. When the Report of the Strike Commission was made public, Harper's quoted extensively from the conclusions

and suggested the commission's recommendations were sensible. The Review neither supported nor rejected the findings of the commission, but urged its subscribers to read the Report for themselves and "to ponder each paragraph."[10]

Arena was more insistent than Outlook and the Review in emphasizing the rights of labor as paramount. Had the Arena carried an editorial column, it probably would have endorsed the Report of the Strike Commission as did Eugene Debs.[11]

Advocacy vs. Objective Interpretation

Journalism professor John Schacht has said the major purpose of a journal of opinion is "actively to shape the course of the events it reports and comments on. . . ." Each journal has "a well-defined political, cultural and sociological point of view, a theoretical concept to which the journal hopes to make public practice approach and ultimately conform."[12]

This study supports Schacht's conclusion and suggests that the journals of opinion in 1894 interpreted the Pullman Strike, not as a journalistic "end," but as a means of advocating their own ideological or theoretical concepts. The evidence indicates that each editor intended to promote his values, to change--or preserve--society on the basis of his particular interpretation of events.

Conservative weeklies sought to keep labor subject

and suggested the commentator's responsibilities were manifold. The Jackson editor supported her criticized the fictions of the commentator, but urged his subscribers to read the Journal for themselves and "to ponder each principle."[10]

Jones was more tendentious than Jackson and the Jackson in explaining the rights of labor as partisans. And the Jones carried an editorial column, it probably would have endorsed the theory of the Trades Assembly as did Jackson later.[11]

Journal vs. Chronicle Independence

Journalism professor John Hulsart has said the major purpose of a journal of opinion is "entirely to shape the course of the events it reports and comments on. . . ."[12] That journal has "a well-defined political, religious and scientific point of view, a theoretical scheme by which the journal hopes to make public practice approach and ultimately conform."[13]

This early accounts Hulsart's conclusion and suggests that the journals of opinion in 1854 interpreted the Jackson strike, not as a journalistic "coup," but as a means of advancing their own ideological or theoretical concepts. The evidence indicates that each editor intended to provide his readers, in chronicle-or primary--detail on the basis of his particular interpretation of events.

Commentaries written could to keep labor activist

to the "iron law of wages," to preserve the status quo and to prevent progressive reform.

The editors of Forum and North American presented symposiums through which, supposedly, a diversity of views would be expressed. In their editorial selection of authors, however, these monthlies emphasized the same perspective of the strike as conservative weeklies.

On the other hand, Outlook and the Review appear to have been more open-minded about the strike, viewing the dispute from the perspectives of both labor and management. These journals seem to have advocated a theory of social responsibility in which both parties to a strike were responsible to insure their conflict did not impinge on the rights of society.

At an extreme position, Arena almost exclusively sought to promote the rights of labor and a theory of social and economic justice.

In summary, advocacy, rather than objective interpretation, seems to have been the primary editorial intention of the journals of opinion.

The Social Role of the Journals of Opinion Before and During the Strike

The authors of Mass Media and Violence comment on the role of the press during civil disturbances:

to the "iron law of wages," to preserve the status quo and to prevent progressive reform.

The military of [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] propaganda through which, supposedly, a conception of [illegible] would be engendered. In their editorial activities of [illegible], however, these societies supplemented the usual propaganda of the press as commercial media.

On the other hand, [illegible] and the [illegible] [illegible] have been more open-minded about the struggle, viewing the dispute from the perspectives of both labor and management. These journals seem to have advocated a theory of social responsibility in which both parties to a dispute were responsible to insure that their activities did not violate the rights of society.

In an extreme position, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] sought to preserve the rights of labor and a number of social and economic [illegible].

In summary, whereas, rather than objective inter-pretation, seems to have been the primary motivation [illegible] than of the journals of opinion.

The social role of the journals of labor

Before and during the Civil War

The outlook of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the role of the press during civil disturbances.

> Whether conflict is resolved by violence or cooperation will depend in part upon the actors' perceptions of the world about them. Providing an accurate perception of that world is the media's most important responsibility.[13]

This study has shown that several journals of opinion attempted a retrospective analysis of the immediate and underlying issues after the railway strike had begun. Nevertheless, to a great extent the journals failed to provide readers with an accurate, complete explanation of the historical background of the situation at Pullman and later at Chicago.

When Debs testified before the Strike Commission, he declared:

> I am impressed with the conviction that if the people of America had understood the truth, if the press had given them the truth and the facts, the people of this country would have been overwhelmingly with us [the A.R.U. and Pullman employees] from beginning to end.[14]

To the extent that Debs' charge may have been directed at the journals of opinion, which is not probable, it seems likely that even if they had interpreted the strike with complete accuracy and fairness, the public still would not have supported the A.R.U. The national mood in 1894 seems to have been sufficiently against organized labor to have precluded any such "overwhelming" support for the strikers.

Moreover, the journals cannot be blamed for not having covered the conditions in Pullman prior to the May 11 strike. Only if editors had been clairvoyant would they

> Whether conflict is resolved by violence or cooperation will depend in part upon the academic participants of the world about them. Providing an accurate perception of that world is the author's most important responsibility.[illegible]

This study has shown that several journals of opinion attempted a retrospective analysis of the immediate and underlying causes after the military struggle had begun. Nevertheless, to a great extent the journals failed to provide readers with an accurate, complete explanation of the historical background of the alliance in Vietnam and later at Chicago.

Also, late revelation before the crisis [illegible], be doubted.

> I am impressed with the realization that if the people of America had understood the crisis, if the press had given them the truth and the facts, the people of this country would have been overwhelmingly with us [illegible], and [illegible] [illegible] from beginning to end.[illegible]

To the extent that lack of [illegible] may have been directed at the journals of opinion, which is not probable, it seems likely that even if they had interpreted the world with complete accuracy and fairness, the public still would not have supported the U.S. The national mood in 1964 seems to have been sufficiently against supporting Saigon to have prevented any such "overwhelmingly" support for the [illegible].

However, the journals seemed to almost [illegible] not having covered the mobilization in Vietnam prior to the [illegible] crisis. Only if editors had been disinterested would their

have recognized that a major civil disturbance was in the making. However, if the editors had been monitoring the Chicago press from May 12 to mid-June, prior to the railway boycott, it seems likely that they would have detected sufficient social unrest to merit coverage.

This study suggests that if the journals had alerted their readers to the situation in Pullman and Chicago during the month preceding the boycott, when discontent was mounting, the subsequent violence might have been prevented. Investigative reporting during the early phases of the dispute could have provided readers with an understanding of: (1) the nature and severity of grievances felt by Pullman employees; (2) whether workers had been reasonable in trying to negotiate their complaints; (3) whether Pullman could have met and resolved the grievances.

Even though only a relatively few readers of the total population might have read the articles, presumably the "opinion leaders" might have generated sufficient interest in the general public to create a climate of concern for the workers. An aroused public opinion might have prodded officials into correcting economic and social injustice before the A.R.U. decision to boycott.

Full coverage of events during the period June 26 to July 3 would have resulted in a more accurate public understanding of provocations directed at union members; it would have suggested that the G.M.A. played a crucial

have recognized that a major civil disturbance was in the making. However, if the editors had been monitoring the Chicago press from May 15 to mid-June, prior to the railway boycott, it seems likely that they would have detected sufficient social unrest to merit coverage.

This study suggests that if the journals had alerted their readers to the situation in Pullman and Chicago during the month preceding the boycott, some disasters may have occurred, the subsequent violence might have prevented. Investigative reporting during the early phases of the dispute could have provided readers with an understanding of: (1) the nature and severity of grievances felt by Pullman employees; (2) whether workers had been reasonable in trying to negotiate their complaints; (3) whether Pullman could have met the grievances.

This theory only a relatively few readers of the total population might have read the articles, particularly the "opinion leaders" might have generated sufficient interest in the general public to create a climate of concern for the workers. An informed public opinion might have prodded officials into correcting economic and social injustice before the A.R.U. decided to intervene.

Full coverage of events during the period June 26 to July 3 would have resulted in a more intensive public understanding of protocolonial disputes at water junctions; it would have suggested that the U.S. plays a central

role in precipitating the railway strike and stimulating violence.

By neglecting the historical context, and during the strike, by largely misinterpreting the related issues, the journals appear to have helped structure a public opinion which supported resisting the strike by means of force.[15]

After the Strike

As the strike began to collapse, the journals increasingly turned to a discussion of proposals aimed at improving labor-management relations. Inspection of Appendix III, "Recommendations Made by Journals to End or Prevent Labor Disputes," reveals that a majority of the weeklies, and articles in monthlies, suggested or endorsed proposals, the balance of which were relatively progressive.

Harper's Weekly, Nation and North American continued to emphasize economic values and business prerogatives.

Independent, which had interpreted the strike in much the same manner as Nation and Harper's Weekly, shifted somewhat to a more progressive orientation. After the strike, Independent continued its support for free enterprise, but suggested more humanitarian means of dealing with employees; businessmen could do as they pleased so long as they were fair with their workers.

Similarly, Forum, which had interpreted the strike

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Similarly, Zion's, which had interpreted the strike

mainly by conservative writers, continued its symposium but included authors that advanced more progressive recommendations.

Outlook and the Review continued to emphasize the rights of society. These journals sought to protect the public from the inconvenience of railway strikes; and they favored proposals aimed at a balance of power between labor and management.

Arena's single recommendation emphasized the rights of labor over those of management.

As a group the journals seem to have contributed substantially to the discussion of proposals designed to prevent or minimize the effects of future strikes. Six proposals would perpetuate the prevailing laissez-faire values; but twelve suggestions advocated more humanitarian treatment of employees, a greater balance of power between labor and management, and respect for the rights of society as a whole.[16] A majority of the recommendations were aimed at recognizing and dealing with employee grievances before violence became inevitable.

The Journals of Opinion in the Mid-1890's

In 1894 the journals pointed out that the Pullman Strike was a symptom of serious discontent. They suggested that corporations, as well as laborers, were responsible for that discontent. And they advanced various proposals to minimize future social strife.

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The Journals of Opinion in the 1894-1895's

In 1894 the journals pointed out that the Pullman Strike was a symptom of serious discontent. They argued that corporations, as well as laborers, were responsible for that discontent. And they advanced various proposals to minimize future social strife.

During the mid-nineties, the journals of opinion seem to have contributed to the social education of the American people. One Forum writer summed up the effects of the journals for the decade preceding 1898: "Higher views of industrial relations, of education, of political rights and duties are gaining ground. . . ."[17]

Historian C. C. Regier notes that the magazines of the 1890's displayed tendencies toward muckraking that became so conspicuous in the next decade.[18] Outlook's analysis of Pullman's corporate wealth, and Arena's expose of the G.M.A. seem to resemble closely the style of journalistic attack for which muckrakers later became noted.

According to David Chalmers, the muckrakers after 1900 were greatly concerned with "the public," whose interests had to be protected against both labor unions and capitalistic trusts.[19] This same concern for the public was evident in Outlook and the Review in 1894.

Theodore Peterson asserts that magazines have been "responsible in some measure for the social and political reforms of the first fifty years of this century." He further states that the magazines which carried on where the muckrakers left off were chiefly the journals of opinion.[20]

This study suggests that several of the journals of opinion in the mid-nineties, those which exposed Pullman and the G.M.A. as well as those which advanced progressive labor relations proposals, may have provided the catalyst or foundation from which reform-minded muckrakers emerged.

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This study suggests that several of the journals of opinion in the mid-nineties, there such as Andrews, Nation and the C.R.A. as well as those which advocated progressive labor relations programs, may have prompted the muckrake or foreshadow from which reform-minded muckrakers emerged.

To the extent that public opinion and government action shifted after 1900 away from the axioms of laissez-faire and in the direction of progressive reform, these journals of opinion in the mid-nineties may have played a significant role in paving the way for that change.

Suggestions for Future Research

The interpretative and social functions of the periodical press have not been sufficiently studied, particularly from an historical perspective.

Interpretative Function of the Periodical Press

Robert Harper has suggested there may have been different forms of interpretation prior to World War I.[21] This study has evaluated the interpretative reporting of the journals of opinion in 1894. The journals appear to have explained cause and effect relationships in the manner best suited to promote various editorial social theories. More research is needed to determine the existence of other forms of interpretation.

Several scholars have noted that magazines often provide a fuller interpretative treatment of news than other media.[22] But there is a need for more intensive study of magazine interpretation, particularly during the period 1900 to 1920, an era during which "objective" forms of news analysis seem to have emerged.

To the extent that public opinion and government action shifted after 1900 away from the axioms of *laissez-faire* and in the direction of progressive reform, these journals of opinion in the mid-nineties may have played a significant role in paving the way for that change.

Conclusion for Future Research

The interpretative and social functions of the periodical press have not been sufficiently studied, particularly from an historical perspective.

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Several scholars have noted that newspapers often provide a fuller interpretative treatment of news than other media.[22] But there is a need for more intensive study of reporting interpretation, particularly during the period 1900 to 1920, as are during which "muckraker" forms of news analysis were to have emerged.

The extent to which trained reporters are used in covering an event seems to be an important factor in effective news interpretation. Harper believes that reporters may have provided the same interpretation of events after 1918 which press releases and official investigations had presented before World War I.[23] This study suggests that few reporters were used by the journals in 1894 to cover the Pullman Strike. More research is needed to assess the developing role of the interpretative reporter.

Social Role of the Periodical Press

The journals of opinion in this study evidently relied extensively on the daily press as a source of information for interpretative treatment. The relationship between the daily and the weekly press needs to be more fully assessed. Each medium plays a role in shaping public opinion; but little is known about the interaction of these media. How extensively does the daily press influence the weekly press? Do the interpretations generated by journals of opinion filter into the dailies of mass circulation, and thus to a vast reading audience?

This study also suggests there may have been a close relationship between certain journals of opinion and subsequent muckraking magazines of mass circulation. A comparative historical study assessing similarities and differences in content between these two types of magazines in the early 1900's might clarify this relationship.

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John Schacht has asserted that journals of opinion seem to play an important role in social change.[24] The periodicals in this study suggested a number of progressive reforms. A follow-up study could attempt to assess the apparent social effects of these proposals, determining if and when they were discussed in the daily press, and in Congress; and what specific legislation may have indirectly been a product of these recommendations.

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CHAPTER VI--FOOTNOTES

[1]Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. XI: Mass Media and Violence, Milton S. Eisenhower, chairman (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 148.

[2]William L. Rivers and Wilbur Schramm, Responsibility in Mass Communications (Rev. ed.; New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), p. 187.

[3]Ibid., p. 154.

[4]Robert B. Harper, "Reporting Social Strife in Five Labor Conflicts," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 182.

[5]Pullman's press releases are reprinted from newspapers in W. J. Ashley, The Railroad Strike of 1894 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Church of Social Union, 1894), pp. 25-38; Chicago Herald, 26 June, 1894; New York Sun, 5 July, 1894; New York Tribune, 14 July, 1894.

[6]See Chapter V.

[7]"Report of the United States Strike Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894), 1503.

[8]Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905, Vol. IV (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 216.

[9]"Plaything Labor Commissions," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 58; "The Report of the Chicago Strike," Nation LIX (22 November, 1894), 376; "Report of the United States Strike Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894), 1503; H. P. Robinson, "The Humiliating Report of the Strike Commission," Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 531; Robinson, editor of Railway Age, had written earlier in North American and seriously misinterpreted the "intent" of the strike; "Revolutionary Statesmanship," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (24 November, 1894), 1107.

[10]"Report of the National Commission," Outlook L (24 November, 1894), 840-41; "Report of the Chicago Strikes," Review of Reviews X (December, 1894), 604.

CHAPTER VI—FOOTNOTES

[1]Report to the National Committee on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, ed. H. [illegible], [illegible] Violence, Action I: Discovery, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 1[illegible].

[2]William L. Riker and Peter Ordeshook, [illegible] in Mass Communications (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 1[illegible].

[3]Ibid., p. 134.

[4]Robert E. Barger, "Improving Social Skills in Five Labor Conflicts," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 122.

[5]Williams's prison relations are reviewed from newspapers in M. G. Ashley, The Railroad Strike of 1894 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Church of Social Action, 1894), pp. 25-31; Chicago Herald, 30 June, 1894; New York Times, 5 July, 1894; New York Tribune, 14 July, 1894.

[6]See Chapter V.

[7]Report of the United Labor Party Convention," Independent LXVI (22 November, 1894), 1[illegible].

[8]Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 31[illegible].

[9]"Splitting Labor Combinations," Public LII (24 July, 1894), 4[illegible]; "The Report of the Strike Review," Public LII (22 November, 1894), 3[illegible]; "Report of the United States Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894); H. F. Robinson, "The Dissenting Report of the Strike Commission," Forum 3[illegible] (December, 1894), 3[illegible]; Bellamy editor of National Aid, was written critic in Forum Magazine and vehemently denounced the "Minority" of the Strike Commission, "Preliminary Unpleasantness," National Aid, [illegible] December, 1894), 31[illegible].

[10]Report of the National Committee," Outlook [illegible] (24 November, 1894), 8[illegible]; "Report of the College Review," Review of Reviews X (December, 1894), 604.

[11]Cited in Public Opinion XVII (22 November, 1894), 812.

[12]John H. Schacht, The Journals of Opinion and Reportage: An Assessment (New York: Magazine Publishers Association, 1966), p. 2.

[13]Mass Media and Violence, op. cit., p. 33.

[14]Strike Report, pp. 157-58.

[15]This analysis is based upon principles for press coverage and demonstrations discussed in Mass Media and Violence, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

[16]The six "laissez-faire proposals" refer to Appendix III, recommendations numbered 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 23. The twelve "progressive suggestions" refer to numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, and 22. (Numbers 7, 8, 20, and 21 are considered essentially neutral; number 19 is a duplication of 11.)

[17]Charles Henry Eaton, "A Decade of Magazine Literature," Forum XXVI (October, 1898), 216.

[18]C. C. Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1957), p. 22.

[19]David M. Chalmers, The Social and Political Ideas of the Muckrakers (New York: The Citadel Press, 1964), pp. 111-12.

[20]Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), 393.

[21]Harper, op. cit., p. 181.

[22]See Introduction.

[23]Harper, op. cit., p. 176.

[24]Schacht, op. cit., p. 79.

[11]Cited in *Public Opinion* XVII (22 November, 1946), 47.

[12]John H. Schaar, *The Geometry of Quantum and Theorems: An Inventory* (New York: Negative Feedback Associations, 1960), p. 47.

[13]*Mind Power and Violence*, op. cit., p. 14.

[14]*Public Poetry*, pp. 137-38.

[15]This article is based upon principles the general concerns and descriptions discussed in *Mass Media and Violence*, op. cit., pp. 42-46.

[16]The six "Violence-Video Propensity" rules to Appendix III, recommendations numbers 3, 10, 11, 13, 18, and 21. The twelve "Corporate Responsibility" rules to numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, and 20. (Numbers 7, 8, 19, and 21 are redundant essentially essential number 19 is a duplication of 11.)

[17]Charles Henry Brown, "A Length of Popular Literature," *TRTO* 4311 (October, 1947), 742.

[18]C. G. Bagley, *The Eye of the Beholder* (Gloucester, Mass.: Water Mills, 1957), p. 22.

[19]David S. Chalmers, *The Moral and Political Ideas of the Democracy* (New York: The Liberal Press, 1964), pp. 111-112.

[20]Thelma Parsons, *Broadcast in the Democratic Process* (Dayton, 1111: The University of Illinois Press, 1970), 333.

[21]Harper, op. cit., p. 130.

[22]See introduction.

[23]Harper, op. cit., p. 171.

[24]Brown, op. cit., p. 78.

APPENDIX I

LANDMARK HISTORY OF THE PULLMAN STRIKE AND BOYCOTT (26 June-18 July, 1894)

First Week

Tuesday, June 26

(1) The A.R.U. orders a boycott of Pullman cars.

(2) The G.M.A. decides to fire employees who boycott Pullman cars.

(3) A sympathetic strike begins on the Illinois Central.

Wednesday, June 27

(1) The boycott is extended to all the principal railroads entering Chicago.

(2) Chicago police are ordered to total readiness.

Thursday, June 28

(1) The boycott is extended to the West, about 18,000 workers on strike.

(2) The G.M.A. initiates measures to deal with the strike.

(3) John Egan is appointed "strike manager" of the G.M.A.

APPENDIX I

LAWRENCE REPORT OF THE
FULLERS STRIKE AND MOTORCAR
(26 June-12 July, 1934)

Chronology

Tuesday, June 26

(1) The Lafayette employs a [illegible] of Fullers [illegible].

(2) The Guild, doubtful in view employees who [illegible] work Fullers [illegible].

(3) A sympathetic article appears on the Guild's demands.

Wednesday, June 27

(1) The Governor is summoned to call the [illegible] militia [illegible].

(2) Guilds police are endorsed by local newspapers.

Thursday, June 28

(1) The Governor is summoned to the [illegible], where 15,000 workers are [illegible].

(2) The Guild, initiative [illegible] to deal with the [illegible].

(3) John Ryan is appointed "[illegible] manager" of the Guild.

Friday, June 29

(1) The G.M.A. decides to fight strikers with blacklists; to seek injunctions.

(2) U. S. District Attorney Milchrist cooperates with the G.M.A.

Saturday, June 30

Attorney General Olney appoints Edwin Walker as special federal attorney and authorizes appointment of extra deputies.

Second Week

Sunday, July 1

(1) Walker and Milchrist draft federal injunction at the request of Attorney General Olney and the G.M.A.

(2) An estimated 50,000 men are on strike.

Monday, July 2

(1) U. S. Circuit Court issues a sweeping injunction against strikers.

(2) Debs ignores injunction.

Tuesday, July 3

(1) Federal officials in Chicago request U. S. Army troops to enforce court injunction.

(2) Cleveland orders troops from Fort Sheridan to Chicago.

Friday, June 27

(1) The U.S.A. decision to fight strikers will significantly be made injunctions.

(2) U. S. Starvel issuing Chicago's employees with the U.S.A.

Saturday, June 28

Attorney General Brady appoints John Walker as special federal attorney and authorizes employment of extra deputies.

Second week

Monday, July 1

(1) Indian and Mexican shell fishers injunction as the request of attorney General Olney and the U.S.A.

(2) An estimated 50,000 men are on strike.

Tuesday, July 2

(1) U. S. Circuit Court issues a sweeping injunction against strikers.

(2) Debs ignores injunction.

Thursday, July 4

(1) Federal officials in Chicago request U. S. Army troops to enforce court injunction.

(2) Cleveland orders troops into Pullman in Chicago.

Wednesday, July 4

U. S. troops are in Chicago under the command of Gen. Miles.

Thursday, July 5

(1) Governor Altgeld protests the use of federal troops. Cleveland replies.

(2) Rioting mobs are active along railway lines in Chicago; freight cars are overturned at stockyards, obstructing trains.

(3) Mayor Hopkins issues a proclamation.

(4) Seven World's Fair buildings are destroyed by fire.

Friday, July 6

(1) Altgeld wires second protest; Cleveland replies.

(2) Altgeld orders out state troops in support of the mayor.

(3) Fire destroys 700 cars; 13 Chicago railroads are obstructed.

Saturday, July 7

(1) Militia fire on a mob at Chicago: 4 killed, 20 wounded.

(2) Armed forces begin to clear the tracks.

[illegible], July 4

1. Is troops are in Chicago under the command of Gen. Miles.

Thursday, July 5

(1) Governor Altgeld protests the use of federal troops. (General reviews.

(2) Striking mobs are active along railway lines in Chicago (Twelfth cars are overpowered at Homewood; co-operative review.

(3) Pullman Company's production.

(4) Troops Twelfth's Pair Militiamen are discovered by Miles.

Friday, July 6

(1) Altgeld orders armed protest; Cleveland replies.

(2) Altgeld orders not enough troops in support of the mayor.

(3) Plan Saturday 700 enroll 1) Chicago militiamen are observed.

Saturday, July 7

(1) Militia fire on a mob on Chicago. 7 killing, 20 wounded.

(2) Armed forces begin to clear the streets.

Third Week

Sunday, July 8

(1) President Cleveland issues a proclamation: rioters must disperse.

(2) Chicago trade unions vote to seek arbitration with Pullman.

Monday, July 9

(1) The Pullman Company refuses to arbitrate.

(2) Rioting and disorder begin to subside.

Tuesday, July 10

Debs and several other A.R.U. officials are arrested and charged with conspiracy to obstruct the mails.

Wednesday, July 11

(1) The Senate approves a resolution endorsing Cleveland's action in regard to the strike.

(2) About 25,000 members of Chicago trade unions strike.

Thursday, July 12

(1) Mayor Hopkins presents the Pullman Company with telegrams from 50 other mayors urging arbitration. Vice President Wickes refuses the offer.

(2) The A.F. of L. rejects Debs' request to convey an A.R.U. proposal to the G.M.A.

(3) Trains begin to move freely.

Night Work

Monday, July 6

(1) Trouble: Crawford issued a proclamation; others made disperse.

(2) Chicago trade unions voted to meet equivocation with truthness.

Tuesday, July 7

(1) The Pullman company refuses to arbitrate.

(2) Shooting and disorder begin to develop.

Thursday, July 10

Debs and several other A.R.U. officials are arrested and charged with conspiracy to obstruct the mails.

Wednesday, July 11

(1) The Cheyenne appoints a regulation committee. Cleveland's action in regard to the strike.

(2) About 5,000 members of Debs's union leave Chicago.

Thursday, July 12

(1) Major Hopkins presents the Pullman company with ultimatum that 50 other repair shops resume operations. Also President Olney reviews the strike.

(2) The A.R.U. of L. refuses Debs' request to meeting on A.R.U. proposal to end strike.

(3) Trains begin to move freely.

Friday, July 13

At Debs' request, Mayor Hopkins conveys to the G.M.A. an A.R.U. offer to declare the strike off if the railroads will rehire the strikers. The G.M.A. refuses to consider the proposal.

Saturday, July 14

The A.R.U. begins losing support.

Fourth Week

Monday, July 16

The House of Representatives adopts a resolution supporting the President's actions against the strike.

Tuesday, July 17

Debs and three other A.R.U. officers are arrested and jailed (after declining bail) on charges of contempt in having violated the federal court injunction.

Friday, July 18

The Pullman Company begins rehiring non-union men.

Friday, July 11

At Salem [illegible], Senator Hopkins answers Mr. Cox's [illegible] on [illegible] offer to declare the station off if the railroads will [illegible] the machinery. The [illegible] refuses to consider the proposal.

Saturday, July 12

The [illegible] begins testing machinery.

Sixth Week

Monday, July 14

The house of representatives adopts a resolution supporting the President's military system [illegible].

Tuesday, July 15

Shoe and [illegible] strike [illegible] are introduced and failed (after [illegible] bill) in charges of monopoly in buying relieves the Federal [illegible].

Friday, July 18

The Pullman Company begins replacing non-union [illegible].

APPENDIX II

EXTRACT FROM OUTLOOK'S STRIKE COVERAGE*

"In order to give our readers the fullest statement from both sides of the present issue, we have obtained directly from Mr. Debs, the President of the American Railway Union, and from the General Manager's Association . . . their respective statements of the present strike. Neither statement differs from those already familiar to our readers through the daily press. We give, however, so much of the former statement as may be regarded as a defense of the boycott. After reciting the history of the Pullman strike, substantially as we gave it last week, Mr. Debs adds:

> Convinced that injustice was being done to labor by the Pullman concern, the American Railway Union determined to come to the aid of the strikers by declaring a boycott upon Pullman cars. This we had hardly done when we discovered that all the railroads, those not using Pullman cars equally with those affected by our boycott, had entered into a combination, not merely to defeat our present purpose, but to smash labor organizations among railroad employees. The General Manager's Association makes no concealment of its purpose. Necessarily, therefore, the contest for justice to the Pullman employees has developed into a struggle for existence. We have had to extend the boycott until it now holds twenty-one lines in its grasp. We may have to call out allied workmen in the trades and on the inter-

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*"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46.

APPENDIX II

EXTRACT FROM [illegible]'S OFFICIAL CHRONICLE*

"In order to give our readers the fullest statement from both sides of the present issue, we have obtained directly from Mr. [illegible], the President of the American Railway Union, and from the General Manager's Association . . . their respective statements of the present crisis. Neither statement differs from those already familiar to our readers through the daily press. We give, however, so much of the former statement as may be regarded as a review of the boycott. After reciting the history of the railway strike, substantially as we gave it last week, Mr. [illegible] added:

> Convinced that injuries were being done to labor by the railway corporations, the American Railway Union determined to come to the aid of the employees by declaring a boycott upon Pullman cars. This is the hardly done when we discovered that all the railroads, those not using Pullman cars equally with those affected by our boycott, had entered into a combination, not merely to defeat our purpose, but to crush labor organizations wherever railroad employees. The General Manager's association makes no concealment of its purpose. Accordingly, therefore, the present fix imposed on the railroad employees has developed into a struggle for existence. We have had to assume the boycott rather in our light against the plans in the great. We have to call out affiliated workmen in the trades and on the latter-

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*"The Week," [illegible] - (11 July, 1894), 4.

urban railways. I have absolute confidence that we will win this battle, win it without violence and in spite of the obvious connivance of the United States authorities and courts. I understand how serious a disaster to our cause violence or lawlessness would be, and I am commanding upon all my lieutenants' regard for the law and respect for property rights.

"The General Manager's Association's briefer statement we give in full:

The General Manager's Association is fighting the strike instituted by the American Railway Union, because they fail to see the sense, reason, or justice of an attempt to club the Pullman Company over the heads of railroad companies which have no control over Mr. Pullman's affairs, either private or corporate, or any connection with the Pullman manufacturing interests. The question of Pullmanism is not recognized by the railroad companies. None of the railroad employees who have gone out on strike have any grievance that is known of against their employers. If they have any such grievance, they have not made it known to the railroad managers. The strike is purely a sympathetic strike. The General Manager's Association of Chicago does not propose to allow the American Railway Union to dictate how the railroad business shall be run, neither does the General Manager's Association propose to assist the American Railway Union in settling its difficulties with the Pullman Company. The General Manager's Association is a unit, and no man in it has any thought of compromise. The fight must be fought to a finish."

[illegible] military. I have absolute confidence that we will win this battle, who is without sin[illegible] and in spite of the obvious cowardice of the United States authorities and courts. I understand how serious a disaster to our whole civilization or independence would be, and I am expecting upon all my influence[illegible] regard for the law and respect for property rights.

"The General Manager's Association's military manoeuvre we give in full:

The General Manager's Association is fighting the battle instituted by the American Railway Union, because they fail to see the cause, reason, or justice of an attempt to plunge the Pullman company over the heads of national committees which have no control over the Pullman's affairs, either private or corporate, or any connection with the Pullman manufacturing interests. The question of Pullmanism is not recognized by the railroad companies. None of the railroad companies can have good use on earth have any grievance that is taken up against their employees. If they have any such grievance, they have not made it known to the affiliated managers. The world is proof a sympathetic world. The General Manager's Association of Chicago does not propose to allow the American Railway Union to dictate how the railroad business shall be run, nothing does the General Manager's Association propose to assist the American Railway Union in inflicting injury indirectly upon the Pullman Company. The General Manager's Association is a unit, and no man in it has any sympathy of sympathizers. The right must be fought to a finish."

APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY JOURNALS TO END OR PREVENT LABOR DISPUTES

I. LEGAL PROPOSALS

Recommendation:	Proponent Journals:
Proposals that would balance the power between labor and management:	
1. Accord labor unions the same rights and responsibilities as business corporations.[1]	Independent Forum North American Review
2. Insist upon orderly alteration of the law to insure that statutes are just and not exceptionally favorable to employers.[2]	Independent
3. Require the use of binding contracts between employers and laborers; whichever party violates such a contract would be liable for damages.[3]	Harper's Weekly Independent Nation Forum Review
4. Institute compulsory arbitration of labor disputes with decisions enforced by courts.[4]	Outlook Forum Review

(Comment: Harper's Weekly, Independent, Nation, and two writers in Forum strongly opposed this recommendation.[5] Conservative journals and authors also opposed other suggestions of progressive reform. Nation opposed

APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY ACADEMICS TO THE CAB OF PROPOSED LABOR LEGISLATION

I. LEGAL RECOGNITION

Recommendations	Proposed Legislation
Proposals that would influence the power relations between and organizations:	
1. Accord labor unions the same rights and responsibilities as business enterprises.[1]	Recognition Right to Strike Unfair Practices Unity
2. Insist upon orderly alternation of the law so issues that arrange are just and not unnecessarily favorable to employers.[2]	Industrial
3. Require the use of binding mediation between employer and bargaining unit whenever party violations such a contract would be liable for damages.[3]	Bargaining Unity Arbitration Unity Unity Legal
4. Institute compulsory arbitration of labor disputes with decisions enforced by courts.[4]	Legislat Unity Unity Legal

(Sources: Bernard Ashby, Independent, Politics and the workers in Ghana strongly opposed this recommendation.[5] Conservative journals and unions also opposed other suggestions of progressive nature. Politics supported

the "socialistic idea" of a minimum wage for employees. Moreover, Hampton, in North American was against any legislation that would attempt to remedy the condition of workers whose labor did not yield proper renumeration.[6])

Proposals that would protect society from the inconvenience of railway strikes:

5.	Amend the law to require railroad employees to give adequate notice before quitting work.[7]	Outlook
6.	Make it illegal for trainmen to quit work in a body for the purpose of stopping railroad traffic.[8]	Outlook

Miscellaneous legal proposals:

7.	Amend the law to eliminate the need for court injunctions in dealing with strikes.[9]	Nation Outlook
8.	Amend the law to stop the importation of immigrant laborers.[10]	North American
9.	Authorize an increase in the strength of the U. S. Army.[11]	Independent

the "socialistic idea" of a minimum wage for employment. However, Tawney, in _Equal Opportunity_ was doubtful any legislation that would attempt to remedy the condition of workers whose labor did not yield decent remuneration.[6]

Proposals that would provide better
security from the consequences of failure
and/or:

5. Amend the law to require individual employers to pay adequate wages before quitting work.[7]	_Unknown_
6. Make it illegal for workmen to quit work in a body for the purpose of adopting political tactics.[8]	_Unknown_

Miscellaneous labor proposals:

7. Amend the law to discourage the use of the "open injunction" in dealing with workers.[9]	_Unknown_
8. Amend the law to give the injunction of Employers' Interests.[10]	_Social Justice_
9. Authorize an Industrial Court to adjudicate of the U. S. Steel.[11]	_Independent_

II. RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENT

Proposals emphasizing economic values and business prerogatives:

10.	Government should ensure the supremacy of law and protect property at all hazards.[12]	Harper's Weekly Independent Nation North American
11.	When employees are dissatisfied with their working conditions or wages they should quit work. When they join in unlawful combinations and threaten the rights of others, they should be treated as criminals.[13]	North American

Proposals emphasizing humanitarian values and the rights of the public and labor:

12.	Government should intervene not only to protect railroads against unjustified strikes, but to protect trainmen against unjust treatment by railroad corporations.[14]	Outlook
13.	Government should intervene to prevent the disturbance of society. The individual who precipitates such inconvenience to the public should be held responsible to the government.[15] (This could also be considered as a legal proposal that would protect society from the inconvenience of a railway strike.)	Forum

11. Proposals to government

Proposals regulating economic gains and business activities:

10. Government should ensure the supremacy of law and protect property as all honours.[12]	Darwin's family [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
11. Then employees are dissatisfied with their working conditions or wages they should quit work. Then they join in unlawful associations and violence the rights of others, they should be treated as criminals.[13]	Karl Marx

Proposals regulating transportation rates and the rights of the traffic and others:

12. Government should intervene not only to protect railroads against unjustified attacks, but to protect citizens against unjust treatment by railroad corporations.[14]	Darlene
13. Government should intervene to prevent the discussions of society. The individual who practicists such inconvenience to the public should be held responsible to the government.[15] (This could also be considered as a legal proposal that would protect society from the inconvenience of a railway strike.)	Jason

14. Government should compel railroads, as public servants, to run their trains regularly and to serve the people, regardless of what wages the companies are obliged to pay in order to retain trainmen and perform their public duty.[16] — Arena

III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO MANAGEMENT

Proposals emphasizing economic values and business prerogatives:

15. Employers should treat workers as businessmen fully capable of managing their own affairs.[17] — Nation

16. Railroads should never hire a man who will not bind himself absolutely to abstain from participation in any "sympathetic" strike.[18] — Harper's Weekly

Proposals emphasizing humanitarian values

17. Employers should observe a conciliatory attitude toward their employees and keep in touch with their workers, not simply deal with them through foremen.[19] — Independent

18. Corporations should enable employees to become stockholders, sharing in the prosperity and adversity of the company, having a voice in its management.[20] — Forum

14. Governments should accept responsibility, as public servants, to act vigilantly against corruption and to serve the people, especially of whom many are expected and obliged to pay in order to receive treatment and perform their public duty.[16]

III. Recommendations on Health

Proposals concerning economic values and business activities:

15. Employers should treat workers as partners fully capable of managing their own affairs.[17]

16. Patients should never live a life which can kill one like himself. Everyone should be treated free and distributed in our "republicanist" system.[18]

Proposals concerning investigation values

17. Employers should observe a non-discriminatory attitude toward their employees and help in their vocations, their interests, and their rights when through trouble.[19]

18. Inspectorates should exercise no-planned to secure monitoring during in the production and generally of the company, having a voice in its management.[20]

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO LABOR

19. When employees are dissatisfied with their working conditions or wages they should quit work.[21] (This is also listed as #11.)	North American

Suggestions to improve workers and unions:

20. The workingman should patiently build his individual character. He should be industrious, grow more skillful in his trade, acquire self-control, and make the best of such economic foothold as he may possess.[22]	Review
21. Labor unions should not encompass men of all trades. Each trade should have its own union. Each union should be locally self-governing and promote industry, not strike warfare.[23]	Outlook

V. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

22. Councils of conciliation should be established for voluntary settlement of grievances.[24]	Independent

19. [illegible]

19. [illegible] employers are discriminating with their hiring conditions or [illegible] they should quit work.[illegible] (This is also linked on [illegible])

[illegible]

Suggestions to improve workers and nations:

20. The workingmen should politically build his individual conscience. He should be independent, gives more efficient in his break, develop self-control, and make the best of such economic foundation as in day [illegible]. [illegible]

21. Labor unions should not encompass [illegible] of all crafts. Each trade should have its own union. Each union should be [illegible] self-governing and provide [illegible] and strike [illegible].[illegible]

5. [illegible]

22. Consult of [illegible] should be [illegible] established for [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible].[illegible]

<u>A suggestion emphasizing laissez-faire values:</u>

23. Society, in educating its young, should emphasize the importance of private property, contract, the manager's function, the law of natural selection, free enterprise, self-reliance, honesty and altruism.[25]	<u>Forum</u>

A [illegible] Production [illegible] Nations:

73. Therefore, in [illegible] the [illegible], [illegible] should emphasize the importance of advanced [illegible], [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible], the law of [illegible] relations from [illegible] [illegible], self-reliance, [illegible] and [illegible].[3]

APPENDIX III--FOOTNOTES

[1]"A Strike or Rebellion?" Independent XLVI (12 July, 1894), 896; Carroll D. Wright, "Steps Toward Government Control of Railroads," Forum XVIII (February, 1895), 709; Samuel Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American CLIX (August, 1894), 205; Stockton Bates, "How to Prevent Strikes and Lockouts," North American Review CLX (March, 1895), 373; "The Rationale for the Boycott," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 190; "Ethical Significance of Labor Troubles," Review of Reviews XI (February, 1895), 214.

[2]W. J. Linton, "The Chicago Strike," Independent XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946.

[3]"Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699; Joseph Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1013-14; "The Settlement of Labor Troubles," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 24; Thomas M. Cooley, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum, XVIII (September, 1894), 18-19; "The Rationale for the Boycott," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 190.

[4]"The Strike: Suggestions of Remedy," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 90; "Arbitration," Outlook LI (13 April, 1895), 590; Carroll D. Wright, "Steps Toward Government Control of Railroads," Forum XVIII (February, 1895), 713; "Compulsory Arbitration," Review of Reviews X (December, 1894), 666-67; C. C. Kingston, "Industrial Agreements and Conciliation," Review of Reviews X (December, 1894), 647-50.

[5]"Legislators and Organized Labor," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (11 August, 1894), 722; "Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 924; "The Settlement of Labor Troubles," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 24; "The Limits of Arbitration," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 42-43; "Reasonable Wages," Nation LX (7 February, 1895), 102; D. M. Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 640; Thomas M. Cooley, "The Lessons of the Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 18.

APPENDIX III—FOOTNOTES

[illegible] "Profile of Tobellian." Independent, XLVI (12 July, 1894), 890; Carroll D. Wright, "Great Labor Government Control of Railroads," Forum, XVIII (February, 1895), 709; Samuel Gompers, "The Labor of the Open Shop," North American Review, CLIX (August, 1894), 255; Grosvenor Dawes, "How to Settle Strikes and Lockouts," North American Review, CLIX (Sept., 1894), 372; "The Railroads for the Protection, (March, 1895), 371; "The Railroads for the Protection, Service of Employes," (August, 1894), 3; "Strike of Railway Employees," Outlook, LIII (Sept., 1895), 314.

[illegible] "The Chicago Strike," Independent, XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946.

[illegible] "Can the Powers do Such Impossible?" Harper's Weekly, XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699; Joseph Cook, "Some Consequences of the Pullman Strike," Independent, XLVI (2 August, 1894), 1023-24; "The Socialists of Labor Tribunal," Nation, LIX (12 July, 1894), 27; Thomas A. Dodge, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum, XVIII (September, 1894), 18-19; "The Railroads for the Protest," Review of Reviews, X (August, 1894), 129.

[illegible] "The Strike: Implications of Power," Nation, LIX (21 July, 1894), 37; "Arbitration," Nation, LI (11 April, 1895), 256; Carroll D. Wright, "Great Labor Government Control of Railroads," Forum XVIII (February, 1895), 712; "Compulsory Arbitration," Review of Reviews, X (December, 1894), 666-67; C. C. Clayton, "Industrial Grievances and Conciliation," Review of Reviews, X (December, 1894), 647-50.

[illegible] "Legislators and Organized Labor," Harper's Weekly, XXXVIII (11 August, 1894), 723; "Political Action," Independent, XLVI (19 July, 1894), 924; "The Settlement of Labor Troubles," Nation, LIX (12 July, 1894), 31; "The Limits of Arbitration," Nation, LIX (19 July, 1894), 42-43; "Reasonable Views," Nation, LI (7 February, 1895), 100; H. H. Dawes, "Arbitration Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 640; Thomas A. Dodge, "The Lessons of the Present Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 18.

[6]"The Minimum Wage," Nation LIX (4 October, 1894), 245; Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 194.

[7]"Debs' Conviction," Outlook L (22 December, 1894), 1078.

[8]"The Strike: Suggestions of Remedy," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 90.

[9]"Government by Injunction," Nation LX (4 April, 1895), 253; "The Strikers in Court," Outlook L (28 July, 1894), 126.

[10]Nelson A. Miles, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 185; Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 190.

[11]Joseph Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1014.

[12]"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674; "The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; "The Settlement of Labor Troubles," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 24; Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 189, 192.

[13]Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 189.

[14]"The Strike: Suggestions of Remedy," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 89-90.

[15]Carroll D. Wright, "May a Man Conduct Business as He Pleases?" Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 427-28.

[16]J. C. Buell, "A Partial Solution of the Railway Problem," Arena XII (May, 1895), 322.

[17]"The Report of the Chicago Strike," Nation LIX (22 November, 1894), 376.

[18]"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674.

[19]"The Conversion of Debs," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1023.

[6]"The Salem case," Review LIV (4 October, 1954), 24; Jack Gordon, "The lesson of the Jasper Spring," North American Review CLII (August, 1954), 134.

[7]"Lady' convicted," Outlook I (22 December, 1954), 1074.

[8]"The Burlsi: Suppressions of Lunacy," Outlook I (22 July, 1954), 30.

[9]"Investment of Intuition," Review II (4 April, 1955), 23; "The Jerkers in Court," Outlook I (22 July, 1954), 126.

[10]Helena A. Hill, "The lesson of the Jasper Spring," North American Review CLII (August, 1954), 12; Tom Simpson, "The lesson of the Lunacy Spring," North American Review CLII (August, 1954), 120.

[11]Joseph Cox, "Causes and Consequences of the Lake Spring," Independent XIV: (2 August, 1954), 1024.

[12]"Some lessons of the Great Spring," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1954), 677; "The Outlook," Independent XIV: (19 July, 1954), 1001; "The Spring of Labor Troubles," Review LII (12 July, 1954), 34; Jack Gordon, "The lesson of the Jasper Spring," North American Review CLII (August, 1954), 129, 132.

[13]Jack Gordon, "The lesson of the Jasper Spring," North American Review CLII (August, 1954), 137.

[14]"The Spring: Suggestions of Lunacy," Outlook I (22 July, 1954), 24-30.

[15]Carroll D. Wright, "Has a Dry Season Influence in Flooded?" Review XXVIII (December, 1954), 127-32.

[16]J. C. Jewil, "A Partial Solution of the Spring Problem," Review III (May, 1955), 10.

[17]"The Dangers of the Flower Spring," Review III (22 November, 1954), 176.

[18]"Some Lessons of the Great Spring," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1954), 674.

[19]"The Conversion of Jane," Independent XVI (4 August, 1954), 1023.

[20]Louis R. Ehrich, "Stock Sharing as a Preventive of Labor Troubles," Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 437.

[21]Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 189.

[22]"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 138.

[23]"The Solidarity of Labor," Outlook L (28 July, 1894), 130.

[24]"Boards of Conciliation," Independent XLVI (16 August, 1894), 1055.

[25]Henry Holt, "The Social Discontent - II - Some Remedies," Forum XIX (March, 1895), 68; Henry Holt, "The Social Discontent - III - More Remedies," Forum XIX (April, 1895), 173-81, passim.

[illegible]

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